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ATTACK GRAPH APPROACH TO DYNAMIC NETWORK VULNERABILITY 
ANALYSIS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
 
By 
Thaier K. A. Hamid 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is widely accepted that modern computer networks (often presented as a 
heterogeneous collection of functioning organisations, applications, software, and 
hardware) contain vulnerabilities. This research proposes a new methodology to 
compute a dynamic severity cost for each state. Here a state refers to the behaviour 
of a system during an attack; an example of a state is where an attacker could 
influence the information on an application to alter the credentials. This is performed 
by utilising a modified variant of the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), 
referred to as a Dynamic Vulnerability Scoring System (DVSS). This calculates 
scores of intrinsic, time-based, and ecological metrics by combining related sub-
scores and modelling the problem’s parameters into a mathematical framework to 
develop a unique severity cost. 
The individual static nature of CVSS affects the scoring value, so the author has 
adapted a novel model to produce a DVSS metric that is more precise and efficient. 
 In this approach, different parameters are used to compute the final scores 
determined from a number of parameters including network architecture, device 
setting, and the impact of vulnerability interactions. 
An attack graph (AG) is a security model representing the chains of vulnerability 
exploits in a network. A number of researchers have acknowledged the attack graph 
visual complexity and a lack of in-depth understanding.  Current attack graph tools 
are constrained to only limited attributes or even rely on hand-generated input. The 
automatic formation of vulnerability information has been troublesome and 
vulnerability descriptions are frequently created by hand, or based on limited data. 
The network architectures and configurations along with the interactions between the 
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individual vulnerabilities are considered in the method of computing the Cost using 
the DVSS and a dynamic cost-centric framework. 
A new methodology was built up to present an attack graph with a dynamic cost 
metric based on DVSS and also a novel methodology to estimate and represent the 
cost-centric approach  for each  host’ states was followed out.  
A framework is carried out on a test network, using the Nessus scanner to detect 
known vulnerabilities, implement these results and to build and represent the 
dynamic cost centric attack graph using ranking algorithms (in a standardised fashion 
to Mehta et al. 2006 and Kijsanayothin, 2010). However, instead of using 
vulnerabilities for each host, a CostRank Markov Model has developed utilising a 
novel cost-centric approach, thereby reducing the complexity in the attack graph and 
reducing the problem of visibility.   
An analogous parallel algorithm is developed to implement CostRank. The reason for 
developing a parallel CostRank Algorithm is to expedite the states ranking 
calculations for the increasing number of hosts and/or vulnerabilities. In the same 
way, the author intends to secure large scale networks that require fast and reliable 
computing to calculate the ranking of enormous graphs with thousands of vertices 
(states) and millions of arcs (representing an action to move from one state to 
another).  In this proposed approach, the focus on a parallel CostRank computational 
architecture to appraise the enhancement in CostRank calculations and scalability of 
of the algorithm. In particular, a partitioning of input data, graph files and ranking 
vectors with a load balancing technique can enhance the performance and scalability 
of CostRank computations in parallel. 
 A practical model of analogous CostRank parallel calculation is undertaken, resulting 
in a substantial decrease in calculations communication levels and in iteration time. 
The results are presented in an analytical approach in terms of scalability, efficiency, 
memory usage, speed up and input/output rates.   
Finally, a countermeasures model is developed to protect against network attacks by 
using a Dynamic Countermeasures Attack Tree (DCAT). The following scheme is 
used to build DCAT tree (i) using scalable parallel CostRank Algorithm  to determine 
the critical asset, that system administrators need to protect; (ii) Track the Nessus 
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scanner to determine the vulnerabilities associated with the asset using the dynamic 
cost centric framework and DVSS; (iii)  Check out all published mitigations for all 
vulnerabilities. (iv) Assess how well the security solution mitigates those risks; (v) 
Assess DCAT algorithm in terms of effective security cost, probability and 
cost/benefit analysis to reduce the total impact of a specific vulnerability.   
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
It is widely accepted that modern computer networks (often presented as a 
heterogeneous collection of functioning organisations, applications, software, and 
hardware) contain vulnerabilities. This research proposes a new methodology to 
compute a dynamic severity cost for each state. Here a state refers to the 
behaviour of a system during an attack; an example of a state is where an attacker 
could influence the information on an application to alter the credentials.  Through 
utilising a modified version of the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), 
referred to as a Dynamic Vulnerability Scoring System (DVSS). This calculates 
scores of intrinsic, time-based, and ecological metrics by combining related sub-
scores and modelling the problem’s parameters into a mathematical framework to 
produce a unique severity cost. 
The individual static nature of CVSS affects the scoring value, so a novel model 
has adapted to produce a DVSS metric that is more accurate and effective. 
 In this approach, different parameters are used to compute the final scores 
determined from a number of parameters including network architecture, device 
setting, and the impact of vulnerability interactions. 
The main aim of this research is: 
To secure Network systems from intended attackers, by providing security 
professionals and system administrators with techniques and tools to identify 
vulnerabilities and their impact, in order to support security decisions and to 
create and maintains security policies and procedures. 
The objectives of the research are: 
1.To develop a unique severity cost of all vulnerabilities existing in a network 
host, using dynamic risk impact metric methods, which can improve the risk 
scoring method within the field of security engineering in the future.   
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2.  To develop a cost-centric approach based on an attack graph model for 
dynamic cost metric calculations that can introduce practical, useful techniques 
for detecting and analysing vulnerabilities to secure network systems. 
3. To develop a dynamic CostRank methodology to mathematically addresses the 
optimum solution of ranking attack graphs towards minimising the dimension 
and complication of attack graphs to assist security professionals and system 
administrators to examine security decisions and to create and maintain 
security policies and procedures. 
4. To develop an analogous parallel algorithm to make CostRank calculations for 
an increasing number of hosts in the network in an efficient and scalable 
manner. 
5. To simulate Countermeasure Attack Tree algorithms to calculate the flow of the 
costs and mitigations across the tree using a dynamic impact approach to find 
the most effective solution to implement the countermeasures. 
6. To conduct extensive testing and experimentation to allocate a solution set. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Despite continuous efforts to secure cyber liberty from intentional attackers’ 
missions, control operations certainly experience security incidents, which result in 
damage to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability (CIA) and ultimately cause 
the degradation of a system, or even make it unusable. 
As an example [Anderson, Ross, et al., 2012] state, the estimated annual cost of 
cyberspace and network attack is $27bn. To put this into context,  it is estimated 
that more than $1,2bn can be attributed to fraudulent activity within the DWP 
(Department of Work and Pensions), and more than $3bn lost in income tax fraud 
while they were in the process of moving all the claims online in 2013, which could 
make the figures much higher.  
The proposed attack graphs are presented as practical tools for detecting and 
analysing vulnerabilities to secure network systems. Even after forming the attack 
graphs professionally, often the dimension and complexity of attack graphs deter 
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humans from completely understanding the information presented. A cleansing of 
a huge volume of information is vital to assist network administrators in efficiently 
detecting and analysing the vulnerabilities and in resources earmarked to 
implement proper mitigation strategies. This thesis presents a novel CostRank 
algorithm that is an improvement of the PageRank algorithm used by Google to 
rank web graphs in terms of web pages. The calculations of PageRank and 
CostRank are based on the stochastic Markov model [Kijsanayothin, 2010], as the 
computation also depends on finding a fixed probability distribution for a Markov 
chain in which the states are represented as vertices or nodes.  
The CostRank algorithm to be considered a state is important if other important 
states are linked to it. However, not all states are equal in importance (dynamic 
cost); the link from different states holds a different cost value. The CostRank 
algorithm uses the dependency attack graphs and integrates the vulnerability data 
to measure a severity cost for each state using the Dynamic Vulnerability Scoring 
System (DVSS) developed based on CVSS using Intrinsic, Time-based and 
Ecological metrics.  Related sub-scores are combined to produce a unique 
severity cost by modelling the problem’s parameters in a mathematical framework 
to calculate the severity cost for each vertex in the graph in terms of privilege, and 
cost metrics, which indicate their severity during a multi-step attack against the 
network. The framework is implemented on different sized networks, using the 
Nessus scanner to discover known vulnerabilities, and to implement the results to 
build and represent the cost centric attack graph.  Instead of using vulnerabilities 
for each host, a CostRank Markov Model has developed that reduces the 
complexity in the attack graph using cost-centric, OLC approaches. The 
consequence of implementing the parallel CostRank algorithm for a number of 
different network scenarios demonstrates that the numerical ranking calculations 
are reliable and consistent with the native severity that the privileges and 
vulnerabilities have during an attack. The vertex ranking is used to provide 
resources and prioritises countermeasures using a Dynamic Countermeasure 
Attack Tree (DCAT), to help better comprehending of the security problems and 
provide a solution to the visual complexity of attack graphs.  
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1.3  HYPOTHESES 
1- Dynamic risk impact metric methods can improve the risk scoring method, in 
order to reduce the visual complexity of an attack graph. 
2-  A Dynamic CostRank methodology can provide the effective solution of 
ranking attack graphs using a cost-centric approach towards minimising the 
dimension and complexity of attack graphs. 
3-  The parallel CostRank algorithm will make the rank calculations for an 
increasing number of hosts in the networks in an efficient and scalable 
manner. 
4-  Countermeasures Attack Tree algorithms can represent the effective solution 
to implement effective countermeasures and mitigations. 
 
1.4  BACKGROUND AND RELATED STUDIES 
Network systems are certainly at risk as they offer services from different 
machines. They depend on application software providers, which are subject to 
fault, making them susceptible to malicious attacks. The Internet, which has 
brought many benefits to organisations and individuals, has also increased the 
risks of having hosts compromised without the need for physical access.  
Network and application vulnerabilities refer to potential problems in configurations 
such as ports, IPs, services or the software construction (programming), 
installation or configuration errors to offer services such as Transparent Network 
Substrate (TNS) Listener on Oracle software for database servers, buffer overflow 
on Windows XP SP2, Vista and 7, to name but a few important examples. This is 
reflected in the number of published vulnerabilities reported by Secunia [Secunia 
Report, 2013] and the number of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) 
disclosed per year since 2005 with a breakdown of the solution status 
(“unpatched,” “patched,” “total number of vulnerabilities”).  As shown in Figure 1-1, 
on average, there were 5,850 CVEs per year from 2005 to 2013.  An extrapolation 
of the data of 2010 showed the numbers of CVEs radically increased, as the 
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exploits of  vulnerabilities in common applications such as Java and Microsoft 
applications are discovered using security applications (such as IDS, Microsoft 
security products). It should be noted that older vulnerabilities are more likely to 
have a patch available than recently found vulnerabilities. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Number of published vulnerabilities from 2005-2013, data from [Secunia Report, 2013] 
 
You can see that from 2005 to 2013, a sharp rise in the number of vulnerabilities. 
In 2006-2007 and from 2010-2011, there was an insignificant decrease of 1.8%. 
This was due in part to the release of new operating systems at that time. 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
V
u
ln
e
ra
b
lit
ie
s 
 
Years 
Upatched
Patched
Total
 6 
 
Nevertheless, in 2008 alone, a total of 8,000 vulnerabilities were published, as 
shown in Figure 1-1. Consequently, this volume of vulnerabilities requires 
management from organisations to determine which of the daily reported 
vulnerabilities apply to their situation according to the software they have installed, 
their version, and configuration. 
 
At first glance, this appears to be a manageable problem in network 
administration, because contracted companies can provide the filtering of 
vulnerabilities, which apply to a specific organisation on a daily basis as a service. 
Table-1-1 shows the figure of vulnerabilities, including a breakdown by Microsoft 
operating systems and third party programs [Mellado et al., 2006]; as you can 
notice from vulnerabilities breakdown, the third party programs followed by 
Microsoft programs installed by the users have the highest number of 
vulnerabilities. However, a number of factors may turn this into a rather 
challenging management problem. Firstly, there is a time interval between 
vulnerability discovery and patch releases [Power et al., 2010]. Network 
administrators are usually very slow in applying fixes [Prasad, Major Santosh, 
2008]. 
 
Vulnerabilities – Breakdown 
 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Windows XP 39 55 72 47 100 48 
Windows Vista  25 49 58 39 91 49 
Win 7 - 5 15 34 40 51 
Microsoft programs 79 89 85 62 73 77 
3rd party programs  120 207 286 275 1024 792 
 
 
Table 1-1. The number of vulnerabilities by breakdown of Microsoft operating systems, and 3rd party 
programs [Mellado et al., 2006] 
 
Secondly, even in well-managed networks with rigid security policies, access 
points to attackers may be totally unidentified by network administrators.  
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Finally, the vulnerabilities are not exploited in isolation; once an attacker has found 
a way into a network, they will try to maximize their return on investment. Figure 1-
2 shows the relationship between attackers and defenders. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-2. The relationship between attackers and defenders 
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Beneath, an indication is offered about how the problem of finding potential multi-
step network attacks has been approached in literature. There are three main 
streams of work, directly related to this topic: Penetration Testing, Attack Trees, 
and Attack Graphs.  
 
1.4.1 Penetration Testing 
Penetration testing, also known as PEN is an important phase to secure any 
computer network, system or product; several organisations consider using 
vulnerability scanners, intrusion detection systems (IDS) and/or other security 
tools as penetration testing methods. The real PEN should be considered in the 
stages of design and implementation of a system not only in the operational stage. 
Mostly, PEN proves the falsity of the hypothesis that a specific network, system or 
software application is secure.  
PEN is a method to check the security strength [He et al., 2006] of a target under 
evaluation, either for verifying compliance of regulations or for quality assurance 
purposes. Authorised professionals perform this, reproducing a threat agent, 
employing the same set of tools and strategies, to break security controls in place. 
The targets of evaluation can be an organisation’s network or application software, 
or partitions on it, and in this case, the goal usually is to assess the network, 
applications against the risk of gaining access to sensitive information. 
The attack graph represents the chains of vulnerability exploits (obtained from 
vulnerability scanners). That provide the security professionals and system 
administrators information regarding possible attack paths that the attackers can 
use to exploit different vulnerabilities existing in the network hosts to assist them in 
making security decisions (including implementing security patches and 
mitigations for different vulnerabilities) and to create and maintain security policies 
and procedures to preventing the networks from possible potential attacks. 
Considering different types of attack graphs and vulnerability scanners to discover 
the weakness in the network system, a dynamic approach to construct DCCAG 
can be considered as a tool to perform PEN tests. 
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PEN tests can be conducted in several manners: they could be executed on a 
white or black box manner.  A black box type of test is more appropriate to 
simulate attacks from outsiders of an organisation.  A white box test is while the 
organisation’s staffs have full knowledge about the testing.  A PEN test has 4 
stages and is usually supported by the Flaw Hypothesis Methodology (FHM) ‎ 
[Prasad, Major Santosh, 2008], as shown in Figure 1-3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-3. Penetration test cycle adapted from [Prasad, Major Santosh, 2008] 
 
[Linde, 1975] stated that PEN used either flaw hypothesis or attack tree, the 
elementary flaw hypothesis approach as follows: 
1. Outline the goals of penetration. 
2. Implement system background review. 
3. Create hypothetical weaknesses. 
4. Approve hypothesis. 
5. Specify revealed weaknesses. 
6. Eradicate revealed weaknesses. 
The attack tree approach, similar to that of a fault tree, is proposed to perform 
PEN where there is not enough information relating to the system background, in 
this case the hypotheses will be arranged in a tree structure with OR and AND to 
approve the hypothesis. 
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1.4.2 Attack Trees 
An Attack Tree (AT) is a multiple level diagram containing one root, multiple 
leaves, and multiple children. The AT has been used in many of the real world 
security implementations, such as digital content security protocols and Mobile 
devices, WAP assisted protocols [Kizza, Joseph Migga, 2013].  
There are different types of AT based on the metrics used. For example, 
vulnerabilities trees, which use vulnerability metrics, defence trees and threat 
trees. 
The root in an AT represents the terminal destination of an attacker, the source 
node is then refined into sub-goals and the sub-goals are further refined until the 
leaf node is reached which represents the specific attacker's actions.  
In the attack tree, there are two kinds of refining:  
1-Conjunction (AND): refined sub-goals are satisfied if all children are true. 
2-Disjunction (OR): refined sub-goals are satisfied if any of the children is true.   
 
Figure ‎1-4. Attack tree structure. 
 
Figure 1-4 shows the structure of a classical AT, which demonstrates the 
following: 
1. The root of the tree at first level represents the valued assets to be protected.  
2. The intermediate level represents states as security properties that enable the 
attacker to reach the goal or the next level of the attack. 
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3. The leaf of the tree, at the third level, represents a different attacker exploit. 
Each leaf node represents a multi-step attack to move to the next level of 
attack. ATs use AND & OR refinements, AND as in the general AT ‎[Edge, 
Kenneth S., 2007] means, the attacker should compromise all leaf node 
vulnerabilities, to reach the goal or to progress to the next level of attack. 
While OR refinement means at least one vulnerability should be compromised 
to reach the goal or to progress to the next level of attack.  
Attack Trees are in fact a variation of Fault Trees (FT) applied to the domain of 
Information Security, see Bruce Schneier [Schneier, 1999]. The root of an FT 
represents a failure, i.e. an undesired event.  The leaves represent causes, which 
contribute to the parent fails, i.e. basic observable failures. The construction of 
both types of trees (AT and FT) requires deductive reasoning, which means 
thinking retrospectively and looking for means or causes of a phenomenon to be 
avoided. The AT are used in different approaches in order to find a unique severity 
cost of all vulnerabilities existing in a network host, using dynamic risk impact 
metrics and in the method of finding the optimum solution to implement the 
countermeasures and mitigations using CAT. 
There are many drawbacks to AT as you will see in the next chapter and therefore 
the research moves toward the use of Attack Graphs (AG) which are discussed in 
the next section.  
 
1.4.3 Attack Graphs 
A security model representing the chains of vulnerability exploits in a network can 
be in various forms. The attack graph could be organised [Ou et al., 2005] as a 
state oriented attack graph,  exploit oriented attack graph or a state exploits 
oriented attack graph.  In a state oriented attack graph, the vertices represent a 
group of the network states and the attacks/exploits represent the edges to show 
the transitions from one state to a different state in the network.  
Early approaches relied on state enumeration (i.e. state of the attacker and the 
network) to generate Attack Graphs. Model checker graphs are an example of 
such an approach [Sheyner, Oleg, and Jeannette Wing, 2004], from Carnegie 
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Mellon University, use a symbolic model checker (NuSMV) to build Attack Graphs. 
The approach requires the input of a group of machines of a specific network in a 
fixed condition, representation chosen for use in this model checker [Sheyner, 
Oleg, et al, 2002].  The model checker builds the model using information related 
to connectivity between hosts and a library of attack actions specifying details 
about vulnerabilities in terms of intruder/network preconditions. Model checker 
approaches in general tend to suffer from the drawback of the state explosion 
problem [J. Cullum et al., 2007]. This means the complexity of the graph 
generated, grows exponentially O (2n), in terms of the size of the state space n, in 
this case n represents the number of hosts and vulnerabilities. Therefore, state 
enumeration-based attack graphs [Borodin, Allan, et al, 2005] [Ding, Chris, et al., 
2002] [Mehta, Vaibhav, et al., 2006], also called full graphs, do not scale to real 
networks. An important aspect of these graphs is the presence of state repetition 
since states are enumerated in every possible order. In practice, it means that the 
attacker would visit the same state more than once to reacquire capabilities. 
Dacier et al. [Steven, Noel, and Sushil Jajodia, 2005] put forward the concept of 
privilege graph, as the vertices could represent the privileges of an attack 
originator or might represent a probable target, i.e. nodes (vertices) signify a set of 
privileges possessed by users or a group of users. Arcs are the vulnerabilities 
representation, which might permit the gaining of the privileges of a probable 
target of an attack originator, the privilege graph is then used to construct the state 
graph (please refer to chapter 3 in this thesis for further details of different types of 
graphs), if the transition occurs. The author converts a privilege graph to a 
Stochastic Petri Net obtaining a state graph to eliminate initial duplication of states. 
However, to estimate the probabilistic Mean Effort To Failure, METF, in other 
words mean effort for an attacker to exploit a target node, they have to enumerate 
all possible paths to this target. Experiments with a system containing 13 
vulnerabilities, reported in [Ou, Xinming et al., 2006], failed to successfully 
compute “due to the complexity of the algorithm”, showing that the METF “can only 
be computed when the number of paths between the attacker and the target is 
relatively small".  
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Figure 1-5. Exploit dependency attack graph representations [Idika, 2010] 
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The 2nd generation of attack graphs (as shown in Figure 1-5) assume that attacks 
are in the domain of network attacks, as introduced by [Ammann et al., 2002]. It 
means that the attacker never has to backtrack, i.e. the attacker does not loose 
capabilities acquired previously in the course of an attack.  
 
In the exploit oriented attack graph, the vertices signify conditions and the edges 
represent the exploits. This is the converse of a state oriented attack graph and 
sometimes refers to as an exploit dependency, attack graph. The representation of 
exploiting dependency/orienting attack graphs comes with primary condition/s and 
goal condition/s and the states of some unique hosts. The exploit-oriented attack 
graph's initial state(s) and the goal state(s) of the network are special nodes. 
Primary condition/s symbolises the exploit hosts with exact post conditions and 
void/null preconditions. Goal condition/s represents the exploit hosts with exact 
preconditions and void/null post conditions.  
The states and exploits are represented as vertices in the state-exploit oriented 
attack graph [Jürgenson, Aivo, 2010]. An edge in this graph could relate to a 
specific state, to a specific exploit or a specific exploit and a state. The edge will 
not directly relate a state to another state or an exploit to another exploit.  
In this thesis, a state oriented attack graph is used. As a state is a network 
attribute or set of network attributes, network state, such as network nodes, node 
connectivity, and installed /upgraded/modified software application, which are 
affected because of attack on a specific node, privilege access right or any other 
characteristic such as privilege level. The state-oriented attack graph model has 
been modified to represent the cost metric approach methodology. 
The Network Security and Planning Architectures (Net SPA) can represent a large 
network attack graph in an efficient manner for the purpose of network security 
analysis; Net SPA collects data from different resources, such as the configuration 
files of routers and firewalls, vulnerability scanners (Nessus scanner) and 
vulnerability databases to build and generate the attack graphs. Net SPA, 
according to existing results of security analysis, produces actions, 
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recommendations, and suggestions to enhance the network security. However, 
Net SPA fails to afford efficient manners to represent the enormous amount of 
information and vulnerabilities [O’Hare, Scott et al., 2008] [Ou, Xinming et al., 
2006]. 
 
 
1.4.4 Visual Attack Graphs Complexity 
A number of researchers have documented attack graph visual complexity, e.g. 
[Franqueira, Virginia et al., 2009] [Li, Zhi-tang, et al., 2007] [Williams, Leevar et al., 
2008], even with simplifications such as the access-to-effect model-to-model 
vulnerabilities. Attack graphs are complex for humans to understand (Please refer 
to Appendix-E, the Figure showing the complexity of a classical AG) for two 
primary reasons. (1) The majority of attack graphs do not completely characterise 
the topology of the network, i.e. firewalls, network hierarchy, logical grouping of 
hosts such as subnet, LAN (Local Area Network), and VLAN (Virtual LAN) are not 
represented in the graph itself. Therefore, it is difficult to relate attack graphs to the 
network itself. (2) The overload of information is above a human’s capacity, even 
for small networks, due to the number of arcs and the absence of logical 
constructs for “zooming in" or “zooming out". Solutions for the problem rely on: (i) 
grouping, (ii) aggregation, (iii) clustering, (iv) tree maps (as shown in Figure 1-6), 
and (v) prioritization, applied after the attack graph is built. [‎Mehta, Vaibhav, et al., 
2006] suggests the grouping of nodes with similar configurations into one single 
node in the graph. Their reason is that such hosts may have similar vulnerabilities. 
They leave as a challenge to “determine how to group these subsets in an efficient 
manner so that there is little overlap and redundancy in the paths". Other 
researchers (e.g. ‎[O’Hare, Scott et al., 2008] ‎[Ou, Xinming et al., 2006]  (in Net 
SPA tool) applies grouping methods to reduce reachability computation. Noel and 
Jajodia applies aggregation rules, visual clustering, and adjacency matrix 
clustering [Shuzhen et al., 2012] to overcome the complexity of attack graphs 
generated by the CAULDRON tool. Utilising these techniques and methods 
reduces the visual complicity of attack graphs, when they are utilised with a 
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modest number of exposures. However, when the number of hosts and 
vulnerabilities increases, there is a significant increase in the complexity and 
overload of information appeared in some instances, some of these methods were 
adapted to implement cost metric calculations; this will be discussed in further 
detail later in this thesis in Chapter-4. 
 
 
 
Figure 1-6. Aggregation applied to a prototype network [Franqueira, Virginia et al., 2009] 
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1.5    CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS 
The Centre of Strategies and International Studies (CSIS) July 2013 estimated 
criminal activity cost on cyberspace to be in the range of $300 billion to $1 trillion 
and estimated the cost of breaching privacy in the range of $1 billion to $16 billion. 
Many victims in cyberspace do not know they have been attacked and if they 
discover that they were attacked, they do not report it and they do not know how to 
measure the cost. This lack of justification (of not having a single number of costs) 
makes it extremely difficult to put a monetary value on a cyber-attack, to address 
this in this thesis the following are developed:  
 
 A unique severity cost of all vulnerabilities existing in a network host, using  
novel dynamic risk impact metric methods to develop the quantitative 
dynamic risk impact metric, which will help in the cost/benefit analysis of 
security. 
  A new method to construct a cost-centric model checking approach based 
on attack graph for dynamic cost metric calculations  
 A dynamic CostRank methodology to mathematically address the optimum 
result of ranking attack graphs which will cut the complexity and scale down 
the security cost (please refer to Chapter-6 as a benchmarking model of 
CostRank approach with Mehta et al. 2006 and Kijsanayothin, 2010 is 
demonstrated in term of efficiency and cost/benefit analysis). 
 An analogous parallel algorithm is developed to make a CostRank 
calculation for an increasing number of hosts in the networks in an efficient 
and scalable manner. 
  Countermeasures Attack Tree algorithms to calculate the flow of the costs 
and mitigations across the tree to reach the goal using a dynamic impact 
approach to find an optimum, effective and economic solution to 
implementing the countermeasures. 
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1.6 DEFINITIONS 
Definition 1: The Network Attack Graph Ng is the representation of a network 
graph as follows:                          
Ng = ( ; Ar ; N,  ) 
Where  is a nonempty set of vertices representing states, and Ar    x  is a 
non-empty set of arcs, representing communication channels to achieve a 
possible attack steps, N   is a nonempty set of nodes under doubt to represent 
the initial position of an attacker. The αr   Ar     is a representation of the 
function, which allocates a cost metric to arcs (i.e. a cost metric that an attacker 
comes upon to compromise an arc). S represents the number of space states. 
Definition 2: If the states (S) are given to achieve and an attack (Ac), the 
associations required for the attack ( cn AS  ) and point toward associations 
cp AS  , the attack  graph ),( pncg ASN    , then called directed attack 
graph where )( cAS   represent sets of states/vertexes and )( pn    represents 
sets of arcs. 
Definition 3: If a possible multi-step attacks (Ac1, Ac2) are given and pnca    
where  Ss  , then this called as a Sequence attack configuration within a directed 
attack graph if 21 Cc AA   
The implication of this configuration is: Ac1 happened and completed, then Ac2 
started. 
Definition 4: If a possible multi-step attacks (Ac1, Ac2) are given and pnca  
where Ss , then this called as a Parallel attack configuration within directed attack 
graph if 21 Cc AA   
The implication of this configuration is: Ac1 and Ac2 occur simultaneously. 
Definition 5:  If a possible multi-step attacks (Ac1, Ac2) are given and pnca  
where Ss , then this called as Alternate attack configuration within directed attack 
graph if 21 Cc AA   
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The implication of this configuration is: Ac1 and Ac2, but not both, occurs occurs at 
the same time. 
Definition 6: Let Ng = (S; Ar ; N,   ) is a network attack graph. The set of all 
possible multi-step attacks Ac over Ng is defined as follows: 
 For every (Ac1, Ac2,..AcN) and pnca   where  Ss ,   there are ¶ (Ac1, 
Ac2,..AcN) in Ac, for ¶  { ( ),,  }.  
 where ])3,2,1([(])3[]2,1([]3,2[1([ CCCCcCCCC AAAAAAAAA   
             ])3,2,1([(])3[]2,1([]3,2[1([ CCCCcCCCC AAAAAAAAA   
             ])3,2,1([(])3[]2,1([]3,2[1([ CCCCcCCCC AAAAAAAAA   
for (Ac1, Ac2, Ac3).  
Definition 7: Let Ng = (S; Ar; N,  ) be a network attack graph, let the cost metric 
of attack v=   vCost  , we calculate iv OLCCost   where OLC=Operational Level 
Cost and  i= C( s, 0) represent the cost of vulnerabilities that enables the attacker to 
exploit the vulnerability from the external networks or the web with no privilege 
escalations. i=C (s, 1) is represent the cost of vulnerabilities, which the intruder 
could exploit the vulnerabilities with user account privilege or gain a user account 
privilege. i=C (s, 2) is represent  the cost of vulnerabilities, which enables an 
attacker to instantly advance privileged access (system administrator). 
 
Definition 8: Let Ng = (S; Ar; N,  ) be a network attack graph, if the state 
)( cASx   is given, then let Fw (x) represent the groups of forward (outgoing) links 
from x and let B k (x) represents the groups of (incoming) links to x. Given od (x) = 
|Fw (u)| represents the out degree of x. 
 
Definition 9: Let Ng = (S; Ar; N,  ) is a network attack graph, )(
)( xt  represents 
the CosRank of the state )( cASx   and n is the number of links point to state x 
and  SSN   is the total number of states  in a network representation graph Ng. 
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PR = random walker matrix entries.(please refer to chapter-3 for more information).  
 
1.7  THESIS ORGANISATION 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  
In Chapter 2,  the state of art in the recent research of security analysis are 
presented such as the development of dynamic quantitative risk impact metric 
methods to evaluate the security state of a computer network; attack graphs based 
on dynamic security metrics analysis; parallel algorithm of PageRank calculations 
and finally the Attack and mitigation Tree implementations are demonstrated. 
Chapter 3 describes a new method to represent a unique severity cost of the total 
weight of all vulnerabilities for each host existing in a network host. 
 A novel dynamic risk impact metric methods used to develop the quantitative 
dynamic risk impact metric with DVSS a modified version of CVSS scores of base, 
temporal and environmental metrics and dedicated database to store information 
about the network architectures and network devices existing in the network, 
which might affect the reachability and connectivity.  
 By combining related sub-scores and modelling the problem’s parameters into a 
mathematical framework, this will provide us the real dynamic score taking into 
account the importance of the assets and patches, and remedy (countermeasures) 
applied for each system;  a new method to construct a cost-centric model checking 
based on attack graph for dynamic cost metric calculations. A risk matrix is  used 
to collaborate the risk equations. Using the framework to classify the vulnerabilities 
to none, user and root privileges and then finding the scores to Operational Level 
Cost (OLC), this classification is proved that really reflects the use of the risk 
matrices. The calculated values used to build a cost-centric attack graph. 
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In chapter 4, a new methodology is developed  to represent dynamic CostRank  to 
mathematically address the optimum solution of ranking attack graphs, using a 
cost-centric model checking for network security. It exercises an iterative 
mathematical process to calculate the maximal eigenvector of a practiced matrix 
with a hosts’ cost values derived from designated file structures. In addition, 
analysis and comparison of existing results of CostRank algorithm with those of 
Mehta et al. and Kijsanayothin approaches respectively. The same undertaking is 
applied to a medium size network.  
Chapter 5 presents a new parallel algorithm to calculate the CostRank of a 
network is introduced to implement CostRank for distributed parallel computers 
using multiprocessors. In order to reduce the complexity of the serial CostRank 
algorithm as the number of hosts in the networks are increasing. The serial 
CostRank algorithms need to read the source CostRank values of different states 
and store it in a buffer, then read the parameters in the binary graph file header, 
which has three components: (i) entire number of states; (ii) entire number of links 
and (iii) the upper limit out degree in the attack graph.  
A state entry record saves the essential structural data for a state such as  state 
ID, the out-degree, and the n forward links (Link 1, Link 2, and Link v) along with 
the corresponding cost for each link (C1, C2, and Cv) respectively. A parallel in-
memory algorithm is selected to extensively reduce access share state stored in 
memory and iterations, which include table partitioning (local access), 
synchronization of distributed table, checkpoint/restore and load balance/ and task 
scheduling. 
In the same manner, large-scale networks are secured that, require quick and 
reliable computing to calculate the ranking of enormous graphs with thousands of 
vertices (states) and millions or arcs.  In this, the focus is on a parallel CostRank 
computational architecture on a cluster of PCs networked via 100 MB/s Ethernet 
LAN. Using a cluster of 32 computers built with Pentium Core2Duo 2.54 GHz 
CPU, 2GB RAM, 250GB Hard Disk interconnected with 100 MB/s Ethernet LAN, 
running the Linux operating system, 30 PCs for partitioning calculations, and two 
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masters for synchronisations to assess the complexity and scalability of the 
algorithms.  
In particular, a partitioning of input data, graph files and ranking vectors with an 
appropriate load balancing technique has reduced the runtime and hence 
scalability of large scale parallel  CostRank calculations.  In this dissertation, an 
application case study of parallel CostRank calculations is given using one-
dimensional sparse matrix partitioning on a modified research page at Stanford 
University. It describes the link structure of the stanford.edu-domain from a 
September 2002 collection and contains 281903 pages with about 2.3 million links, 
outcomes in a major reduction in communication overhead and in runtime. To 
consider its efficiency, several experiments are performed using out-vector files 
synthesised from the real networked data.  
In chapter 6, a novel effective countermeasures solution is developed against 
network attacks using cost-centric model checking by identifying the set of top 
network risks and host and application vulnerabilities and countermeasures. In the 
DCAT model, attack detection and mitigations are permitted not just at the leaf 
node, but at the transiting nodes as well. The effects of incorporating 
countermeasures and attacks in the DCAT are studied, using the DVSS 
framework and the Nessus scanner for vulnerability detections, to construct both 
dynamic Cost Centric Attack Trees (CCAT) and Dynamic Countermeasures Attack 
Trees (DCAT).  The idea of mixing countermeasures into attack trees, and more 
generally into directed acyclic graphs, using cost centric driven from CVSS and 
probability is a new approach. The main difference between CCAT and a DCAT is 
the CCAT represents the attacker actions using cost centric values and probability, 
while DCAT adds a set of vulnerability mitigations to the CCAT; the new structure 
reduces the possible damage by an attacker to a critical asset in term of 
protections. The root of the DCAT represents a critical valuable asset that the 
system administrators need to secure and give it special consideration. The DCAT 
could be described as CCAT enhanced by adding a set of mitigations to each leaf 
node with vulnerability. To represent optimal manners of vulnerability mitigations in 
DCAT, the system administrator will calculate the effective cost of possible 
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mitigations in an attack scenario using DCAT algorithms to reduce the total impact 
of a specific vulnerability.  
 In the next chapter, the state-of-the-art methods will discuss within the areas of 
the research, and compare the thesis contributes to clearly demonstrate the novel 
contribution that is made.  
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Security Is A Journey, Not A Destination. 
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART 
 
 
 
 
 
Developing CostRank attack graphs based on dynamic security metrics analysis is a 
novel new approach to reducing the complexity of attack graphs and finding 
appropriate mitigations to secure Network systems from intended attackers. The 
focus of this chapter will be on the literatures using the following approaches and 
methods: (i) dynamic quantitative risk impact metrics; (ii) attack graph security 
metrics; (iii) parallel algorithms and PageRank calculations and finally (iv) attack and 
mitigation tree implementations.  These approaches and methods need online 
tracking to meet the aims and objectives as the research in these areas cannot be 
considered as completed and integrated in terms of finding a solution to attack graph 
visual complexity and dynamic security metrics. Using and developing existing 
separated and different approaches and methodologies can be considered as a vital 
step to completing and enhancing approaches and methodologies. 
The vulnerability quantitative assessment is an essential process to evaluate the 
security state of a system and to enable the security professionals and decision 
makers to implement mitigations and patch administration to protect the system from 
potential attacks. The quantitative score of the risk is represented by combining the 
consequences of a threat (impact) with the likelihood of its exploitability. 
The risk should be evaluated in terms of maximum impact on an adverse event. 
Microsoft Baseline Security Analyser, Nessus, OpenVAS and the Skipfish  scanner 
are used to discover known vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, all these tools use their own 
formulae to evaluate the severity of vulnerabilities and mostly they evaluate an 
individual vulnerability without taking into account the relationships between 
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vulnerabilities and the effect of network devices such as routers and the firewalls in 
the variables used by formulae to calculate the total severity. 
In this chapter, the state of art in the recent research of security analysis is 
presented.  
A SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) analysis is practiced to 
provide analytical evaluations of the approaches and methods. 
 
2.1  ATTACK GRAPH SECURITY METRICS 
The classifications of attack graph security metrics shown below demonstrate the 
state of the art approaches: 
1- Attack Graph with Probabilistic metrics: represents an attack graph where each 
exploit of any vulnerability has a probabilistic numerical scoring value wherever 
the scoring value is confirmed, it means the possibility of an attacker to exploit 
a specific vulnerability [L. Wang et al. 2008].  
2- Attack Graph with Expected Risk metrics: AG represents a chain of probable 
exploits and new vulnerabilities that might affect services in the future along 
with the estimated scoring of the vulnerability. [M.S. Ahmed et al., 2008]. 
3- Attack Graph with Resistance metrics: represents the structure of separate 
attacks, scoring, which violate the network configuration such as Firewall rules, 
Router access lists and polices [L. Wang et al., 2007]. 
4-  Attack Graph with Hosts Compromise Percentage metrics: represent a chain 
of scoring values of the proportion of hosts on the network that the attackers 
can access after the exploit in terms of privileges (none, user, administrator) 
used [R. Lippmann et al. 2006]. 
5-  Attack Graph with Security Risk metrics: represent a chain of vulnerabilities 
using scoring values driven from the measurement of many factors calculated 
during the course of attack such as type of exploits, accessibility and distance 
[F. Chen et al., 2010].  
6- Attack Graph with K-step Capability Accumulation metrics:  represent the 
structure of vitality gained by an attacker in a multi - step attack on the network 
in K steps [N.C. Idika, 2010]. 
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The AG with expected risk metric is a novel approach, but out of the scope of this 
study, which is relevant to develop the cost-centric AG in the future work work (see 
Chapter 7). 
The AG with resistance metric has a limited scope; the network architectures and 
network device configurations have been considered in calculating the   dynamic 
cost calculations for each vulnerability and in the dynamic cost framework. 
The AG with host compromise percentage is metric approach is not relevant to this 
study as the compromise percentage already covered in CVSS and DVSS modes. 
The AG with the security risk metric approach uses a classical method for 
representing the chain of vulnerabilities and is not relevant in this study. 
The AG with k-step accumulation metric approach uses the structure of vitality 
gained by attackers in multi-step of an attack. In this thesis, the interactions 
between vulnerabilities with privilege considerations for each state of attack are 
being considered using a different methodology to formulate the cost-centric attack 
graph using  dynamic risk impact metric methods to improve the risk scoring 
method and reducing the visual complexity of an attack graph. 
The AG with the probabilistic metrics approach is relevant to be adapted in this 
study as each exploit of the vulnerabilities in the AG has a probabilistic numerical 
scoring value representing the dynamic cost-centric of the states for each exploit. 
Different techniques have been used such as dynamic impact scoring, cost-centric 
OLC, CostRank in this study.  
   
2.2  SECURITY INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 
In this section, the analytical approach used in the business case study presented 
in Chapter-6 will discuss, to assist the security investment, decision makers in the 
process of selecting a proper security solution based on a robust cost/benefit 
analysis. The security investment approach is based on Daniel Bernoulli, Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT) and Von Neumann-Morgenstern [Mongin, 1997], these 
approaches calculate the consequence of the decisions under uncertainty and 
risk. As in this thesis, the focus on the risk evaluation of a potential attack and 
finding a relevant solution of vulnerability mitigations to provide security 
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professionals and system administrators with techniques and tools to support 
security decisions, the Bernoulli equations of probability theory and related work is 
essential to evaluate the model. 
Using the [Anderson, Ross, et al., 2012.] model, the estimated cost of an attack is  
calculated as follows: 
1. The costs represent the expectancy of an attack, such as the costs of 
purchases of mitigations and implementing the policy. 
2. The costs, which are represent the consequence of an attack, such as the 
direct and indirect losses.  
3. The costs, which represent the reaction to an attack, such as recompense 
charges to the victims and other parties. 
4. Indirect costs, such as reputational impact and the loss as consequences of 
individual business damage of internet transactions.   
The annual loss, which represent the likely loss per period (yearly in this case), 
can be calculated by the integral of the possible loss probability with probability 
values of losses with a specific security level and without implementing a 
protection. 
Let us assume the loss measured without implementing any security =LN. 
In addition, the loss measured when implementing a specific level of security=LS. 
Then the annual lost can calculate as follows: 
     

 
0
Annual )(. dxxLxL NN  
              

 
0
Annual )(. dxxLxL SS  
                
  Where x is represents the possible loss. 
As you can see from Figure 2-1 (b), the expected loss using a specific level of 
security LS is assigning to low function loss probability and the expected loss 
without security LN is assigned to high function loss probability when no security 
measurements as in (a),
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Figure 1-7. The anticipated loss of a system with (a) no Security measurement implemented; and (b) with 
a specific level of Security 
 
To adjust the standard Bernoulli equations with probability theory, assume the 
probability of loss using the loss assumption with a specific security level=Ps, the 
probability of loss without implementing any security = (1-Ps) and  represents the 
expected impact in this case the LS can be calculated for the hypothesis to have 
simple two loss outcomes  (0, ) as follows: 
 
The expected benefit ( ) of implementing a specific level of information, security 
techniques can be calculated as follows Annual: 


 
0
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The net benefit expected ( ) can be calculated as follows: 
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  where Cs= the cost of implementing a level of security. 
For full comprehensiveness of this approach, let us see this through a guided 
example: 
In a company X, the security specialist suggests to implement security mitigations 
for existing vulnerabilities in the corporate network, with a cost of £27,645 to attack 
the manufacturer’s Database. The Nessus scanner indicates a couple of 
vulnerabilities that the attackers could exploit across the Network, the report states 
that  the probability of attack without using the security mitigations will be 40%, 
while the probability of the attack after using the suggested countermeasures to 
protect the network will be 3% only.  
The estimate cost of a successful attack to exploit the manufacturer’s Database 
Using [Anderson, Ross, et al., 2012.] model, will be £100.000.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Please note that in this case any NBs> 0 could be considered as a good 
investment.  
The return on security investment ( ) is defined as the ratio of the benefit of the 
security investment to the cost of security. 
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In the above example, the loss calculation does not consider temporal benefits, as 
the investments over time are not considered. 
The net present value ( ) considers the expected net benefit of a security 
investment over a future interval in the corresponding present value. 
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where Ct=0 represents the unrepeatable security cost at t=0. 
cr represents the recurring cost of security in interval t. 
LN,t and LS,t represents the loss expectancy of interval t. 
Dr represents the discount rate. 
The internal rate of return (IRR) represents the discount rate (Dr) when Pn=0, a 
higher rate of return means the security investment is more valuable. 
The above analysis will implement to calculate the expected benefit and the net 
expected benefit and Internal Net Return of this approach against the standard 
approaches of mitigations in Chapter-6. 
 
2.3  DYNAMIC QUANTITATIVE RISK IMPACT METRIC METHODS 
The attacked organisation's computer network could cause huge impact and 
losses for organisations such as reputation and financial loss. 
So developing accurate security metrics could specify the security state and help 
security professionals to develop security policies and rules to protect the 
organisations networks. 
Vulnerability quantitative assessment is an essential process to evaluate the 
security state of a system and to enable security professionals and decision 
makers to implement mitigations and patch administration to protect systems from 
potential attacks [Herrmann, Debra, 2007]. Microsoft Baseline Security Analyser, 
Nessus, OpenVAS and Skipfish scanner are used to discover known 
vulnerabilities, but all these tools use their own formulae to evaluate the severity of 
vulnerabilities. Mostly these tools evaluate an individual vulnerability without taking 
into account the relationships between vulnerabilities and the impact of network 
devices such as routers and the firewalls on variables used to calculate the total 
severity. When these vulnerabilities are used in, an AG with probabilities 
represents the static severity to detect the vulnerable paths, attackers can use this 
to attack the network, and this can lead to incorrect results, which can mislead the 
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security professional in the process of finding the exact countermeasures and 
mitigations. 
The commercial open framework standard CVSS ‎[Mell et al., 2007] provides 
useful information about the impact and communication features of different 
vulnerabilities, not only considering the intrinsic features of  vulnerabilities, but also 
taking into account  the environmental influence and the progress of  
vulnerabilities over time. CVSS represents a widely used technique for measuring 
the vulnerability scores on an individual (static) model. Therefore, security 
professionals and system administrators could be misleading, when a specific 
vulnerability score is low but the attackers can still compromise a critical asset 
using multi-step attack techniques, as CVSS does not take into consideration the 
interactions between vulnerabilities and other dynamic features of the 
vulnerabilities.  
For example, the Google Chrome Pwnium browser attacks in 2012, as the attacker 
Pinkie Pie  managed to execute a remote arbitrary code in the browser; using six 
individual low scoring vulnerabilities, in a successful multi-step attack to crack the 
Chrome sandbox. 
1. Another example to demonstrate the attackers approach used a medium 
CVSS Base score of 5.0 (Please refer to Appendix-B and Chapter-3, for 
CVSS structure and scoring details) to cause a kernel to crash and make a 
Linux system completely unavailable, the vulnerability CVE-2009-1758 has 
the following CVSS score: 
          CVSS v2 Base Score: 5.0 (MEDIUM): 
 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: N  I:     N A: P 
     
CVSS proposes the following benefits: 
1- Provide a standardised score system for all vulnerabilities, as a single 
vulnerability management system to indicate how fast a specific vulnerability 
must be, validated and mitigated. 
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2- Deliver a clear score that enables everyone to understand the sub scores 
which representing the separate features used to originate the numerical value 
representing the score. 
3-  Help to specify and produces priority to different risks, according to the 
numerical scoring values assigned to the vulnerabilities. 
4- Consider the effect of existing vulnerabilities in different environments and the 
progress of the vulnerabilities over time.  
5-  CVSS represents an open framework, which could be used to advance an 
application appropriate to the organisation’s needs. 
Although CVSS has many benefits, it has also many weaknesses to deliver a 
satisfactory and beneficial quantitative risk-scoring model such as: 
1- A Complete Guide of CVSS V2 by First stated, “Vulnerability scoring should 
not take into account any interaction with other vulnerabilities. That is, each 
vulnerability should be scored independently.” [Mell, Peter et al., 2007] 
This strategy could make sense in the process of giving individual vulnerability 
a score by itself; it is important to acknowledge that two or further apparently 
inoffensive vulnerabilities could be joined to create a critical impact. 
2- The methodology of combining CVSS scores of Base, Temporal and 
environmental dimensions provides a useful approach to measure fixed 
severity scores of different vulnerabilities. However, in a multi-step attack 
environment, the fixed scores are a problem, as the scores combining metrics 
do not take into account the changes in the parameters when the attacker 
moves from one stage to another. A novel Dynamic Vulnerability Scoring 
System (DVSS) based on Intrinsic, Time-based and Ecological Metric, 
considers the interactions between vulnerabilities. The solution is based on 
utilising three files, the first file contain Vulnerabilities and related static CVSS 
scores, the second file contains network architecture and configurations’, 
including network devices such as routers, firewalls and switches, the third file 
contains the occurrences of CVSS scoring severity levels introduced from 
different security organisations. These files are used with relevant probabilities 
to calculate the dynamic cost score for each vulnerability. 
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3- Some Vulnerabilities have scored zero by CVSS v2 such as arbitrary site 
redirect flow as the variable of the vulnerability as shown below:  
CVSS v2 Base Score: 0.0 
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: N  I:     N A: N 
 
The impact of this vulnerability is to redirect specific site like google or 
government or commercial website to another one, which might lead to 
financial, or reputation damage, but the CVSS v2 scoring is null as the 
confidential and the integrity and availability variables scored none. 
4- Some vulnerabilities scored low or medium according to their variables, in the 
same time it could lead to gain the root/administrator password such as cross 
site request forgery vulnerability which according to their variables scored as 
follows: 
 
 CVSS Base Score: 4.3  
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: N  I:     P A: N 
Please note if the attackers gain the root/administrator access to the to the 
web site, they could execute arbitrary code and gain complete access to the 
system and fully compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability which 
make the base score much higher than 4.3. 
5- 5-CVSS v2 uses three levels of scoring in the range of 0.0 to 10.0, as they use 
a limited number of variables many vulnerabilities scored same numerical 
values although the risk factors are completely different. For example (i)  path 
disclosure vulnerability existing in some website application scored as follows: 
CVSS Base Score: 5.0 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: P  I:     N A: N 
 
(ii) The vulnerability that leads to pass through the system and read all files 
reachable through the web server. 
CVSS Base Score: 5.0 
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AV: N AC: L Au: N C: P  I:     N A: N 
 
6- CVSS v2 uses a limited number of access vector (AV), network, adjusted 
network, and local. These three levels are not enough to represent the 
attacker’s access for examples, there are no differentiations between the local 
attack using network account and physical attack, in the same way there are 
no differences between the attacker access to the wireless network and wired 
network. 
7-  The scores in CVSS should associate the scores of individual vulnerabilities 
into a total assessment of the security of the complete to provide effective 
network security metrics considering the interaction of vulnerabilities in a 
specified network. 
 
The majority of the literature in the security-engineering field does not utilise 
dynamic scoring by taking into consideration the interaction between 
vulnerabilities and addressing the multi-steps attack problem into account. 
 As most publications try to use the CVSS as an open framework to modify the 
variables to address some scoring problems to get an evaluation that is more 
accurate, by using sub-metrics, risk, returns to the original vulnerability sub-
metrics to ensure the precision such as [Houmb, 2009]. 
In [Singhal, Anoop, and Xinming Ou, 2009] The researchers identified two 
levels of network security metrics: “component metrics” which represents static 
scoring of vulnerabilities such as CVSS from NVD as they don’t consider 
interactions between vulnerabilities and “cumulative metrics” which can be 
considered as baseline between the static metric and the interaction between 
the vulnerabilities. Their solution is based on using Java; XML parser with 
three XML format files, the first file contains Vulnerabilities and related static 
CVSS scores. The network architecture, including network devices such as 
routers, firewalls and switches in the second file, the third file contains the 
network host’s configurations. These files used to feed attack graph with 
relevant probabilities for analysis, a similar approach is being used in the cost-
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centric AG methodology, but the type of the files and the manner the network 
architectures and configurations files interact are improved as demonstrated in 
Chapter-3. 
In [Luo, J at al., 2014] the researchers develop software vulnerability-rating 
approach in which they consider the analysis of the occurrences of CVSS 
scoring at different periods. They modified the formulae to calculate the 
exploitability and the impact using the sub scores. Parameters in the analysis 
of these occurrences are used to develop the new scoring system. They use 
the average of exploitability and impact sub scoring weight. While the 
occurrences changes the scoring will take variable values instead of constant 
scoring to take variable values instead of constant scoring, The vulnerability 
scoring calculates, in a dynamic approach at different period of time. The 
scoring metric method was developed for CVSS base scores only and does 
not consider the temporal and environmental scoring along with testing if 
vulnerability severity scoring variations for future work. The approaches 
covered in this paper have been used in developing DVSS proposed model.   
[Frigault et al., 2008] provide a partial solution to the problem of associating 
the scores of individual vulnerabilities into a total assessment of security by 
combining the temporal scores of individual vulnerabilities into a global rating 
of security of the whole network at any given time using Dynamic Bayesian 
Networks based model to incorporate temporal factors. In cost-centric method 
a different approach being used to solve the problem, according to the model 
needs to create cost-centric methodology, including modified base and 
environmental metrics. 
In this thesis, a novel approaches to developing a tool set for dynamic 
vulnerabilities quantitative scoring is described, including network topological 
analysis to measure the impact of the network devices and configurations and 
considering the correction factor to change the score of the intrinsic metric on 
the final scoring value of the vulnerabilities, as the network topology and 
configuration change. The formula takes different scoring values from the 
developed dynamic database files instead of constant empirical static values 
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used by CVSS, to develop a unique severity cost of all vulnerabilities using 
dynamic risk impact metric methods. This process aimed to improve the risk 
scoring method. 
  The dynamic impact scoring system of vulnerabilities is used to advance the 
cost-centric method, by assigning a unique severity cost for each host. 
Through dividing the scores of the vulnerabilities to three main levels of 
privileges (i) none; (ii) user and (iii) root, and then classifies these levels into 
operational levels to identify and calculate the dynamic severity cost of multi-
step vulnerabilities. These approaches and methods represent  an important 
step to achieve the aim of this thesis, to secure network systems and to assist 
the security investment decision makers in the process of selecting a proper 
security solution based on the cost/benefit analysis, as the cost-centric method 
will be used in building and ranking a novel cost-centric attack graph. 
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2.4  ATTACK GRAPHS BASED ON DYNAMIC SECURITY METRICS ANALYSIS 
 
Attack graphs (AG) are a standard representation of how multi-step 
vulnerabilities can interact in order to perform an attack. Usually the AG 
represents the structure of system states via a group of security conditions 
(pre- and post-conditions), the exploits of different vulnerabilities are then 
represented by transitions between states. Different vulnerabilities usually 
stay in the system, even after been discovered and exploited because of the 
slow release of patches and countermeasures, or due to the expensive cost 
of deploying the countermeasures.  Frequently the organisations 
compromise the availability of services to maintain the business with security 
risk and threats, but later they discover that they are paying a very high price 
in terms of cost and reputation as a consequence of an attack. 
In the same style of implementing SWOT analysis of the methods, will take 
off with the attack graphs advantages:  
1- The AG can catch hidden attack circumstances undetected by an IDS or any 
other security tools.  
2- AG helps the security professional and the security decision makers to find 
the best location for the IDS and security machinery to achieve fine coverage 
to protect critical assets within networks. 
3- Helps the decision makers and security professionals to evaluate the security 
policies and procedures, hardware and software setting and configurations, It 
can also be used to anticipate the change in the different status of the hosts 
within the network as a result of the attackers exploiting the different 
vulnerabilities in the network. 
4- AG can build and identify worst security case scenarios and then accordingly 
the security professional can set the priority to implement the security 
countermeasures and mitigations. 
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The main weaknesses in the AG are: 
1- The majority of attack graphs do not completely characterise the topology of 
the network, i.e. firewalls, network hierarchy, logical grouping of hosts such as 
subnet, LAN (Local Area Network), and VLAN (Virtual LAN) are not 
represented in the graph itself. Therefore, it is difficult to relate attack graphs 
to the network itself.  
2- The overload of information is above a human’s capacity, even for small 
networks, due to the number of arcs and the absence of logical constructs for 
“zooming in" or “zooming out" which makes the attack graphs output  very 
complex for humans to understand. 
3- The time scale for AG algorithms for large networks appears as a problem 
because the time measurement for algorithm such as the one used by MIT 
Laboratory [Artz, 2002] is poor even when it will used for medium network. 
4-  The amount of information and the time needed to analysis the pre-condition 
and post-condition to construct the AG is enormous, for example, it required 
between 10 to 60 minutes to specify the pre and post- condition for a single 
attack [Bilar, 2003]. 
5- Reachability between the nodes in a computer network is appears as AG 
weaknesses, especially when many Firewalls and Routers and Gateways are 
used. Some of the security professional wrongly assumes that the reachability 
information exists in the outputs of the vulnerability scanners, particularly 
when they are used them for each subnet, to analyse the  reachability issues, 
information is a complex task and it is impossible to determine this information 
using vulnerability scanners as the output  represents static information and 
scoring of the vulnerabilities. 
 
In [Steven Templeton and Karl Levitt, 2000] they suggest a model to represent a 
chain of exploits of network vulnerabilities. They create a scenario, which links the 
exploits in the manner that the previous exploits provides prerequisites to the 
advanced exploits. Scripts presented for identifying exploits and stated that their 
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approach can assist in determining new exploits. The researchers were not 
merging the attack’s case study into the attack graph model.  
Their approach of using attack trees to reduce the complexity is used in an OLC 
method to combine the scoring of the vulnerability into a cost-centric framework. 
To reduce the visual complexity of attack graph that deters the humans from fully 
comprehending the information presented to secure Network systems from 
intended attackers by providing security professionals and system administrators 
with techniques and tools to support security decisions and to create and maintain 
security policies and procedures. 
In [R.W. Ritchey and P. Ammann, 2001] Ritchey and Ammann custom a single 
attack graph case study to examine the security of heterogeneous networks in 
term of published exploits. The SMV model checker is used for a single scenario 
showing an attack on a heterogeneous network that intrudes upon the security 
arrangements.  
In [Paul Ammann, Duminda Wijesekera et al., 2002.] they demonstrate a scalable, 
embedded attack graph to evade the exponential output of a classical attack graph 
to reduce the visual complexity. They use a dependency attack graph and they 
were using the exploit conditions with a monotonicity (which means, no matter 
what action an attacker may perform, no changes can be made) and access 
privilege, network reachability to give set of preconditions and post conditions as 
atomic Boolean elements.  
The methods used in this thesis, such as access privileges, network reachability 
are modified from the above approaches to make them, useable in the cost-centric 
AG approach.  
The attack graphs presented by Ammann et al. are difficult for the human to fully 
comprehending, the information presented, as the AG is not clear.  
Dacier in [M. Dacier,1994] suggest the privileges attack graph model as each 
vertex in the graph represents a privilege, while the edge represent vulnerability 
exploits. The Dacier model is used to build state attack graphs, which represent a 
new and different approach in which the attackers can exploit the vulnerability 
such as administrator/root privilege in the target goal. He used METF as a 
 40 
 
probabilistic scoring metric to analyse and evaluate the security status. This model 
suffers from the complexity of the algorithms to represent the attack graph, some 
of his intuitive approach is borrowed in this thesis, but the cost-centric metric is 
used instead of using a METF along, to solve the problem of algorithm complexity 
by combining individual measures into overall attack resistance measures.   
 In a similar fashion to [Mehta et al. 2006] and [Kijsanayothin, 2010], a framework 
is implemented on a test network, using the Nessus scanner to discover known 
vulnerabilities, implement these results and to build and represent the cost centric 
attack graph using ranking algorithms. However, instead of using vulnerabilities for 
each host, a CostRank Markov Model has developed, thereby reducing the 
complexity in the attack graph and reducing the problem of visibility. 
In this thesis, a scalable, dynamic CostRank algorithm for ranking the AG is 
presented using a new approach to represent the states by implementing a 
dynamic cost-centric driven from statistical probability of  dynamic impact scoring 
for the vulnerabilities.  
The ranks of the states represent the importance of the states in the DCCAT. The 
resulting ranking represents a metric that can be used by security professionals 
and system administrators to make different security decisions to improve the 
network security based on cost/benefits. 
     
2.5  A PARALLEL ALGORITHM TO CALCULATE THE COSTRANK OF A 
NETWORK 
 
The complexity of the serial CostRank algorithm grows polynomially, as the 
number of hosts and vulnerabilities in the network are increased. The serial 
CostRank algorithm is needed to read the source CostRank values of different 
states and store it in a buffer. Then read the parameters in the binary graph file 
header and calculate the CostRank, the goal to extensively reduce the access 
share state stored in memory and iterations, which include table partitioning (local 
access), synchronization of distributed table, checkpoint/restore and load balance 
and task scheduling.  
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Parallel computing is a well-established method, and researchers have used and 
defined different model of algorithms to satisfy their needs.  
The following models of parallel algorithms have been studied in terms of 
strengths and drawbacks: 
1- The parallel random access memory (PRAM) model is look upon as 
fundamental parallel algorithm models and proposed the opportunity of 
solving the problem of the physical limitations of the computers using many 
processors connected to a shared memory to run the tasks in parallel. The 
focal weaknesses of PRAM model are the impractical expectations of the 
communication overhead and the synchronisations of the instructions cannot 
use the model for real time parallel computing and the complexity of the 
algorithm. 
2- Bulk-synchronous parallel model (BSP) projected in 1990 by [L. G. Valiant, 
1990]. In order to solve the weaknesses in the PRAM model, the model used 
a fixed number of n processors and memory nodes connected by a computer 
network, this model used the super step idea of encompassing the 
synchronisation and communication process, also used public variables or 
transient message in processor communication. 
The BSP model is supplementary representative comparing with PRAM as it 
is considering most of the parallel commuting overhead except the 
professor’s management overhead. 
In the parallel PageRank, numerous methodologies have been proposed. 
In [S. Kamvar, T. Haveliwala, 2004], the researchers suggested an adaptive 
methodology by organised groups of web pages founded on the speed of 
convergences of PageRank ranking values, then accordingly the resources 
used to perform the distributed algorithm allocated. In other approaches as in 
[K. Avrachenkov at al., 2007] the communications are completed using 
multiple synchronisation servers to communicate the variable values 
between different processors involved in PageRank computations. In [Y. Zhu 
at al., 2005] the authors are suggested chunk of structure to implement 
Markov chain to compute the distributed PageRank. 
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 In this thesis, most of BSP advantages are adopted, considering the process 
management and the scalability. A partition-centred CostRank algorithm 
based on BSP has suggested that can efficiently run on a parallel 
background. A visible logical dialogue has provided in terms of I/O and 
synchronization rate, and memory utilisation, speedup gain by using parallel 
CostRank over the Serial CostRank algorithm, load balancing, processor 
loads, and efficiency of parallel CostRank algorithms. 
The CostRank algorithm is developed, based on the PageRank Markoven 
chain approach, to implement the cost-centric ranking for distributed parallel 
computers using multiprocessors. In order to reduce the complexity of the 
serial CostRank algorithm, which is grows polynomially (as it includes a 
matrix multiplication). Satisfactory to make CostRank calculations more 
effective in terms of accuracy, cost/benefit trade-off, because in the arena of 
security management, untreated threats can be hazardous and if the network 
administrators and security professionals are unaware of an attack, the 
impact could be very detrimental to the businesses concerned. 
 
 
2.6  DYNAMIC COUNTERMEASURES ATTACK TREE ALGORITHMS 
 
The AG is a natural application to build a security scenario graph, especially 
when ranking of the vertex is required and a huge number of vulnerabilities 
need to be chained and the considerations of  multi-step attack, the relations 
between vulnerabilities need to be addressed. For the aforementioned 
reasons AG is used in developing the methodology of a dynamic CostRank 
attack graph. In the process of selecting, a suitable graph structure to 
optimise the countermeasures process the AT is selected for the following 
reasons: 
1- Bruce Shneier’s [Opel, Alexander, 2005] The AG is a natural application to 
build a security scenario graph as the exploits structured similar AT, 
Conversely the chance of cyclic dependency, the state’s merged could  
happens inside AG. 
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2-  In AT the leaves node could represent the vulnerabilities or a 
countermeasure for mitigations, in other hand the attack represented as set 
of actions to compromise the vulnerabilities. 
3- To mitigate the risk in AT, an attacker could exploit a vulnerability in the 
method of OR attack, the security professional/system administrator needs to 
find a countermeasure for every conceivable exploit, in the method of AND 
attack, it will be sufficient to present a mitigation for only one conceivable 
exploit to protect the target asset. 
The fault tree model was advanced in 1960 [Vesely et al., 1981] to assess 
systems, safety and maintenance, security engineering, Schneier introduced 
AT as tools for assessing the systems security, a clear constraint of AT that 
they are not integrated the relations between the countermeasures and the 
exploits that the attackers try to use the vulnerabilities across the system. 
 Defence trees (DTs) ‎[Bistarelli, Stefano et al., 2006] have been developed to 
investigate the effect of defence mechanisms using measures such as attack 
cost, security investment cost’s weight, return on attack (ROA), and return on 
investment (ROI) ‎[ Roy, Arpan et al., 2010]. However, placing defence 
mechanisms only at the leaf nodes cannot represent a complete solution; the 
corresponding ROI/ROA analysis does not incorporate the probabilities of 
attack and the attack cost used in these models did not reflect the real 
numerical scoring metrics for both the vulnerabilities and the mitigation. 
In this research, all available techniques are used to develop a novel 
effective countermeasure solution against network system attacks was 
established using a cost-centric attack graph by developing DCAT, in the 
DCAT model, attack detection and mitigation are legitimate not just at the 
leaf node, but at the transiting nodes.  
The results of incorporating countermeasures and attacks in the DCAT, using 
the DVSS framework and the Nessus scanner for vulnerability detections to 
construct both dynamic attack trees and DCAT, show clearly the 
effectiveness and the significance of the CAT algorithm. This is both are in 
terms of reducing the total impact of a specific vulnerability and giving the 
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security professional and system administrators the capability to select more 
effective mitigations. 
In the following chapter, a novel approach to developing a tool for dynamic 
vulnerability quantitative scoring is awarded, including network topological 
analysis to assess the impact of net devices and forms.  
The dynamic impact scoring of vulnerabilities would give the decisions maker 
clear idea of the requirements to secure the organisation's networks to avert 
financial and reputational impacts. 
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CHAPTER 3.DYNAMIC COST-CENTRIC RISK IMPACT 
METRICS  
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Oxford Dictionary ‎[Oxford Dictionaries, 2011] defines a metric as “a system or 
standard of measurement.” From this meaning, the measurement is utilised to 
clarify the term metric.  Quantitative security metrics could present a clear image 
of security structure, security problems, and resolutions, security policies, and 
procedures. Furthermore, helps the security professionals to understand the 
capability of a system,and to carry on a task whilst being under attack. 
 
Risk assessment can be carried out to assess system reliability and to benchmark 
different security solutions. A measurable risk assessment is the primary tool used 
to specify if the additional budget should be allocated to afford more security 
features, as the mathematical numbers of the security protections and 
weaknesses, would give the decision maker a clear idea of the requirements to 
ensure the organisation's network security to avert financial and reputational 
impacts. 
 
The objective of risk assessment is to measure the likelihood of exploitability and 
its consequences (Impacts), by measuring the probability that manifest threats in 
terms of access required, attack complexity and weighting the impact of the 
occurrence with the damage potential that may occur.  
 
According to [Herrmann, Debra, 2007] there are three major phases of security 
metrics: 
A. Compliance metrics: measures compliance with current security and privacy 
regulations and standards, such as Health Insurance Portability and 
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Accountability Act (HIPAA), Sarbanes-Oxley, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 
etc. 
B. Resilience metrics: measures the resilience of controls relating to operational 
security and IT security, physical security, personnel security, both before and 
after a product, systems or network are deployed, such as the metrics are 
used in MITRE Establishment. 
C. Return on investment (ROI) metrics: measures the ROI in physical, personnel, 
IT and operational security controls to guide capital investment. 
 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and The Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exploits Database (CVE) provide specific CVSS scores for publicly known 
vulnerabilities, as the CVSS is becoming an industry standard and widely used in 
private and public sectors, is relevant to consider it as new forms of security 
metrics. 
Different systems of security metrics exist and these have been developed by 
different organisations. They hold their own methodologies to use different metrics 
such as ROI based on capital investments; CVSS use the different parameters 
related to vulnerabilities, they employ different manners to measure and estimate 
the risk. For example, the CERT/ Coordination Centre (CC) ‎[Jajodia et al., 2005] 
[Mell et al, 2007] is introduces, a metrics system which produces  a numerical 
outputs ranging from 0 to 180.  According to the numerical output values, a 
decision will be made to consider whether the organisation’s infrastructure is at 
risk or not, this inconsistency in a security metrics can lead to security weaknesses 
issues and inaccuracies    
 
The SANS vulnerability analysis outputs a range of numerical values to show 
whether there are any weaknesses in the Server or Client  configurations and 
whether they need major/minor adjustment. 
Microsoft’s proprietary scoring system (MPSS) was designed to indicate a severity 
of compromising the different vulnerabilities during the exploit, and give some 
indication of the impact of the vulnerabilities.  
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The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) represents open references 
for different vulnerabilities and their corresponding impacts ‎[Mell et al, 2007]‎[ 
Papadaki, Maria, and Steven Furnell, 2010] ‎[ Purboyo et al., 2012]. 
 
The CVSS model is designed to offer the end-user with a complete combined 
score system symbolising an individual risk and severity of a vulnerability. It is 
resultant from applying specific formulae to metrics in three different groupings 
that could be evaluated quantitatively or qualitatively. Base Metrics comprise 
merits describing a specified vulnerability, which does not change in dissimilar 
circumstances and over time. Temporal Metrics comprise merits originalities of an 
exposure that has altered and changed in dissimilar circumstances and over time. 
Environmental Metrics comprise those individualities of a vulnerability, which are 
linked to an operation on a particular user’s environment. 
CVSS used to assess the vulnerability scores on individual (static) style as a 
result, the security professionals and system administrators could be misled when 
a specific vulnerability score is low, but the assailants can be compromised a 
critical asset using multi-step attack techniques. As CVSS is not taken into the 
considerations the interaction between vulnerabilities and other dynamic featured 
of the exposures. The computed values of the dynamic method used in a novel 
approach to building the cost-centric attack graph. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH METHODS 
 Unidentified enemies with unknown skills, knowledge, resources, authority, 
motives, and objective attacking make risk measurement and management really 
challenging. This chapter contains work related to dynamic quantitative 
representation and investigation of computer and information security. The ability 
to accurately describe a security using quantitative methods could provide better 
control and evaluation of protection in operational settings [Herrmann, 2007].  You 
cannot master what you cannot assess. To recognise how well security 
requirements are met, one manner to approach this problem is to attempt 
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quantification. The goal of this work is to advance a new methodology to measure 
a dynamic severity cost impact for each host by developing the Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) based on base, temporal and environmental 
metrics to create a Dynamic Vulnerability Scoring System (DVSS) based on 
Intrinsic, Time-based and Ecological Metric.  
The interactions between vulnerabilities are considered and dynamic impact metric 
is produced, which can be viewed as a baseline between the static metric and the 
interaction between the exposures. The solution is based on utilising three files; (i) 
the first file contain Vulnerabilities and related static CVSS scores. (ii) The network 
architecture and configurations, including network devices such as routers, 
firewalls, and switches in the second file, (iii) the third file contains occurrences of 
CVSS scoring severity levels introduced from different security organisations. 
These files are used with relevant probabilities to estimate the dynamic cost score 
for each vulnerability. This is driven from a modified network.xsl, which contains 
the network infrastructure and configurations to calculate a dynamic new score for 
each vulnerability and save it as Dynamic.xsl file. By combining related sub-scores 
from dynamic file, a unique severity cost is produced by modelling the problem’s 
parameters using mathematical framework, a mathematical model is an 
appropriate approach as the different parameters used to calculate the final scores 
determined from network architecture, device setting, and the impact of 
vulnerabilities interactions. The individual static nature of CVSS affects the scoring 
value, thus a model has adapted to produce a DVSS metric that is more precise 
and efficient. In addition, it also addresses the problems of some vulnerability, 
which could have the same CVSS score even though the impact and accessibility 
is different. This is accomplished by introducing a correction factor, as different 
security organisations are susceptible to the same vulnerability; different levels of 
severity; the intrinsic correction factor is employed to measure the intrinsic scoring. 
This is reflected in the corrections.xsl file that is used in a mathematical formula to 
calculate the correction factor, which might have negative values to adjust the 
intrinsic scoring. 
 49 
 
A new method has developed to represent a unique severity dynamic cost of the 
total weight of all vulnerabilities for each host to represent the cost-centric severity 
for each state. 
A vulnerability rating approach is developed which considers the analysis of the 
occurrences of DVSS scoring at different periods (temporal); the formulae are 
modified to calculate the exploitability and the impact using the sub-score, 
parameters in the analysis of these occurrences to develop the new scoring 
system using the average of exploitability and impact sub-scoring weight. 
As an example, the equation to calculate the Intrinsic metric (InS) is: 
))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((( 1 
D
x
DDD
IFunctionEIroundInS  
where round1=round to one decimal, 
D
I =Dynamic Impact, 
D
E =Dynamic 
Exploitability. 
Please note 

AuACAV ,,  and 

AIInICI ,,  values are driven from the files specified 
above, which represent the dynamic values of vulnerabilities interactions and the 
network topologies and devices and the Calculated occurrence values. 
 While the occurrences changed, the scoring will take variable values instead of 
constant scoring. The vulnerability scoring calculated in the dynamic approach at 
different period.  
This approach was used to solve the problem with CVSS v2 of using a limited 
number of variables as much vulnerability scored the same numerical values, 
although the risk factors are completely different that will leads to miscalculate the 
risk factors and influence the security policies and mitigation plans. 
 
The DVSS framework is developed using modified equations to simplify the 
calculations of the vulnerability impact, dynamic scores and to benchmark against 
other models. The framework that could be applied by organisations to manipulate 
their own schemes and execute their own audits. 
A novel approach to exemplifying the cost-centric to each host is projected. by 
dividing the scores of the vulnerabilities into three primary degrees of privileges: (i) 
none; (ii) user and (iii) root, and classified these levels into operational levels to 
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key out and compute the dynamic severity cost of multi-step vulnerabilities to 
produce a unique severity cost for each vulnerability states, to be used to build the 
cost-centric attack graph. As this approach will reduce the visual complexity of the 
classical AG and assessing the security professionals to detect and mitigate the 
vulnerabilities and provide effective protections to the systems.  
This approach is used to solve many problems that exist in CVSS v2 such as: (i) 
the problem of the scores in CVSS, which should associate the scores of 
individual vulnerabilities into a total assessment of security to provide effective 
network security metrics that consider the interaction of vulnerabilities in a 
specified network. (ii) The problem existing in some vulnerability, as some of them 
scored low or medium according to their variables, but at the same time, it could 
lead to an attacker gaining the root/administrator password.  (iii) The problem of 
some Vulnerability scored zero by CVSS v2 such as arbitrary site redirect flow and 
it might cause financial or reputational damage.  
Finally, the framework is implemented on a prototype network; a test plan is 
introduced, by examining the dynamic scoring of DVSS using a practical network 
example. 
The implementations indicate CVSS combining scores problems and testing 
dynamic cost framework using the Nessus Scanner as a tool to detect known 
vulnerabilities on a prototype network. 
 A check list is prepared to make sure that the framework solve the problems 
existing in the static model, using  DVSS cost assigned to each host and the 
operational levels to identify and calculate the severity cost of multi-step 
vulnerabilities to implement a cost centric attack graph. 
The initial result shows the substantial reduction of the visual complexity of the 
dependency cost-centric attack graph. 
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3.3 VULNERABILITY DATABASES 
In this thesis, many examples are presented using vulnerability databases to 
represent and benchmarking the vulnerabilities using DVSS, CVSS scores and it 
is significant to make a survey of different vulnerability databases. 
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exploits Database (CVE) is a cooperative effort 
along with the theatrical role of the MITRE Corporation and research facilities, 
institutions, and projects [Herrmann, Debra S, 2007]. CVE list is an initiative to 
standardise vulnerability references and gives vulnerabilities a name in the form 
CVE-XXXX-YYYY [Purboyo et al., 2012], where XXXX represents the day of the 
month/year in which the vulnerability was recounted/reported. This central 
database allows each of the vulnerabilities to have one unique identifier, a CVE id, 
such as “CVE- 2002-0649.” The use of unique identifiers reduces the complexity of 
the international security threat identifications effort, in that are fewer duplicate 
vulnerabilities circulating, enabling a cleaner, and simpler network report to be 
generated. CVE serves as more of a dictionary of vulnerabilities than a database. 
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is one of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST)’s important security assets for learning the 
severity of computer security risks. NVD is the core of many other security 
databases and utilises the CVSS scoring system, allowing the fullest use of 
available public computer security risk analysis and quantification methods via 
CVSS scores [Mell et al, 2007]. NVD is also linked with CVE, enabling comparison 
and the expansion of NVD with CVE entries.   The CVSS scores from NVD, and 
identified vulnerability signatures in NVD entries, allow for this automated 
approach. NVD is used as the primary resource for finding vulnerabilities and 
determining their comparative severity and impact. Using NVD’s information about 
the vulnerabilities, vulnerability signatures can be derived, enabling the matching 
of network conditions to the extracted signatures, then marching to CVE IDs, and 
getting the CVSS base score from the NVD entries. Scores can be acquired for 
each of the vulnerabilities identified from the matching process. NVD provides a 
reputable, widely used, constantly updated, and openly available resource 
[Purboyo et al., 2012]. 
 52 
 
3.4 QUANTITATIVE RISK EVALUATION 
The Risk is limited to be a mapping of the probability (likelihood) and the severity 
(impact) of the probable breaches on a scheme. The risk in IT systems could be 
exposed from the Internet, Network, Servers, and Local Host. 
A prototype uses the Dynamic Vulnerability Scoring System (DVSS) metric 
groups: Intrinsic, Time-based, and Ecological metrics developed to measure the 
risk rate and safeguard a system.  As discussed in Section 3.2, CVSS v2 provides 
an individual static scoring for vulnerabilities; this strategy could make sense in the 
process of measuring an individual vulnerability score. Nevertheless, it is important 
to acknowledge that two or more apparently inoffensive vulnerabilities could be 
joined to create a critical impact in a multi-step attack environment. The fixed 
scores are a problem, as the scores combining metrics do not take into account 
the changes in the parameters, when the attacker moves from one stage to 
another and the network architectures and configurations affects, as theses 
parameters will lead to ineffective scoring values of the vulnerabilities and will 
influence the accuracy of security decisions and polices. To solve this problem, the 
vulnerability scanners should combine with network resources and configurations, 
these resources should modify the parameters used to calculate the dynamic 
impact scores (DVSS).   
The method as shown in Figure 3-1 can be summarised as follows: 
1-  Convert the Nessus scanning output to a spreadsheet XSL format 
(Nessus.xsl). 
2-  Create network architectures and configurations file Nconfig.xsl. 
3- The rules sheet (rules.xsl) which represents the rules in binary to represent the 
influence of each network device on the reachability and other sub-scoring 
parameters used by CVSS v2. 
4- Combine Nconfig.xsl with Rules.xsl to produce a single network specification 
file (Network.xsl) contains the necessary information of network architectures 
and configurations to be used in the DVSS calculation.  
An open source program is developed to convert Nessus scanning reports into 
(Nessus. xsl) is being given in that file which used to be administered against 
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network architectures and configurations file Nconfig.xsl and rules sheet 
rules.xsl to produce a single network specification file (Network.xsl). 
The DVSS takes the modified 

parameter  from network.xsl to calculate a 
dynamic new score for each vulnerability and save it as Dynamic.xsl. 
Different organisations are dealing with security impact severity in a different 
manner, they are using own formulae and reporting mechanism. Such as 
Secunia based in Denmark is using five levels of severity, ISS X-Force, which 
based in USA is using three levels of severity, FrSIRT, which based in France 
is using four levels of severity, and CVSS, which initially was NAIC project 
then, now under the custodial care of FIRST-SIG is using five levels of 
severity. In the methodology the severity of the vulnerabilities assigned in four 
levels as Critical in the range of 8 -10 of base score, High if the base score in 
the range of 7 – 7.9, Medium if the base score in the range of 4 – 6.9 and Low 
if the range 0.1 -3.9 and none to support mitigation administration priorities. As 
you can see in the Table 3-5, the diversions of severity level, as the security 
organisations are given to the same vulnerability different levels of severity. To 
calculate the intrinsic correction factor ( ) a corrections.xsl has been used, 
which contains the vulnerabilities and the corresponding scoring from above 
organisations, to consider the impact factors on the scoring that other 
organisations believes is being ignored in CVSS base calculations to make the 
empirical dynamic impact scoring more accurate. 
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Figure 3-1. The DVSS framework combines Intrinsic, Time-based, and Ecological Metric Groups 
 
The following formula is used to calculate the correction factor for the 
vulnerability x: 
nSbaseCVSS
n
x
xxx /
1



  
where xS represents the median value for each severity level, this formula 
builds using the median values of the severity range used for each organisation 
subtracted from the static severity value provided by CVSS. 
Example of calculating on the correction factor of the vulnerability CVE-2007-
2242, please note the CVSS scoring range of [0-10] is utilised in the following 
formula, as the DVSS will convert the range to [0-100]. 
nSCVSS
n
x
xbasex x
/
1



  
)4/)45.55.6445.5((8.7 x  
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45.2x  
 
Vulnerability FrSIR (x/4) Secunia(x/5) CVSS(x/5) Forse(x/3) Β 
CVE-2007-2242 Medium Medium High Medium M 
CVE-2007-3338 Critical Medium High High H 
CVE-2007-1497 Medium Medium High Medium M 
CVE-2007-3680 Medium Low High High M 
CVE-2007-1748 Critical High High High H 
      
Table 3-1. Security impact severity levels are offered by different organisations 
 
The initial exploitability metrics driven CVSS base score captures access required 
(AV) and attack complexity (AC) and authentication instances (Au). The 
corresponding values can be found in Table B-1. The dynamic exploitability is 
calculated as follows: 
 
The equation to calculate the Intrinsic metric (InS) is: 
))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((( 1 
D
x
DDD
IFunctionEIroundInS  
where round1=round to one decimal, 
D
I =Dynamic Impact, 
D
E =Dynamic 
Exploitability. 
Please note 

AuACAV ,,  and 

AIInICI ,,  values are driven from the files specified 
above. 
))1(*)1(*)1(1(*41.10

 AIInICII
D
 

 AuACAVE
D
***20  
{where 00)( 
DD
IIfIFunction  
     0176.1)( 

IIfIFunction } 
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The Intrinsic metric score, which represents a threat, could change over time 
according to the developments in exploiting methods, availability of mitigations and 
countermeasures for the vulnerability, exploit scripts and other information, Time-
based Score  (TS) is calculated  as follows: 
10*)(( 1 )R*R*E*  TS CL
D
S
D
InSround  
     
The Adjusted dynamic Impact Score (AI) is calculated as follows: 
))*1(*)*1(*)*1(1(*41.10,10(Minimum

 ARAIRIInICRCIAI
D
 
These equations were developed/adapted from the original CVSS scoring system, 
as CVSS is widely utilised and significantly accurate to calculate static scoring, the 
passing dynamic parameters, which looked at the network topologies, devices and 
interactions between vulnerabilities is the main criteria to calculate the dynamic 
scores. 
The Adjusted Intrinsic score (InSE) is recalculated using Adjusted Impact (
D
AI ) 
instead of Impact as shows below: 
))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((1
DD
x
D
E IFunctionEAIroundInS   
 
The Adjusted Time-based Score (AT) is calculated using BSE as follows: 
)R*R*E*  E CL
DD
InSroundAT (1  
 
The Ecological Metric Score (ES) could modify the metrics score of vulnerabilities, 
according to CDP, TD, and security requirements. The primary ground for using 
the quantitative metric method is to prepare a unique cost-centric value for each 
vulnerability; the environmental score will represent the Cost value for a 
vulnerability. 
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At this stage, a careful investigation of the formula applied is needed to calculate 
the ecological score, which is shown below:   
))1(*)5.0(*)10(((1 

TDCDPATATroundES
DDD
 
 
NIST [Mell et al., 2007] states that the formula used to calculate the environmental 
score should not produce a numerical score greater than the temporal score and 
the temporal formula should not produce a score higher than Base score, which 
represents the impact and three possibilities to exploit a vulnerability.  For that 
reason in ES formula, they subtract the maximum CDP, TD scores from the actual 
CDP, TD values. 
 
The threat of an existing vulnerability will have different impacts, according to 
assets essential and network settings. For example, CDP might evaluate the 
financial damage caused by exploiting a vulnerability in a specific asset; TD 
measures the percentage of assets that could be impacted if the vulnerability has 
been exploited. For the above grounds, the environmental score might be larger 
than the temporal and base scores according to CDP, TD and security 
requirements, the CVSS scores for base, temporal and environmental  scores 
range from 0-10, as the cost of vulnerabilities is evaluated in DVSS from 0-100, 
the final score is multiplied by 10.0 to adjust the final grade. 
 
From now on, the ES is called as Costv as shown in the modified formula: 
0.10*))(*)(*)10((( 1

 TDCDPATATroundCost
DDD
v  
 
DVSS is used based on CVSS v2, to produce unique quantities metric to evaluate 
the static severity cost of a specific vulnerability. The methodology based on the 
following facts driven from a careful consideration of different CVSS sub-metrics of 
Base, Temporal, and Environmental. 
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The possible adjusted impact essential to a vulnerability (the Intrinsic metrics 
indicate the points of impact), could be decreased or increased based on the 
security needs, driven from Ecological metrics as shown below: 
IntrinsicEcological (C)impact ality Confidenti(CR)t requiremenality Confidenti   
IntrinsicEcological  (I)impact Integrity (IR)t requiremenIntegrity   
IntrinsiclEcologica  (A)impact ty Availabili(AR)t requirementy Availabili   
IntrinsiclEcologica  (A)impact ty Availabili(CDP) potential damage Collateral   
IntrinsicIntrinsicIntrinsicEcological (C), (I) , (A) (TD)   
 
The primary causes behind these decisions to make the DVSS calculations more 
effective and accurate as the influences of Ecological sub-scores to the intrinsic 
sub-scores used by DVSS are considered. 
According to ISO 31010 [Massacci et al., 2011] the risk combines the 
consequences of a threat (impact) with the likelihood of its exploitability thus: 
 
Risk = Likelihood of an adverse event x Impact of the adverse event. 
 
By establishing, the formulae based on the Time-based and Ecological sub 
metrics provided by the DVSS, which could regularly assess, update, and easily 
maintain the result using a cost metric approach shown in Figure 3-1. 
The risk weight could be measured as a function of Impact and likelihood.   
),( LIfWi   
where I= Impact, L= Likelihood. 
 
A risk matrix Figure 3-2 linking the two vectors’ likelihood and impact is a graphical 
description of different dangers in a comparative manner. The matrix uses the 
standard four levels of weights to classify the ranks of different cases of risks 
based on empirical grounds. 
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40.00 70.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 
 
 
40.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 
 
 
10.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 
 
 
10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 
 
     
 
       Figure 3-2. A risk matrix, provides a description of the hazard ranking  
 
 
1- Level 1 (80-100) (Critical cost): Exploiting a vulnerability that allows an attacker 
directly to gain privileged rights to access (Administrator, root, power user) the 
system. For example, using a Buffer overflow attack, from a local or remote 
system to gain root access to a specific system.  
2- Level 2 (70): (High cost):  Exploiting a vulnerability that allows local or remote 
users to increase their privileges on a system or access confidential information, 
such as company financial records or user passwords, are usually considered 
moderate risks.  
3- Level 3 (40) (Medium cost):  Exploiting a vulnerability like a Denial-of-Service 
attack: Generally, these do not compromise the system beyond a Denial-of-
Service. This type of attack often prevents running a particular service.  
4- Level 4 (10) (Low cost): Exploiting a vulnerability that provides information, 
(Information about the target is gathered) to an attacker who might use them to 
carry out additional compromise efforts. 
 
This model is widely used in most risk assessments; some other models just use 
low, medium and high. This model is suitable for the cost-centric approach as it 
represents the risk in terms of Critical risk, high, medium, low and none. 
     
2 4 6 8 10 
2 
4 
6 
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0 
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The DVSS framework is built, using modified equations to simplify the calculations 
of the vulnerability scores and to benchmark against other models. The DVSS 
scores range from [0, 100] with the higher score meaning worse security. 
The following examples are to test the DVSS framework, by evaluating the sub-
scores attribute with the Ecological (Cost) score, in example 2-1, the attributes of  
maximum sub-scores values should result in a maximum Ecological score and 
vice versa in example 2-2. 
 
Example: 2-1 (Critical cost-Maximum)  
If a given vulnerability has the following DVSS sub-scores (maximum) attributes, 
then the Ecological score represents a critical cost: 
Intrinsic:  
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: C  I:     C A: C 
Time-based: 
E: H RL: U RC: C 
Ecological(Costv) 
TD: ND CDP: H CR: H IR: H AR: H 
 
The equation to calculate the Ecological (Costv ) is: 
*As a replacement for Ecological scores, will be used as Cost v, as this account 
represents the final dynamic impact cost for vulnerabilities.    
1- The Impact (I) and Exploitability (E) are calculated  as follows: 
 
 
))1(*)1(*)1(1(*41.10

 AIInICII
D
 
I=10.41 * (1-(1-0.66)*(1-0.66)*(1-0.66)) 
I = 10. 

 AuACAVE
D
x ***20  
0.704 * 0.71 * 1.0 * 20
D
xE   
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2- The Intrinsic score calculate as follows:  
 
)))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((( 1 
D
x
DDD
IFunctionEIroundInS
 
))0)176.1*)5.110*4.00.10*6.0((( 1  roundInS
D
 
10.0
D
InS  
 
3- The Time-based Metric Score (TS) is calculated as follows: 
 
)(( 1 )R*R*E*  TS CL
D
S
D
InSround
 
)0.10.10.10.10(( 1 )***  TS round
D
  
0.10
D
TS  
 
4- The Costv is calculated as follows: 
 
The Adjusted Impact Score (AI) is calculated as follows: 
 
))*1(*)*1(*)*1(1(*41.10,10(Minimum

 ARAIRIInICRCIAI
D
 
))1.51*0.661(*)1.51*0.661(*)1.51*0.661(1((*41.10,10(Minimum 
D
AI
0.01
D
AI  
 
The Intrinsic score is recalculated to get the Adjusted Intrinsic score (InSE) 
using Adjusted Impact (AI) instead of Impact as shown below: 
))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((1
DD
x
DD
E IFunctionEAIroundInS   
)176.1*)5.10.1*4.00.01*6.0((1  roundInS
D
E  
0.01
D
EBS  
.10
D
xE
 62 
 
 
The Adjusted Temporal Score (AT) is calculated using BSE as follows: 
)R*R*E*  E CL
DD
InSroundAT (1
 
)***  0,10.10.10.10(1roundAT
D

 
0.10
D
AT  
 
The Costv Score is calculated as follows: 
10*))1(*)5.0(*)10(((1 

TDCDPATATroundCost
DDD
v  
10*))0.1*5.0*)1010(0.10((1  roundCost
D
v  
0.10,100  ESCost
D
v  
 
Example 2-2 (Low cost-Minimum) If a given vulnerability has the following DVSS 
sub-scores (minimum) attributes, then the Ecological score represents a low cost: 
Intrinsic: 
AV: L AC: H Au: M C: N  I:     N A: N 
Time-based: 
E: U RL: TF RC: UC 
Ecological 
TD:  N  CDP: N CR: L IR: L AR: L 
 
The equation to calculate Costv (which represents a minimum cost) is: 
 
1- The Impact (I) and Exploitability (E) are calculated as follows: 
))1(*)1(*)1(1(*41.10

 AIInICII
D
 
0))-(1*0.0) - (1*0.0) - (1-(1 * 10.41
D
I  
0
D
I  
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
 AuACAVE
D
x ***20  
0.45 * 0.35 * 0.395 * 20
D
xE  
 
 
 
2- The Intrinsic score calculate as follows:  
 
  ))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0(((
1 
D
x
DDD
IFunctionEIroundInS
 
        ))00*)5.12.1*4.00*6.0(((
1  roundInS
D
 
  0
D
InS  
 
3- The Time-based Metric Score (TS) is calculated as follows: 
 
)(( 1 )R*R*E*  TS CL
D
S
D
InSround
)0.90.90.850(( 1 )***  TS round
D
  
0.0
D
TS  
 
5- The Costv is calculated as follows: 
 
The Adjusted Impact Score (AI) is calculated as follows: 
 
))*1(*)*1(*)*1(1(*41.10,10(Minimum

 ARAIRIInICRCIAI
D
 
))0.5*0.01(*)0.5*0.01(*)0.5*0.01(1(*41.10,10(Minimum 
D
AI
0.0
D
AI  
 
The Intrinsic score is recalculated to get the Adjusted Intrinsic score (InSE) 
using Adjusted Impact (AI) instead of Impact as shown below: 
))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((1
DD
x
DD
E IFunctionEAIroundInS   
2.1
D
xE
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)0.0*)5.12.1*4.00.0*6.0((1  roundInS
D
E  
0.0
D
EInS  
 
The Adjusted Temporal Score (AT) is calculated using BSE as follows: 
)R*R*E*  E CL
DD
InSroundAT (1
)***  9.09.00.850.0(1roundAT
D
  
 
 
The Costv Score is calculated as follows: 
10*))1(*)5.0(*)10(((1 

TDCDPATATroundCost
DDD
v  
10*)0)0.0*0.0*)0.010(0.0((1  roundCostv  
0,0  ESCostv  
    
 
3.5  CVSS v2 SCORING PROBLEMS 
The DVSS solved the following CVSS v2 scoring problems, (i) the methodology of 
combining CVSS scores of Base, Temporal and environmental provides a useful 
approach to measure fixed severity scores of different vulnerabilities. But in a multi-
step attack environment, the fixed scores are a problem, as the scores combining 
metrics do not take into account the changes in the parameters when the attacker 
moves from one stage to another (as evidenced by the DVSS approach that 
considers the reactions between vulnerabilities  in the way the example 
demonstrated in this chapter). (ii) Some Vulnerability have scored zero by CVSS v2 
such as arbitrary site redirect flow as the variable of the vulnerability as shown below:  
 Base score=4.3  
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: N  I:     P A: N 
 
0.0AT
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The impact of this vulnerability is to redirect specific site like Google or government or 
commercial website to another one, which might lead to financial or reputation 
damage, but the CVSS v2 scoring is null as the confidential and the integrity and 
availability variables scored none.  
Exactly how the DVSS solves the problem of measuring fixed severity scores of 
different vulnerabilities is demonstrated here. As explained earlier in this chapter, 
when multi-step attacks used, the fixed scores are a problem, as the scores 
combining metrics do not take into account the changes in the parameters when the 
attacker moves from one stage to another. 
The scores in CVSS should associate the scores of individual vulnerabilities into a 
total assessment of the security of the complete set in order to provide effective 
network security metrics that consider the interaction of vulnerabilities in a specified 
network, which introduce practical useful techniques for detecting and analysing 
vulnerabilities to secure network systems. 
To explain this indication in detail, the network example shown in Figure ‎3-3 is used, 
which represents an attacker through external networks wanting to exploit the 
vulnerability in Host-3 using multi-steps attack through Host-1 and Host-2, as the 
parameters of the vulnerability in the host-2 establishes the Access requirement, 
Av=Local and the attackers based behind the firewall. 
 
The detail of the descriptions of the vulnerabilities in Host-1, Host-2, and Host-3 is 
shown below: 
 
 
                                                                            
 
 
 
Figure 3-3. Practical Example indicates a CVSS’ combining scores problems. 
 
 
External 
Network 
Attacke
r 
Host-1 Host-2 Host-3 
CVE-1999-1468 CVE-2005-2120 CVE-2011-0739 
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The vulnerabilities details shown below: 
 
Host-1: CVE-2005-2120, this vulnerability exists in Windows XP and Windows 
2000 up for services pack-4 and permits attackers to influence the plug and play 
services by inserting illogical script, through a huge number of backslashes into 
the Registry Key/System Registry. The vulnerability will lead to compromise the 
confidentiality partially by revealing some of the data and information, and the 
integrity by letting the attacker alter the data, and the availability by distressing the 
services.  
 
 The CVSS v2 Parameters:  
Base= 6.5: 
AV: N AC: L Au: S C: P  I:     P A: P 
Temporal= 5.7 
 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Environmental v= 74.0: 
TD:  H  CDP: MH CR: M IR: M AR: M 
 
Host-2: CVE-1999-1468, this vulnerability exists in UNIX hosts, run in sending 
mail services and enables the local user to root to escalate the right to gain 
administrator/root privilege.  
The CVSS v2 Parameters: 
Base=6.2: 
AV: L AC: H Au: N C: C  I:     C A: C 
Temporal= 5.4 
 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Environmentalv = 68.0: 
TD:  M  CDP: MH CR: H IR: H AR: H 
 
 67 
 
 
Host-3: CVE-2011-0739, this vulnerability permits the running of an illogical script 
in a mail sent to a specific email address; exploiting the vulnerability will lead to 
compromise of the confidentiality by revealing the data and information, and the 
integrity by letting the attacker alter the data, and the availability by distressing the 
services.  
The CVSS v2 Parameters:  
Base= 6.8: 
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: P  I:     P A: P 
 
 
Temporal= 5.9 
 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Environmental v= 71.0: 
TD:  MH  CDP: M CR: M IR: M AR: M 
 
When the attacker manages to exploit the vulnerability in Host-1, he also manages 
to gain access to the LAN in the second stage of multi-step attack. The attacker 
will try to exploit the vulnerability in Host-2 which is located on the same subnet as 
the access requirement, Av=Local.  If the attacker is successful, then effectively 
the attack has happened through the external network where the attacker is 
based.  For that reason, the Av should replace to network instead of local and that 
will change the final scores of Intrinsic and the corresponding scores of Time-
based and Ecological. The same consideration should be taken to calculate other 
parameters, for example, if in the first stage of attack the attacker managed to gain 
the root/administrator privileges then logically the Impact and confidentiality and 
availability should change accordingly. The new scores of the vulnerability in Host-
2 according to DVSS are shown below: 
          ))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0(((
1 
D
x
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IFunctionEIroundInS
 
          7.3
D
InS  
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The Costv is calculated as follows: 
 
The Intrinsic score is recalculated to get the Adjusted Intrinsic score (InSE) 
using Adjusted Impact (AI) instead of Impact as shown below: 
))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((1
DD
x
DD
E IFunctionEAIroundInS   
The Adjusted Temporal Score (AT) is calculated using BSE as follows: 
)R*R*E*  E CL
DD
InSroundAT (1  
The Costv Score is calculated as follows: 
10*))1(*)5.0(*)10(((1 

TDCDPATATroundCost
DDD
v  
75,75  ESCostv  
 
Intrinsic = 7.3: 
AV: N AC: H Au: N C: C  I:     C A: C 
Time-based = 6.1: 
 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Costv= 75: 
TD:  M  CDP: MH CR: H IR: H AR: H 
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3.6 DYNAMIC COST CALCULATION FRAMEWORK 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4. Cost-centric calculation framework using the Nessus scanner 
 
Some vulnerability are scored low or medium according to their variables, which, 
at the same time, could lead to an attacker gaining the root/administrator 
password by using an attack such as cross site request forgery vulnerability.  
 Please note if the attackers gain the root/administrator access to the to the web 
site, they could execute arbitrary code and gain complete access to the system 
and fully compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability which make the 
base score much higher than 4.3.  
CVSS v2 used three levels of scoring in the range of 0.0 to 10.0, as they use a 
limited number of variables many vulnerabilities scored same numerical values 
although the risk factors are completely different. For example, a path disclosure 
vulnerability existing in any website application and the vulnerability that leads to 
pass through the system and read all files reachable through the web server. 
The following framework designed to solve above problem and develop a dynamic 
impact cost-centric. 
In this research, the Nessus scanner is used as a tool to discover known 
vulnerabilities; Nessus scanners ‎[Deraison, Renaud, 2006] are designed to identify 
vulnerabilities before the attacker can exploit them as shown in Figure 3-4. Then 
the vulnerability attributes are analysed and classified to calculate vulnerability 
costs, according to privileges as follows: 
 
NESSUS 
VURNABILITI
ES SCANNER 
 
VURNABILITY 
ATTRIBUTE 
ANALYSIS 
 
VULNERABILITIE
S 
PRIVILEGE 
CLASSIFICATION 
ROOT, SYSTEM 
ADMINISTRATOR 
(2) 
PRIVILEGED USER 
(1) 
GUEST, NONE (0) 
 
Calculate 
Severity cost 
levels depend 
on 
Vulnerabilitie
s 
 70 
 
1- The cost of vulnerabilities, which enables an attacker to instantly advance 
privileged access (system administrator. Root (2)). 
2- The cost of vulnerabilities, which the intruder could exploit the vulnerabilities 
with user account privilege or gain a user account privilege (privileged user 
(1)). 
3- The costs of the exploits that are enable an attacker, to exploit the vulnerability 
from external networks or website, with no privilege escalations. (Guest or 
None (0)). 
 
The classification is done according to the vulnerability specification to User 
privilege vulnerabilities and root privilege vulnerabilities, which include gaining 
privileged access along with other impacts and none. To calculate the operational 
values for each group of vulnerabilities, the Attack tree structure was used to 
calculate the OLC (the representation of cost-centric for each state). An Attack 
Tree (AT) is a multiple level diagram containing one root, multiple leaves, and 
multiple children. As with the bottom up model, child nodes must satisfy the 
conditions to mark true the straight parent node.  The attack is complete when the 
root is fulfilled. The child, through node only may satisfy the parent node.  ATs with 
AND & OR refinement, AND means the attacker should compromise all leaf node 
vulnerabilities to reach the goal or to progress to the next level of attack, while OR 
refinement means at least one vulnerability should be compromised to reach to 
the goal or to progress to the next level of attack [Edge, Kenneth S., 2007]. In this 
model, the AG is represented by cost centric driven from CVSS as a new 
approach to build effective AG. Exploiting more than one vulnerability in one asset 
is possible in terms of AND and OR refinement associations between 
vulnerabilities in different time slots, to calculate the effective cost according to 
operational levels.  Only one vulnerability from an operational level group can be 
exploited at a given time and based on this fact the relationships between 
vulnerabilities in terms of calculating the effective cost for each operational level 
will use only OR refinement to  adjust the operational costs to be near to the 
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higher cost vulnerability in the group. Chapter-6 in this thesis will give the formal 
definitions of CCAT and CAT. 
 
The following formulae will be used to calculate the Operational Level Cost (OLC):  
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By estimating the effective costs using AT structure, the probability and the 
dynamic cost of the vulnerabilities are distributed across the nodes as will be 
presented in details examples later in this chapter. 
 
3.7 FRAMEWORK TEST PLAN 
In this section, the foundational goal of the dynamic cost calculation framework is 
discussed, which is used when creating a dynamic cost-centric scoring for each 
status of hosts in the network and use them to build an impact cost-centric AG to 
reduce the visual complexity of a classical AG. 
The in-depth test plan should offer a complete list of required results, functional 
requirements that can contribute to finding the primary strength and weaknesses 
of the framework.  
The test plan checklist: 
1- The method used in the framework to proceed  analyse of  the vulnerability 
attributes and classify and calculate vulnerability costs, according to privileges 
should provide effective cost according to operational levels. 
2- The framework is capable to provide dynamic cost-centric for each state of the 
host, and classify and calculate the dynamic vulnerability costs according to 
privileges.  
3- The proposed method should produce a security standard solution and met 
the system specification.  
4- Inspection the cases of using a different techniques and structures used in the 
method could lead to inappropriate results.  
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5- Examining the cases when the correct setup of the test platform could lead to 
inappropriate outcomes and the adverse disturbs on the setup goal.  
  
   
3.8 PRACTICAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPING A COST-CENTRIC ATTACK 
GRAPH 
For the purpose of framework analysis, a prototype network setup is been used, 
with two computers (this approach is applicable for much more complex enterprise 
level network architectures as you will see in Chapter-4). PC1 (Windows XP 
platform with IP: 192.168.153. 160) and PC2 (Lunix Platform with IP: 192.168.153. 
31) are connected with 100 MBPS Ethernet switch, the Nessus 4.x scanner 
installed on PC1 and program has been used to convert the Nessus scanning 
output to a spreadsheet XSL format (Nessus.xsl) and network architectures, and 
configurations file Nconfig. xsl, the rules sheet (rules.xsl) which represents the 
rules in binary to represent the influence of Ethernet switch configuration  on the 
reachability and other sub-scoring parameters used by CVSS v2. An open source 
program was developed to convert Nessus scanning reports into (Nessus. xsl) 
which used to be administered against network architectures and configurations 
file Nconfig.xsl and rules sheet rules.xsl to produce a single network specification 
file (Network.xsl). 
The DVSS takes the modified data from network.xsl to calculate a dynamic new 
score for each vulnerability and save it as Dynamic.xsl. 
Instead of specifying a state by network attributes, a dynamic cost-centric model is 
proposed; each state in the graph is stated using the features/vulnerabilities of an 
individual host. The dynamic cost centric attack graph is a reference of this model 
by using the DVSS cost calculator and attacker privileges. The methodologies and 
all of the concepts mentioned are used to develop dynamic quantitative risk 
evaluation metrics and the existing results being used to build the dynamic cost-
centric attack graphs. Nessus 4.x scanner is been used as a tool to discover 
known vulnerabilities on PC1 and PC2 on the prototype network shown in Figure 3 
- 5. The Dynamic.xsl file is analysed adding the correction factor to the intrinsic 
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score as the different security organisations are given the same vulnerability, 
different levels of severity. The intrinsic correction factors are used to evaluate the 
intrinsic scoring, the corrections.xsl  file has been used with a mathematical 
formula to calculate the correction factor, which might have negative values to 
adjust the intrinsic scoring. 
A new method to represent a unique severity dynamic cost of the total weight of all 
vulnerabilities is developed for each host. We calculate the severity cost for all 
vulnerabilities based on the DVSS score and then  process the existing results by 
classifying them to none, user and root privilege levels. We may need to tolerate 
some of the vulnerabilities, and to take countermeasures only for critical 
vulnerabilities when a multi-step intrusion is actually happening.  Accordingly, 
within each level, each of them classified to operational level 0, 1 and 2 (a multi-
step intrusion) severity cost and then use the existing results to build the cost-
centric attack graphs. 
 
 
                                                                 
 
 
                                                
 
Figure 3-5. Using Nessus scanner as a tool to discover known Vulnerabilities on PC1 and PC2 
 
 
 
The vulnerabilities classified into three levels, according to privileges (user, 
root/administrator, none). The user privileges are presented, those, which the 
intruder could exploit, the vulnerabilities with user account privilege or gain a user 
account privilege. While root privileges level are refers to the vulnerabilities that 
100 MBPS 
Switch 
PC2 PC1 
Network 
Attacker 
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could give the intruder root or admin privilege after exploiting the vulnerabilities 
and none privileges are presented the attackers, which can exploit the vulnerability 
from the external networks or website with no privilege escalations. User, root, and 
none privileges are shown in Table 3-2.  
                                   
 
 
Figure 3-6.  Using AT structure to calculate OLC, 
 
In this model, AT is represented using cost centric driven from DVSS as a new 
approach to building effective AT. Exploitation of more than one vulnerability in 
one asset is possible in terms of AND and OR refinement associations between 
vulnerabilities in different time slots.  For calculating the effective cost, according 
to operational levels, only, one vulnerability from an operational level group could 
be exploited at a given time.  Based on this fact the relationships between 
vulnerabilities in terms of calculating the effective cost for each operational level 
will use only OR refinement to adjust the operational costs to be near to the higher 
cost vulnerability in the group. To calculate the OLC CPC 1, 0, which means the 
average severity of PC-1 vulnerabilities with none privileges, we will use the 
following formula and methods: 
 
As shown in Figure 3-6 and Table 3-2, the OLC- CPC1, 0 for Vn1, Vn2, Vn5 and 
Vn10 vulnerabilities calculated as follows: 
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Using AT to calculate the OLC for CPC 1, 0, CPC 1.1 and CPC 1, 2 shown in 
Table 3-2 and Figure 3-7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Vn1 Vn2 Vn5 Vn10   OLC Value 
Probability 0.31 0.25 0.20 0.24     
None privileges 57 47 38 44   CPC1,0 56.31 
 Vn4 Vn6 Vn9 Vn11     
Probability 0.23 0.31 0.26 0.19     
User privileges 52 71 60 44   CPC1,1 70.47 
 Vn3 Vn7 Vn8      
Probability 0.33 0.33 0.33      
Root/Administrator 
privilege 
89 90 87    CPC1,2  89.12 
 
Table 3-2. Operational levels of PC1 Host 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-7.  Vulnerabilities distribution for PC1  
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In the same manner, the average level of vulnerabilities is calculated for OLCs as 
shown in Figure 3- 8 and table 3- 3. 
 
 Vn1 Vn2 Vn6 Vn7 Vn11 Vn12   OLC Value 
Probability 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.18 0.17 0.06     
None privileges 50 64 69 54 51 18   CPC2,0 68.58 
 Vn8 Vn10 Vn13 Vn14 Vn15 Vn16 Vn17    
Probability 0.13 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.10 0.06    
User privileges 48 77 54 65 66 38 23  CPC2,1 76.47 
 Vn3 Vn4 Vn5 Vn9       
Probability 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.23       
Root/Administrator 
privilege 
92 91 90 82     CPC2,2  91.12 
 
 
Table 3-3. Operational levels of PC2 Host 
 
 
`
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-8. Vulnerabilities distribution for PC2 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Vn1 Vn2 Vn6 Vn7 Vn11 Vn12
Severity 50 64 69 54 51 18
OLC 68.58
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Vn8 Vn10 Vn13 Vn14 Vn15 Vn16 Vn17
Severity 48 77 54 65 66 38 23
OLC2.1 76.44
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
Vn3 Vn4 Vn5 Vn9
Severity 92 91 90 82
OLC 2,2 91.12
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
CPC1, 0 
CPC1, 1 CPC1, 2 
 77 
 
 
 
 
In the OLC model, the attributes of hosts PC1, PC2 include: 
1- Intruder’s right of entry privilege for each host: the privilege level, classified as 
system administrator/ root (2), regular user (1), guest or none (0). 
2- Security Metrics cost for each host: represents the CVSS score with the Risk 
Assessment levels for each host. 
3- Exploit mode: The attacker location (e.g. Local, Network) to perform an 
attack/exploit. 
3.9 RESULTS AND OUTCOMES OF FRAMEWORK TESTING  
 In practical testing of the framework demonstrated in section 3.7, the cost-
centric approach was tested using a prototype network. The Nessus Scanner 
4.x, developed open source program and a VLAN is used to separate the ports 
in the Ethernet switch and measures the influence on the dynamic.xsl file and 
the CVSS calculator demonstrated in the Appendix- is used to benchmark the 
DVSS scores with CVSS to monitor the impact of using a dynamic approach of 
calculation vulnerabilities scoring.  The method of vulnerability classification is 
divided into three levels, according to privileges (user, root/administrator, none) 
is tested by comparing the most critical vulnerability scoring. To make sure that 
the calculated values are reflect a real representation of the vulnerabilities 
existing in the hosts and the operational levels of the vulnerabilities states for 
each privileges are rigor and significant  and it will lead to correct results, at the 
time when the dynamic cost-centric values used to builds and ranks the attack 
graph.  
The following results are presented according to the test plan demonstrated in 
section 3.7: 
1- As shown in Figure 3-8 and Table 3-3, the dynamic severity costs driven 
from this approach according to DVSS scoring in each host, using OLCs are 
comparable to each other (DVSS and CVSS scoring values). If the dynamic 
impact and correction value are considered to the intrinsic scoring that will 
prove the framework used in this test is capable of providing an accurate 
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dynamic cost-centric metric for each state of the host and classify and 
calculate the dynamic vulnerability costs according to privileges. 
2- A VLAN is used to separate the ports in the Ethernet switch and measures 
the influence on the dynamic.xsl file. The CVSS framework demonstrated in 
the Appendix-B is used to benchmarking the DVSS scores with CVSS, to 
monitor the impact of using a dynamic approach in the calculation of 
vulnerabilities scoring. In section 3.4, which demonstrate the significant and 
accurateness of the dynamic cost approach use in the framework to precede 
the analysis of the vulnerability attributes. 
3- Using a different platform, Windows and UNIX in the practical example, with 
Nessus scanners and using dynamic files and the program proved that the 
proposed method produces a security standard solution and met the system 
specification. 
4- The AT used in this approach and lead to proper and accurate results, 
however, using this structure need a lot of adjustments and collaborations as 
in some cases the flow of the costs and probabilities could lead to improper 
results. The same issues are occurring with the hardware and software 
setup, for example, incorrect reading of the information from dynamic.xsl file 
leads to some mistakes in the dynamic calculations even when the manual 
calculations give a correct result due to some problems in digital 
communications. Which take some time for fixing them to get the correct 
results that indicate the need to improve the quality of the programs and 
tools were used in the investigations.     
5-  As you can see from Figure 3- 9, AG is using dynamic impact cost-centric 
metrics,  with a total of 7 states to represent the dynamic cost centric attack 
states for PC1 and PC2 and all possible paths. The main goal is to reduce 
the visual complexity of an AG using a CostRank methodology (as we will 
explain in the next chapter); the presentation of the full-scale scenario for the 
test pad indicates a dramatic reduction of the complexity of an AG. State 
zero (s0) represents the attacker initial stage, an assumption has been made 
that the attacker can initiate the attack on his/her own PC and he has full 
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privileges on it (ATT, 2).  The other state represents the status of PC1 and 
PC2 according to the vulnerabilities type. Exploit S1 means the attacker 
exploits a vulnerability in PC1 without gaining any privileges and without any 
authentications (PC 1, 0).  While S3 means the attacker exploits a 
vulnerability with a user's privilege or the attacker escalates the privileges as 
user as a result of the attack. S5 allows the attackers to gain 
root/administrator privileges because of exploiting a vulnerability.   
Please notice the direct cost to reach S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, and S6 represent 
OLC values shows below and in table 3-2 and 3-3. 
 
CPC 1, 0 = 56.31 = (S0, S1) 
CPC 1, 1 = 70.47 = (S0, S3) 
CPC 1, 2 = 89.12= (S0, S5) 
CPC 2, 0 = 68.58= (S0, S2) 
CPC 2, 1 =76.47= (S0, S4) 
CPC 2, 2 =91.12= (S0, S6) 
 
The indirect cost in multi-step attack will depend mainly on the destination state 
as shown in Figure 3-9.  For example (S3, S2) cost=68.58 as the attacker tries 
to exploit the vulnerability in PC2 with OLC 2, 0.  
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S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
Attacker PC 1, 0 PC 2, 0 PC 1, 1 PC 2, 1 PC 1, 2 PC 2, 2 
 56.31 68.58 70.47 76.47 89.12 91.12 
 
Figure 3-9. Dynamic Cost centric attack graph (a full-scale scenario) 
 
As the main goal of this thesis, to reduce the visual complexity of the attack graph, 
the benchmarking of the dynamic cost-centric AG approach with the classical 
method is substantial to illustrate the effectiveness and significance of the method. 
Figure 3-10, shows a) Prototype network for experiments taken from [Reginald 
Sawilla, 2008] and b) corresponding attack graph. The assailant, in this experiment 
has a direct access to PC1, which causes just one vulnerability Vu1 and PC2, 
which has likewise only one vulnerability Vu2. PC1 and PC2 have access to the 
destination machine, which possess just one vulnerability Vu3, there are no 
connection between PC1 and PC2. 
      
       
       
       
       
              
   
      
      
      
         
         
         
            
       
         
            
          
    
         
          
            
       
         
         
            
       
         
         
            
       
         
          
            
       
     -     
         
 81 
 
In this experiment, the authors generate the AG only for three vulnerabilities as 
shown in Figure 3-10 (b), the vertex colours used to represent the vulnerabilities 
with low and high risk, representing from blue to red.  
In the experiment using dynamic cost-centric AG, there are 10 vulnerabilities in 
PC1 and 17 vulnerabilities in PC2, the AG representation in Figure 3-9, represents 
a full-scale scenario, taking into account all the possibilities of multi-step attack. 
Just as, you can observe, the vulnerabilities in the instance represented in Figure 
3-9 are increased approximately 6 times.  
Using a full-scale scenario, the AG is much less complicated and the information 
presented is more comprehensive for system administrators and security 
professional.  
When the ranking algorithm will be utilised to determine the peak serious states (in 
Chapter-4), then an effective cost-centric approach can be applied to protect a 
critical asset and to carry out an effective countermeasure as the following 
chapters will show. 
 As an outcome, a novel and significant approach are presented, to develop a 
dynamic cost-centric scoring system using OLC, producing a unique severity costs 
for each state of the host. The cost-centric values are used to build a novel cost-
centric AG to reduce the visual complexity and to assist the security professionals 
and system administrators in security decisions and to create and maintain 
security policies and procedures.   
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a) Prototype network experiment 
 
              
 
b) A classical attack graph of prototype network (a). 
Figure 3-10. A classical attack graph of the Prototype network (a) taken from [Reginald Sawilla, 2008]   
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3.10  CONCLUSION 
This chapter, described a novel approaches, for developing a tool for dynamic 
vulnerability quantitative scoring. Including network topological analysis to 
measure the impact of network devices and configurations and considering the 
correction factor to change the scores of the intrinsic metric (as the different 
security organisations are given to the same vulnerability different levels of 
severity). In addition, the influence of these factors on the final scoring value of 
the vulnerabilities, as the network topology and configuration change, the 
formulae takes different scoring values from the developed dynamic database 
file instead of constant empirical static values used by CVSS.  
 The dynamic impact scoring of the vulnerabilities is then used, to advance the 
cost-centric method to assign a unique severity cost for each host. By dividing 
the scores of the vulnerabilities to three main levels of privileges: (i) none; (ii) 
user and (iii) root, and then classified these levels into operational levels to 
identify and calculate the severity cost of multi-step vulnerabilities. These 
advances and methods that provides an important stride towards reaching the 
objective of  securing network systems and to assist the security investment 
decision makers in the process of choosing a proper security solution based on 
the cost/benefit analysis, as the cost-centric method will be utilised in building 
and placing a novel cost-centric attack graph. 
 A unique dynamic severity cost model using the total weight of all vulnerabilities 
for each host has been developed, using DVSS scores of intrinsic, time-based, 
and ecological metrics by combining related sub-scores and modelling the 
problem’s parameters using mathematical framework. In the test pad, Nessus 
Scanner 4.x was used to discover known vulnerabilities, an open source 
program has been modified to process and combine different dynamic files to 
produce dynamic scores. The CVSS Framework demonstrated in the Appendix-
B is used to benchmark the DVSS scores with CVSS to monitor the impact of 
using a dynamic approach of calculation vulnerabilities scoring.  
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As the risk should be evaluated in terms of maximum impact on an adverse 
event, the risk matrix is used and modified formulae to collaborate the risk 
equations.  
The method of vulnerability classification into three levels, according to 
privileges (user, root/administrator, none) is tested. By comparison, the most 
critical vulnerability scoring to make sure that the calculated values reflect a real 
representation of the vulnerabilities existing in the hosts. In addition, the 
operational levels of the vulnerabilities states for each privileges are rigor and 
significant and it will lead to correct results, at the time when the dynamic cost-
centric values are used to build and rank the attack graph. Using a cost - centric 
framework to classify the vulnerabilities to none, user and root privileges, and 
then finding the scores to OLC, the practical approach, demonstrated that this 
classification really reflects the use of the risk matrices. The cost-centric values 
are used to build a novel DCCAG to reduce the visual complexity and to assist 
the security professionals and system administrators in security decisions and to 
create and maintain security policies and procedures.  An example of a dynamic 
Cost centric attack graph is presented with unique dynamic cost assignments 
according to different operational levels calculated using the cost-centric 
framework and formulae.  
In the next chapter, a novel approach to building up a scalable  CostRank 
algorithm for ranking the AG using a new approach to represent the states by 
implementing a dynamic cost-centric driven from statistical probability of  
dynamic impact scoring for the vulnerabilities.  
The ranks of the states represent the importance of the states in the Dynamic 
Cost-Centric Attack Graph (DCCAT). The resulting ranking represents a metric 
that can be used by security professionals and organisation administrators to 
establish different security decisions in order to improve the network protection 
based on the financial cost effective approach. As CCAG is represents the key 
step to elaborate the dynamic security business case. 
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CHAPTER 4.COST-CENTRIC ATTACK GRAPHS 
BASED ON DYNAMIC SECURITY METRICS 
ANALYSIS  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
. 
As the number of vulnerabilities and hosts in the network rises, the process of 
evaluating the critical vulnerabilities, which can be used by attackers, turns out 
to be vital. In modern computers, networks, there are usually several platforms, 
many software application packages, and different network technologies, so it is 
not sufficient to consider individual (static) vulnerabilities to evaluate security 
because using these approaches will lead to many security holes that most 
security professionals will be unable to discover.  
 The attack graph (AG) is a security model representing the chains of 
vulnerability exploits in a network. A number of researchers have acknowledged 
the attack graph visual complexity and the lack of in-depth understanding. 
Each Node in the AG represents a single attacker state (action), the paths in the 
AG represent a sequence of states that an attacker can use in a multi-step 
attack to exploit a vulnerability in the target’s potential assets. This results in a 
scenario where the attacker has breached network security.  
Classical AG methods evaluate the protection required by bringing into account 
the vulnerabilities in each host by using vulnerability-scanning tools.  
The interactions between the individual vulnerabilities and the network 
architectures and configurations are not considered in most AG models. 
 In the dynamic cost-centric AG, the paths of an AG are represents a chain of 
the states of dynamic vulnerabilities. These are referred to as states, where 
each state signifies an action of an attacker, such as the attacker gaining 
administrator/Root privileges on a specific host.  
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 In this novel approach, statistical probability mitigation to dynamic vulnerability 
impact model is used to construct a dynamic metrics attack graph. 
The network architectures and configurations, along with the interactions 
between the individual vulnerabilities are taken during the calculations of the 
cost. These are  exemplified by the Dynamic Vulnerability Scoring System 
(DVSS) and an associated the dynamic cost framework.  
Migrating statistical probability of the dynamic impact model is the key to this 
thesis, as in objective 1, 2  are achieved, referring to  Chapter-3,  A new 
methodology was built up to present an attack graph with a dynamic cost metric 
and also a novel methodology to estimate and represent the cost for each 
vulnerability states was developed. 
The next phase, as demonstrated in objective-3, is to develop a ranking method 
for cost-centric attack graphs to minimise dimension and complexity of the 
attack graphs. 
  As the classical AG suffers from visual complexity, the need of ranking 
techniques has arisen when performing link analysis to deal with these 
problems, the author studied some poplar ranking algorithms to develop a 
ranking method for CCAG. PageRank [Arasu, Arvind, et al., 2002] is the most 
respected ranking algorithms, considered equally a narrative of success for 
Google. Other ranking algorithms are considered to be less popular, such as, for 
example, Hyperlink Induced Topic Search (HITS) [Edge, Kenneth, 2007], Hub-
Rank, Sym-Rank and Auth-Rank.  All of these methods use Stochastic 
techniques for link analysis. Recently, researchers [Kijsanayothin, Phongphun, 
2010] suggested the idea of using a modified PageRank algorithm in 
dependency AG to rank the graph and detect the most effective vulnerabilities 
for proper analysis and to find effective countermeasures and mitigations. 
In this Novel approach, CostRank algorithm was developed (based on 
PageRank) using stochastic Markov model calculations taking into account the 
dynamic cost-centric approach via matrix’s Eigenvalue calculations to rank the 
states of vulnerabilities using statistical probability of the dynamic vulnerability 
impact model. This approach enhanced the classical approaches of constructing 
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and analysis of an AG.  As the CCAG is  based on dynamic vulnerability 
quantitative scoring, including network topological analysis to measure the 
impact of  network devices and configurations.  Considering the correction factor 
to change the scores of Intrinsic metric of DVSS and the interactions between 
vulnerabilities as discussed in Chapter-3, which reduced the problem of visual 
complexity in classical AG approaches, which represents a chain of  individual 
(static) vulnerabilities. In this approach, the states of the host are represented 
instead of each vulnerability, using the operational levels to model the cost of 
the states. 
Analysis and comparison have been conducted on the existing results of the 
ranking algorithms with those of Mehta et al. and Kijsanayothin approaches 
respectively, as these particular approaches are highly valued and published in 
high-ranking journals in the field of AG. The same undertaking was applied to a 
prototype network as a proof-of-concept validation of the model. Additionally, 
graphs and modelling environments have been extended in order to facilitate 
the computation of more complex metrics. The existing results demonstrate the 
effects of the algorithm. The dynamic cost-centric AG can be used as valuable 
tools in forensic investigation, detection and mitigation of the critical 
vulnerabilities for analysis and mitigations intrusion  detection and defence.   
There are four types of graph [Manaskasemsak, Bundit, and Arnon 
Rungsawang., 2005] [Sawilla, Reginald Elias, 2011]:  
i. Undirected graphs  
ii. Directed graphs 
iii. Undirected hypergraphs  
iv. Directed hypergraphs  
 
Detailed information about these four types is shown below with examples of 
suitability of data representations for each type: 
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4.1.1 Undirected graphs 
An undirected graph could be defined in terms of the relationship between 
vertices, as the relation between any two vertices is symmetric, (the edge not 
assigned with the direction attributes as in a directed graph).  
 
UG represents the undirected graph, UG = (Vx, E) which has a set of vertex Vx 
and a set of edges E that connect different vertices to each other. The edge set 
features could be represented as follows: 
 
EU = {(vn, vm) | vn, vm  Vx }  where n, m represents the vertex’s number, the 
above sets containing two vertices indicating that an edge occurs between 
them. 
The representation of the data in Facebook or Twitter or any other social 
network is more suitable to an undirected graph.  In Facebook, for example, the 
vertex symbolises the individuals and the edges represent the connection 
(friendships) between them.  
 
To justify the suitability of data representations with an undirected graph: 
Since the relationships between friends are usually both one to one and bi-
directional, an undirected graph is most suitable. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows an example of an undirected graph, the vertices represented 
from vertex-1 to 6. 
VU = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6} 
 
The set of edges represents the relationships between vertices as follows: 
EU = {(v1, v2), (v1, v3), (v1, v4), (v1, v6), (v2, v3), (v3, v5), (v4, v5)}. 
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Figure 4-1. An example of an undirected graph modified from ‎[Sawilla, Reginald Elias, 2011] 
 
4.1.2 Directed acyclic graphs 
In directed Graphs the relationship between vertices are Asymmetric, (the edge 
assigns with the direction attribute). The basic/simple directed graph is a 
representation in the form of a graph, but without loops (cycles) and with no 
compound/several arcs/ edges. The number of simple directed graphs of n 
nodes for n=1, 2 ...x are 1, 3, 16, 218, 9608 … 
V1 
V4 V5 
V6 V3 
V2 
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The graph is called a directed graph if the graph has directed arcs (edges) such 
as Ed =→ (vn, vm) is called directed graph from vn to vm where n, m is the edge 
numbers, vm represents the head and vn represents the tail. The number of 
heads brings up to a specific node called in-degree and amount of tails emerge 
from a specific node called out-degree, the edge set defined as: 
 
ED = {→ (vn, vm) | vn, vm   V} 
 
A web graph that contains websites links to each other is an example of data 
suitable to the directed graph.  Each vertex represents a website and the edges 
represent the links (hyperlinks) from one website to another.  The link between 
webpage X to webpage Y does not indicate there is a reverse link between 
webpage Y to webpage X, that justifies the web graph data is suitable to direct 
graphs. Figure 4.2 shows direct graphs representing a web graph.  
 
The web pages represented as graph vertex as follows: 
VD = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6} 
 
The set of edges (arcs) is represented as follows:  
 
ED = {→(v1, v3), →(v2, v3), →(v3, v4), →(v3,v5), →(v3,v6), →(v4,v5), →(v6,v3)} 
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Figure 4-2. Illustration of a directed graph modified from ‎[Sawilla, Reginald Elias, 2011] 
 
4.1.3  Undirected Hyper graphs 
A hyper graph [Sawilla, Reginald Elias, 2011] is an overview of a graph where 
arcs/edges could bond any number of vertices. 
 
An undirected hyper graph satisfies the condition that each edge be comprised 
of exactly two vertexes. These arrangements will not be used to characterise 
other dense sets of data apart from undirected graphs.  While they do not 
represent more complicated sets of data than undirected graphs, if the data set 
is naturally represented in 1-2-1 (one to one) fashion, the undirected hyper 
graphs can present the data in a more squeezed style ‎[Aykanat, Cevdet et 
al.,2008]‎ ‎[Sawilla, Reginald Elias, 2011]. 
 
The hype edge could be defined as a single undirected edge. The hyper graph 
can attach several vertices using a hyper edge. A hyper graph could be 
represented as: 
GHU = (VH, EH) 
 
v3 
v2 
v1 
v4 
v5 
v6 
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As shown above, the hyper graph encompasses a group of vertices VH with a 
group of edges EH which connects the vertices. A facet en    EH (where n 
represents the edge number) is a set en = {v1, v2, . . . , vk} denoting that all of the 
vertices in en are connected by a particular edge n. The hyper graphs can be 
described as S-Uniform if all the edges connect exact S vertices. Using the 
same logic, the undirected graphs could be called 2-uniform.  
 
An example of data's suitability to the hyper graph representation is a group of 
students and the courses they study. Figure 4.3 shows a hyper graph of 
students and courses, students represented by vertices, and the courses they 
study represented by hyper edges. Students are represented by the set of 
vertices as follows 
VH = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5} 
 
The courses are symbolised by groups of hyper edges 
EH = {{v1, v2}, {v1, v2, v3, v5}, {v5, v4}}. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3. An instance of an undirected hyper graph modified from ‎[Sawilla, Reginald Elias, 2011] 
 
4.1.4  Directed Hyper graphs 
A directed hyper graph is a hyper graph with direct hyper edges. Directed hyper 
graphs are the common generalisation of both directed graphs and undirected 
hyper graphs. A hyper graph could be represented as: 
GDH = (VD, EHD) 
V1 
V2 V3 
V4 
V5 Mathematics      English 
Chemistry 
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The directed hyper graph consists of vertices VD and an ED group of direct hyper 
edges or hyper arcs. 
  
A facet en   EHD (where n represents the edge number) is a set en = {v1, v2, . . . 
, vk} denoting that all of the vertices in en are connected by a particular edge, n 
is an ordered pair of detached vertex group en = (VD 
− 
→, VD 
+
←). Where the 
vertices in the group  V – (→) are the resources (Tail)  of the directed hyper 
edge and the vertices in the set V + (←) are the targets (Head) [Sawilla, 
Reginald Elias, 2011] Specific rates/weights ( ) are assigned to the edges 
using the following formula: 
HDDxEVCost :  
  will represent negative real numbers for source vertices and positive real 
numbers for the target vertices of a specific edge. 
 
An Fw-arc (forward hyperarc) is a directed hyper edge where cardinality of a 
source vertex set is one, |V+←|=| |=1, a Bw-arc (backward hyperarc) is a 
directed hyper edge where cardinality of source vertex set is one, |V-→|=| |=-1. 
An Fw-graph (forward hyper graph) is a directed hyper graph whose edges are 
Fw-arcs, a Bw-graph (backward hyper graph) is a directed hyper graph whose 
edges are Bw-arcs. 
 
An example of data's suitability to the direct hyper graph representation is an 
exploit against computer network vulnerabilities. The vertices in the directed 
hyper graph represent the attacker privileges; Fw Arcs represent the 
preconditions that enable the attacker to gain new privileges during an attack. 
 
An example of directed hyper graph represented in Figure 4.4, where the 
vertices symbolise the attacker privileges as follows:  
VD = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7} 
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Figure 4-4. Model of a directed hyper graph 
 
The preconditions to satisfy the goal target v1 are represented in terms of the 
following vertices: 
{v2} or {v3, v4} or {v5, v6, v7}. 
 
EHD = {((v1) ← (v2)), ((v1) ← (v3, v4)), ((v1) ← (v5, v6, v7))}. 
 
4.2 ATTACK GRAPHS CLASSIFICATIONS 
Much research in network security has focused on generating attack graphs 
from attack paths composed of states and vulnerability exploits, according to a 
probable grouping. The attack graph could be organised ‎[Steven Templeton and 
Karl Levitt, 2000] as:  
 
1. State oriented Attack Graph. 
2. Exploit oriented Attack Graph. 
3. State Exploit oriented Attack Graph. 
 
 95 
 
4.2.1 State-Oriented Attack Graph 
In this class, the vertices represent a group of the network states and the 
attacks/exploits represent the edges to show the transitions from one state to a 
different state in the network.  
 
The attack/exploit is an utilisation of vulnerability; the descriptions of an exploit 
will be in terms of its preconditions and impacts. The characteristic of the 
network or group of network characteristics can describe the term network state, 
such as network node/host, node connectivity, and installed/upgraded/modified 
software application on a specific node, privilege access right or any other 
character such as privilege level. 
 
The vulnerabilities are described in terms of their preconditions and post 
conditions in the state oriented attack graphs as shown in Figure 4-5 taken 
from ‎[Bhattacharya, Somak, and S. K. Ghosh, 2008], the attacker can grant 
more states in the network if the preconditions of the vulnerabilities are fulfilled.  
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Figure 4-5. State-Oriented attack graph generated by model checker [Bhattacharya, Somak, and S. K. 
Ghosh., 2008]. 
 
Referring to Figure 4.5, which represents a state oriented attack graph; in this 
example, there are two incidents of two attacks. 
 
The ftp bounce attack (att 0) is an attack/exploit of ftp software vulnerability; in 
this exploit the attackers using “port” command to get access to the ports on the 
target host/node using a specific host as middle host/man.  
 
The secure shell (ssh) buffer overflow (att1) represents vulnerability in the 
software applications (web site) by sending very large packets and executing an 
arbitrary code to get access to the remote host through a network to copy, 
modify, delete or add files or change configurations and settings. 
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These two exploits att0, att1 are not related to each other in their precondition or 
their post condition in the network specifications. 
 
The attacks can be moved in any direction, for example: 
att 1 (0,    →     1 (0, 1  →     0 (1, 1  →     2 (1,    → att 3 (2 , 2) 
or  
att 0 (0,    →     1 (1, 1  →     1 (1, 2  →     2 (1,    → att 3 (2, 2) 
 
Each vertex in the state oriented attack graph represents a state assigned with 
a digital number 0, 1, 2, 3,... n which represents node-1, node-2, node-3, 
...node-n.  
 
The main goal of a state oriented attack graph model is to discover possible 
paths from the source host (attacker host) to the target host in terms of 
exploiting vulnerabilities and gaining privileged access, in efficient manners, 
acceptable timing and finding appropriate countermeasures to mitigate 
vulnerabilities across the paths.  
 
The model should contain the appropriate tools to represent all states of the 
network in terms of connectivity, privileges, configurations, vulnerabilities and 
other recourses in order to represent different paths the attackers might use to 
exploit vulnerabilities. The representation of a different state in the following 
methods for example  
User > Administrator>S 
  Mean the user on host S has administrator privilege. 
 
Buffer overflow > N  
FTP > H1 
This will return true/false for the first one; it means, the buffer overflow can run 
and execute arbitrary code to gain privileges on host N and the second one 
means the ftp services can run on host H1. 
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4.2.2 Exploit dependency/Oriented Attack Graph 
In the exploit oriented attack graph, the vertices signify conditions and the edges 
represent the exploits. This is the converse of the state oriented attack graph 
and sometimes, refers to it as an exploit dependency, attack graph. 
 
The representation of exploiting oriented attack graphs comes with primary 
condition/s and goal condition/s and the states of some unique hosts. The 
exploit-oriented attack graph's initial state(s) and the goal state(s) of the network 
are special nodes. Primary condition/s symbolises the exploit hosts with exact 
post conditions and void/null preconditions. Goal condition/s represents the 
exploit hosts with exact preconditions and void/null post conditions. 
 
Figure 4.6 demonstrates the exploit oriented attack graphs; the oval symbols 
represent the exploits and the plain text represents the conditions, as 
exceptions the triple octagon represents the goal conditions‎[Steven Templeton 
and Karl Levitt., 2000]. 
 
For example: 
F     ,    →         , 0  →          →         ,    
 
The numerical values in the parenthesis represent specific hosts. 
FTP (1, 2) indicates execute FTP on host 1 to transfer files from host 2, user (2) 
indicates using user privilege on host 2 and trust (1, 2) indicate host 1 trust host 
2.  
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Figure 4-6.  Exploit dependency/oriented attack graph [Noel, Steven, et al., 2003]  
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4.2.3 State-Exploit-Oriented attack graph 
The states and exploits are represented as vertices in the state-exploit oriented 
attack graph ‎[Steven Templeton and Karl Levitt, 2000].  An edge in this graph 
could relate to a specific state, to a specific exploit or a specific exploit and a 
state. The edge will not directly relate a state to another state or an exploit to 
another exploit.  
 
In this thesis, a state oriented attack graph is used. As a state is a network 
attribute or set of network attributes, network state, such as network node/host, 
node connectivity, and installed /upgraded/modified software application on a 
specific node, privilege access right or any other render character such as 
privilege level. The goal is to develop a DCCAG approach where states are 
used to describe vulnerabilities, and the state-oriented attack graph model has 
been modified to represent the dynamic cost metric approach methodologies. 
The state oriented attack graph was more appropriate in this research, as the 
cost-centric framework is used to represent the dynamic state for the 
vulnerabilities existing is a specific critical asset (host) according to the different 
operational levels based on privilege, the cost of exploiting a vulnerability is 
determined according the accumulation approach of a dynamic cost calculation. 
As it is very important to reduce the visual complexity of an AG to enable 
security professionals and system administrators to fully understand the 
information presented to secure Network systems from intended attackers.   
 
4.2.4 Vertex ranking 
As the AG suffers from visual complexity due to the huge number of vertex and 
arcs are used to construct the graph, which lead to the lack of in-depth 
understanding of information offered, different ranking techniques using link 
analysis have been used to deal with these problems. PageRank ‎[Arasu, Arvind, 
et al., 2002] metrics is the most respected ranking algorithm, considered as a 
story of success of Google. Other ranking algorithms considered to be less 
poplar like Hyperlink Induced Topic Search (HITS)‎ [Ding, Chris, et al., 2002], 
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Hub-Rank, Sym-Rank and Auth-Rank  all use  Stochastic methods for link 
analysis. 
 Recently, researchers suggested ideas to solve some problems in PageRank 
such as Input/output efficiency matrix’s Eigenvalues calculations to be 
implemented in AG, in  ‎[Rungsawang, Arnon, and Bundit Manaskasemsak, 
2003] Many examples demonstrated that during the calculations of derived 
eigenvectors in the directed graphs matrices, it is possible to derive the ranks 
within the sub – link analysis. 
This approach is used in the CostRank algorithm to rank the dynamic cost-
centric AG. The main idea of the CostRank algorithm in terms of vertex ranking 
is to consider a specific state (vertex) as a high rank state if it is linked with 
many other high rank states.  
 
A fixed probability distribution, conversion matrix is used in graph 
ranking ‎[Sawilla, R., and X. M. Ou, 2007]  calculations,  The graph is primarily 
mapped to a random walker matrix, occasionally called random jump, as each 
vertex/node is assigned with a value based on the probability of 
incoming/outgoing links representing the relationships with other vertex. 
Referring to Perron’s theorem, that makes the principal eigenvector unique, 
positive, and real. Mehta et al. ‎[Mehta, Vaibhav, et al., 2006] gives thorough 
descriptions of stochastic process models and random walk matrix, which 
describe the fundamental concepts of the CostRank  for vertex ranking. 
 
There are no assurances that the principal eigenvectors will be unique, if the 
adjacency matrices  ‎[Chen, Yen-Yu et al., 2002] ‎[Zonghua et al., 2012] of 
graphs are not irreducible (the matrix is irreducible if their elements are tightly 
coupled). SALSA and HITS ‎[Ding, Chris, et al., 2002] are examples of two Web 
Pages graphs ranking algorithms, which do not use irreducible matrix. In the 
CostRank algorithm, several principal eigenvectors are used, the results of 
biggest eigenvalue multiplicity; the principal eigenvalue has been always one of 
probability evolution methods. 
 102 
 
 
These ranking algorithms compute their output with the use of an iterative power 
technique; the principal eigenvector provides the ordinary probability for a 
random walker to be assigned to every vertex. Calculating the fixed distribution 
employing the power method provides an instinctive form of a random walk. 
 
The calculations of CostRank are based on the stochastic Markov model, as the 
computation also depends on finding a fixed probability distribution for a Markov 
chain in which states/websites are represented as vertices or nodes. The 
CostRank algorithm assigned initial ranking values for each and every 
vertex/node in the directed graph and creates the initial ranking values matrix.  
These values will be equivalent to 1/ total number of nodes; it will then create a 
random walker matrix as each vertex/node assigned with a value based on the 
probability of incoming/ Outgoing links representing the relationships with other 
vertex. 
 
In the first iteration, the CostRank algorithm will multiply the initial ranking values 
matrix by the random walker matrix to get a new ranking matrix, as each vertex 
will receive a new ranking value. 
 
These processes/iterations will carry on until fixed probability distributions for 
the Markov chain is held; the ranking matrix will represent the final ranking 
values for all peaks in the DCCAT. 
 
4.3 THE COSTRANK FRAMEWORK 
The CostRank algorithm is developed based on Google PageRank algorithm to 
demonstrate significance high rank states based on dynamic cost probability 
that the attackers can use in multi-step attack to exploit a vulnerability in the 
target critical asset.  
As demonstrated in Figure 4-7, the core of the security solution presented in this 
thesis is CostRank method.  
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The CostRank framework is presented in this section to map the thesis 
objectives with different phases of the process of producing important high rank 
states to reduce the complexity of the classical AG and to present useful 
information can be used by the security professionals to secure network 
systems. 
1- Activated the Nessus scanners for all the hosts in the network 
system to reveal the individual vulnerabilities are exist in each host. 
2- Combine the Network configuration file with devices rules file to 
create a single network specification file (Network. xsl) contains the 
necessary information of network architectures and configurations to 
be employed in the DVSS calculation.  
3- Compute the DVSS score for each vulnerability existing in the 
network hosts, at this phase objective 1 was met. 
4- Put through the cost-centric method to specify a unique severity cost 
(impact cost-centric) for each host by dividing the loads of the 
vulnerabilities to three principal degrees of privileges: (i) none;  (ii) 
user and (iii) root, and then sorted out these levels into operational 
levels to key out and estimate the severity cost of multi-step 
vulnerabilities. 
5- Construct the DCCAG according to the cost-centric values, which 
represents the states of each attack actions of the vulnerabilities, at 
this phase objective 2 was met. 
6- Run CostRank algorithm using stochastic Markov model calculations 
taking into account the dynamic cost-centric approach via matrix’s 
Eigenvalue calculations to rank the states of each attack actions of 
the vulnerabilities using statistical probability of the dynamic 
vulnerability impact model. This approach enhanced the classical 
approaches of constructing and analysis of an AG, at this phase 
objective 3 was met. 
As you can see from Figure 4-7, there is a need to develop a new 
parallel algorithm to implement CostRank for distributed parallel 
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computers using multiprocessors. To reduce the complexity of the serial 
CostRank algorithm, that related to the objective four and will be 
discussing in Chapter-5. 
All the phases mentioned above will be used to develop an effective 
countermeasures solution against network attacks using cost-centric 
model, this work related to objective five and will be covered in Chapter-
6. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-7. The construction of the security solution proposed in this thesis  
 
4.4 QUERY INDEPENDENT LINK BASED RANKING-PAGERANK 
A CostRank algorithm is developed based on PageRank using stochastic 
Markov model calculations taking into account the cost-centric approach via 
matrix’s Eigenvalue scheming, This was used to rank the states of 
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vulnerabilities using a statistical probability mitigation to a dynamic vulnerability 
impact model. 
The main alterations, between the Costrank and the PageRank approach are 
presented in Section 5.9. 
 The following definition of PageRank ( ) is given. Let u be a web page (a 
vertex in the graph). Then let Fw (u) represent the groups of forward (outgoing) 
links from u and let B k (u) represent the groups of (incoming) links to u. Given 
od (u) = |Fw (u)| represent the out degree of u.  
 
 (u) represents the rank   of vertex u. The initial rank Ʀ values of the vertices 
are computed as follows, each vertex is allocated to the initial Ʀ value 
equivalent to 1/n, n represents a whole number of vertices/pages in the 
Webpages directed graph. 
 
= Vufor
uod
u
uBu k



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At the conclusion of this phase, the initial ranking vector representing the initial 
ranking values for all the vertices in the Webpages graph.
 
 
 
v
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Figure 4-8. A simple web graph with vertex weight 
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The second phase is the calculation of random walker matrix PR that stands for 
the row stochastic matrix related to the Webpages graph G.  
 In this demo, all arcs assumed to have, in any event, one outgoing connection. 
In the case exhibited in Figure 4–8, there are outgoing  links  from page X to 
page Y, and from page X to page N then the total outgoing links from X is 
represented by od (i) where i interpret a specific vertex in the graph, in this case  
od (x) =2. The random walker matrix entries PR (xy) have the value 1/od (i); all 
the other representations will have the value 0. 
 
P X Y Z N M 
X 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 
Y 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 
Z 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 
N 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
M 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 
 
 
Table 4-1. Transition probability of random walker matrix 
 
The third phase is to calculate the new ranking values by using the vector 
matrices multiplications, by multiplying the initial ranking vector by the random 
walker matrix as first iteration, the result will be the new ranking matrix  [ ]1n  x 
[PR ]nn. Repeated multiplication of the vector by random walker matrix PR will 
give the principal eigenvector of the matrix PR. The new ranking matrix after 
iterations represents a stochastic transition matrix of Web pages graph G. The 
PageRank  
)1(  t  represents the results of vector/matrix multiplications.  As 
explained, as these cancellations represent fixed probability distributions over 
web page links, the iterations (multiplications) must carry on until the ranking 
probability reaches the stable states values (fixed) to represent the final vertex 
ranking in the graph as shown below: 
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The PR represents the random walker matrix of web browsing over the 
Webpages graph; the calculation of a fixed probability distribution for a Markov 
chain of Web pages in the directed graph represents the ranking states. The 
separate time steps in the chain and the iterations of   computation are shown 
in Figure-4-9.  The ranking after 13 iterations, until the algorithm reached fixed 
probability, is X=0.22, Y=0.17, Z=0.18, N=0.27 and M=0.16. In this case, N is 
the most important web site. 
 
Figure 4-9. A simple web graph with vertex weight after 13 iterations 
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In the following example shown in Figure 4-10 (a), the damping factor (d), as  cited 
earlier the final probability assigned to a specific webpage represent a specified 
probability distribution for a Markov chain of all Web pages points to it, to reduce 
the influence of many pages added their probability values, a value between 0, 1 
assigned to damping factor. 
The majority of the articles and practical assignment of google page rank used the 
value d= 0. 85, but other values could be used according to specific environments. 
In other, hand the value (1-d) which assigned the value 0.15 to a specific web 
page when there is no page appointed to it at all. 
The pattern used to forecast the probability distribution, modified as follows: 
 
)*(*/)1(
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1
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The ranking after 13 iterations as shown in Figure 4-10 (b), until the algorithm 
reached fixed probability, is A=0.135, B= 0.135, C=0.135, D= 0.18, E=0.24 and 
F=0.175. In this case, E is the most important web site. 
Please note the sum of the all fixed probability of all web pages always equal to 
one. 
 
                 
(a)                                  (b)
Figure 4-10. A network graph with vertex weight using damping factor after 13 iterations 
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4.5 METHODOLOGIES FOR DEVELOPING THE DYNAMIC COST-CENTRIC 
RANKING  APPROACH 
In real-world environments, the complexity of an AG, is well beyond the human’s 
capabilities to understand. It is important to distinguish applicable parts of the 
graph to analyse. The ranking model of an AG is suggested to accomplish that. 
In the CostRank approach, a ranking model of the dynamic states of 
probabilistic cost-centric AG is proposed similar to the Google PageRank 
algorithm to demonstrate significantly higher ranked states based on dynamic 
cost probability that the attackers can use in multi-step attack to exploit a 
vulnerability in the target critical asset. Using a CostRank algorithm for cost-
centric AG, can allow the security professional and system administrator to 
focus on specific vulnerabilities, thus is allowing them to deploy a policy of 
implementing security countermeasures to protect the network system in a cost 
effective manner. 
In the dynamic CostRank approach, instead of specifying a state by network 
attributes, a dynamic cost- centric metric is proposed; each state in the graph 
represents a dynamic cost attributes of all vulnerabilities in a single host as 
explained in chapter-3. The resultant attack graph is called a Dynamic Cost 
Centric Attack Graph (DCCAG), which take into considerations the network 
architectures and configurations, along with the interactions between the 
individual vulnerabilities, Along with a new novel CostRank algorithm that 
reduced the complexity and provides security professionals with an effective tool 
to enhance the security. 
 
As shown in Figure 4-13, the principal sign for the CostRank algorithm to be 
revealed, a state is important if other important states are linked to it. However, 
not all states are equal in importance (cost); the link from different states holds a 
different cost value.  The initial value vector is assigned the cost derived from a 
dynamic cost framework for each state in the graph, which describes the initial 
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CostRank value for all states Vi. Then the excursive formula is iterated until two 
consecutively iterated CostRank vectors are similar enough ‎[Gürdag, Adnan 
Burak, 2002]. In the CostRank algorithm, the input is not directly taken from link 
files (as explained in more detail in chapter (5)); instead, the out-link file is 
converted into a binary graph file structure as demonstrated in Figure 5-1. The 
total number of floating point numbers read from graph file is |2*Vertexes (Vx)| at 
the start of an execution. While the size of the data read from an attack graph 
file during each iteration is | ||V*s)(3|2*|É|*2 x  integers, where s represents 
the number of out links for each state.   
In the developed algorithm shown in Figure 4-13, 
)(t  represents the CosrRank 
of the state x and n is the number of links point to state x and N is the total 
number of states in a network representation graph. 
 )*()
1
*)1(()(
)(
1
)1(
R
t
i
i
i
t P
Nod
n
dx  


   for Initial attack state 
)*()
1
*()(
)(
1
)1(
R
t
i
i
i
t P
Nod
n
dx  


 otherwise. 
If the attacker in the Initial stage of multi-step attack, in this case the attacker, 
will commence with a probability of (1-d), otherwise if the attack in the middle of 
the terminal stage of attack will continue with probability d. 
In this model, the attributes for any vertex X includes: 
1- The right of entry (access) or gaining privilege of the attacker on host X: 
Classified by privilege levels, such as: 
System administrator or the Root privilege (2). 
Users privilege (1). 
None privilege (0). (The attacker has no privilege on the node.) 
2-  Security dynamic metrics, cost for each host: represent the CVSS score 
for each host. 
3- Exploit style: The location of an attacker during an exploit (LAN, remoteness 
network, WANS). 
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To illustrate the proposed approach in detail, consider a prototype network as 
shown in Figure 4-11 taken from [Mehta, Vaibhav, et al., 2006] and used by  
[Kijsanayothin, Phongphun, 2010] to compare the results, where readily 
available are two service hosts, IP1, IP2, and an attacker’s workstation; the 
attacker connects to each of the servers via a central router. 
 
 
Figure 4-11. A prototype network taken from ‎[Mehta, Vaibhav, et al., 2006] 
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(Att, 2) (IP 1 , 2)  (IP 1 , 1)  (IP 2, 1)  ( IP 2 , 2) 
S0 S1  S2 S3 S4 
 
Figure 4-12. Cost-centric attack graph with arc weight 
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Figure 4-13 The CostRank algorithm 
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  S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 
S0 0 86 36 48 83 
S1 0 0 56 58 89 
S2 0 91 0 58 83 
S3 0 91 56 0 89 
S4 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 4-2. Cost matrix representations 
 
As shown in Table 4.2, the calculated cost values derived from the DVSS and 
operational level cost-centric framework (as explained in Chapter-3 of this 
thesis) recorded for each state in the graph as cost matrix. 
In the normalised cost matrix, the following formula is used: 
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  S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 
S0 0 0.339921 0.142292 0.203390 0.351695 
S1 0 0 0.275862 0.285714 0.438424 
S2 0 0.392241 0 0.250000 0.351695 
S3 0 0.385593 0.237288 0 0.377119 
S4 0 0 0 0 1 
Table 4-3. The normalised cost matrix 
 
Let )(
)( xt  be the probability of intrusion of attack state x at time t and d be a 
damping factor representing the probability of an attacker continuing to 
penetrate the current path of the attack. Thus, in the context of network: 
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where n is the number of links point to state x and  N is the total number of 
states  in a network representation graph. 
 
Since this is a recursive formula, the iterative implementation will make the 
calculation faster, and will require several iterations before stabilising to an 
acceptable solution.  This can be solved in an iterative fashion using the 
algorithm shown in Figure 4-13. 
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 Mehta et al Kijsanayothin CostRank  
S0 0.1500 0.1500 0.1500 
S1 0.1450 0.1287 0.210806 
S2 0.1020 0.1658 0.123615 
S3 0.2090 0.2548 0.139394 
S4 0.3940 0.3007 0.475065 
Table 4-4. Comparing CostRank Ranking results with Mehta et al. and Kijsanayothin’s approach 
 
Table 4-4 shows the ranking result obtained when the experimentation is done, 
that is s4, s1, s0, s3, s2 (i.e. CostRank approach). 
 
Otherwise, s4, s3, s0, s1, s2 is obtained when Mehta et al.’s approach is applied 
and s4, s3, s2, s0, s1 when Kijsanayothin’s approach is used. 
 
 
4.6 INITIAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The ranking produced is in the order of likelihood of intrusion based on 
exploitability. For example, all results suggest that s4 has the highest (relative) 
likelihood of being attacked (i.e. highest exploitability and most vulnerable), to 
further compare the ranking results, if s0 is omitted in all ranking lists, both 
ranking orders generally agree except for the conflicting case of ranking orders 
between s1, s2 and s3. 
 
1-{s1, s2}:  Consider attackers from the initial state. As shown in Figure ‎4.12 to 
reach state s1 (e.g., from s0, s2 or s3) requires exploiting cost 89 71 85, 
whereas to reach state s2 (e.g. from s0 or s3) requires exploiting cost 79 85. 
However, according to simple calculations, s1 is more vulnerable than s2; in 
addition to reaching s1 means, the attacker has the ability to compromise a host 
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and reach the root of IP1; this is not the case for s2. Therefore, s1 should rank 
higher than s2. 
2-{s2, s3}:   starting from an initial state s0, to reach s4  through  s2 requires 
three applications of the costs of exploitability value  79 49 70 , whereas to 
reach s4 through s3  only requires two applications of the costs of exploitability 
value  49 70. Therefore, s3 should rank higher than s2. 
3-{s1, s3}: Consider attackers from the initial state. To reach state s1 (e.g., from 
s0, s2 or s3) requires exploiting cost 89 71 85, whereas to reach state s3 (e.g., 
from s0 or s2 or s1) requires exploiting cost 49 49 66. Therefore, s1 should rank 
higher than s3 because s1 is more vulnerable than s3. 
4- {s3, s4}. If there is only one-manner to reach s4 by an attack path from s0 to 
s3 to s4 then s3 ranks higher than s4. However, s4 can be reached by 
another attack path from s0 to s2 to s4 and attack path s0 to s3 to s4, thus, 
s4 ranks higher than s3. 
 
 
Figure 4-14. Initial cost-centric ranking results 
 
As shown in Figure 4-14, as a direct result of employing the dynamic approach 
in the process of estimating the cost value of exploiting each state.  In the 
graph, the ranking results of DCCAG are more effective, represent the 
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substantial impact of vulnerabilities, evidenced that the CostRank model is more 
effective in term of detecting the actual risk, and can be utilised to enforce an 
efficient method to implement the countermeasures and mitigations.  
The resolutions above certified that the CostRank algorithm and approaches 
produce accurate solutions in terms of ranking the states during any attack 
compared to the other two methodologies.  The system administrator should 
give first priority to s4 (IP 2, 2) {compromised root of IP2} as it possesses the 
highest (relative) likelihood of being attacked. It has the highest exploitability 
and is the most vulnerable. Resolutions should be immediately implemented, 
then in the second place s2 (IP 1, 2) {compromised the root of IP1} then s3 (IP 
2, 1) then s2 (IP 1, 1) as explained. 
 
4.7  INVESTIGATIONS 
In the next case, the algorithm has been carried out on a relatively small 
prototype network as shown in Figure 4-15. This example represents LAN 
exploit style; to commence with the attacker attached to host- A and needs to 
exploit a vulnerability at host-E or Host-F, both of which are protected by a 
firewall. 
 
Figure 4-15. An example network, modified from [Franqueira et al., 2009] 
 
The firewall rules just permit communications of host-C or host-D to host-E. 
Router (Ro) connects segments 1 and 2. Additionally, all hosts have a CVE-
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2003-0818: a vulnerability in the single service called “Microsoft Windows 
ASN.1 Library Integer.”  
 
Gaining system administrator or root privilege results if the attacker manages to 
exploit the vulnerability, buffer overflow state result of sending large packet, 
which is achieved by running arbitrary code in it to get root privileges, potentially 
having a comprehensive impact/damage on its availability (A), confidentiality 
(C), integrity (I). A full-scale scenario CCAG is presented in Figure 4-16. 
 
Table 4-5 shows the ranking result obtained when the CostRank algorithm 
castoff in the experimental approach using the normalised cost matrix. 
 Using the CostRank algorithm, in the first iteration T1 the ranking values are 
calculated by matrix multiplications of the initial ranking values vector by the 
random walk matrix. This process must carry on (normally for 13 iterations) until 
the ranking probability reaches the stable status values (fixed). The excursive 
formula is iterated until two consecutively iterated CostRank vectors are similar 
enough, as you can see in Table 4-5, in this case the two consecutively iterated 
CostRank vectors are similar enough at T13, where the state values reach the 
fixed value, the CostRank values presented for 24 iterations, please refer to 
Appendix -F for all iterations. 
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  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 
T1 0.0375 0.0442 0.0438 0.0352 0.0463 0.0608 0.0768 0.0584 0.0719 0.1001 0.1337 0.1413 
T2 0.0294 0.0215 0.0252 0.0200 0.0488 0.0635 0.0607 0.0583 0.0546 0.1001 0.1740 0.2456 
T3 0.0478 0.0169 0.0123 0.0115 0.0488 0.0635 0.0661 0.0461 0.0545 0.1001 0.1740 0.3197 
T4 0.0188 0.0275 0.0096 0.0056 0.0488 0.0635 0.0661 0.0502 0.0431 0.1001 0.1740 0.3197 
T5 0.0434 0.0513 0.0501 0.0386 0.0523 0.0701 0.0890 0.0673 0.0825 0.1150 0.1559 0.1642 
T6 0.0435 0.0514 0.0503 0.039 0.0526 0.0703 0.0892 0.0675 0.0828 0.1154 0.1561 0.1645 
T7 0.0436 0.0515 0.0505 0.0394 0.0529 0.0705 0.0894 0.0677 0.0831 0.1158 0.1563 0.1648 
T8 0.0437 0.0516 0.0507 0.0398 0.0532 0.0707 0.0896 0.0679 0.0834 0.1162 0.1565 0.1651 
T9 0.0438 0.0517 0.0509 0.0402 0.0535 0.0709 0.0898 0.0681 0.0837 0.1166 0.1567 0.1654 
t10 0.0439 0.0518 0.0511 0.0406 0.0538 0.0711 0.09 0.0683 0.084 0.117 0.1569 0.1657 
t11 0.039 0.0519 0.0513 0.041 0.0541 0.0713 0.0902 0.0685 0.0843 0.1174 0.1571 0.166 
t12 0.0440 0.051 0.0514 0.0413 0.0542 0.0714 0.0903 0.0686 0.0844 0.1176 0.1572 0.1662 
t13 0.0441 0.052 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 
 
Table 4-5. The ranking result obtained when CostRank algorithm castoff in the experimental approach 
using the normalised cost matrix  
 
The final ranking results driven from the cost matrix are presented at a lower 
place:  
 s12, s11, s10, s7, s9, s6, s8, s5, s3, s2, s1, s4. 
 
 
S(0) S(1) S(2) S(3) S(4) S(5) S(6) S(7) S(8) S(9) S(10) S(11) S(12) 
0.076  0.044  0.052  0.051  0.041  0.054  0.071  0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 
 
 
Table 4-6. Experimental  network ranking results 
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Figure 4-16. A full-scale scenario of a prototype network 
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4.8 RESULTS JUSTIFICATION 
1. {s12, s11} s12 can be reached by another attack path to s4 thus, s12 ranks 
higher than s11. 
2. {s11, s10}   total cost to reach s11: 87 85 87 88 72 69 69 = 557, but the total 
cost to reach s10 from initial state = 482. Therefore, s11 should rank higher than 
s10 (same segment). 
3. {s9, s7} the total cost to reach s9 = 374 and to s7 = 528 from the initial state. 
Therefore, s7 should rank higher than s9. 
4. {s9, s8} because s9 (f1) is in the same segment while s7 (c1) is in the other 
segment, the firewall rules only permit communications of host-C or host-D to 
host-E. Therefore, s9 should rank higher than s8. 
5. {s6, s7, s8} total cost to reach s6 = 434, and the total cost to reach s7 from 
initial state = 528, the total cost to reach s8 from initial state = 407.   Therefore 
s7 (cm2), should rank higher than s6, s8 and s6 rank higher than s8 (same 
segment). 
6. {s6, s5} total cost to reach s6 = 434, while the total cost to reach s5 from initial 
state=334.  Therefore, s6 should rank higher than s5, especially s6 = (d, 2) 
compromised the root (same segment). 
7. {s5, s4} total cost to reach s4 = 209 and to s5 = 334 from the initial state. 
Therefore, s5 should rank higher than s4.  
8. {s3, s2} from initial state. Therefore, s3 should rank higher than s2.  
9. {s1, s2} total cost to reach s2 = 257 and to s1 = 222 from the initial state. 
Therefore, s2 should rank higher than s1.   
10.{s1, s2} total cost ∑     to reach s2= 257 and to s1 = 222   from the initial 
state. Therefore, s2 should rank higher than s1.  
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4.9 CONCLUSION 
  
The Classical AG, provide the security professionals and system 
administrators with many tasks to fix the existing security problems and require 
them to carry through the AG model again, if something sounded awry. As the 
classical AG represents a range of individual vulnerabilities with static natures 
because, the interactions between the vulnerabilities and mostly the network 
topology and device configurations are not counted. 
In this thesis, formal techniques are built up for the dynamic cost-centric AG, 
the courses of an AG are representing a chain of the states of dynamic 
exposures. 
 In the dynamic cost-centric approach, instead of specifying a state by network 
attributes, a dynamic cost- centric metrics are proposed; each province in the 
graph represents a dynamic cost attributes of all vulnerabilities in a single host 
as explained in chapter-3 satisfying objective 1 and 2 of this thesis. The 
resultant attack graph is called a Dynamic Cost Centric Attack Graph 
(DCCAG), which takes into considerations the network architectures and 
configurations, along with the interactions between the individual 
vulnerabilities,  
A new novel CostRank algorithm, to examine objective 3 of this thesis, which 
cut the complexity and offers security professionals with an efficient tool to 
heighten the security. 
A scalable CostRank algorithm for ranking the AG uses a novel method to 
represent the states by implementing a dynamic cost-centric driven from 
statistical probability of dynamic impact scoring for the exposures.  
The ranks of the states represent the importance of the states in the DCCAT. 
The resulting ranking represents a metric that can be used by security 
professionals and organisation administrators to establish different security 
decisions in order to improve the network security based on monetary 
value/benefits as demonstrated in the business case subject to examine 
objective 4, 5 and 6 in this thesis (please refer to Chapter-6).  
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Ranking an AG signifies a useful approach to solve the problem of an AG 
visual complexity by providing an insight into the critical area of vulnerabilities 
to perform the analysis and to discover the effective method to implement the 
mitigation required.  
 A new methodology is developed to represent attack graphs with cost metrics 
and model the problem’s parameters into a mathematical framework. Instead 
of specifying a state by network attributes, a dynamic cost-centric model is 
proposed, where each state in the attack graph represented a severe cost of 
all vulnerabilities existing in the node (host). 
The CostRank algorithm is developed based on Google PageRank algorithm to 
demonstrate significance high rank states based on dynamic cost probability that 
the attackers can use in multi-step attack to exploit a vulnerability in the target 
critical asset. The principal suggestion for the CostRank algorithm to be 
considered a state is important if other important states are linked to it. However, 
not all states are equal in importance (dynamic cost), the link from different states 
holds a different cost value.  The initial value vector is assigned the cost derived 
from a dynamic cost framework for each state in the graph, that describe the 
initial CostRank value for all states Vi, Then the excursive formula using 
stochastic Markov model calculations is iterated until two consecutively iterated 
CostRank vectors are similar enough. In the CostRank algorithm, the input is not 
directly taken from link files; instead, the out-link file is converted into a binary 
graph file structure. In the CostRank algorithm the information about pre-condition 
probability, not essentially to be known for all states as the value can be alleged 
to perform the ranking, however knowing the probability can produce more 
accurate results. 
The main differences between PageRank and CostRank are: 
1- PageRank uses probabilities derived from the initial number of pages and 
Markov model calculations of consecutively iterated, in CostRank The initial 
value vector is assigned the cost derived from a dynamic cost framework for 
each state in the graph, that describe the initial CostRank value for all states 
Vi. In terms of complexity the PageRank only considers the number of pages 
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pointing to another page using fixed probability distribution, conversion matrix 
in the process of rank calculations.  The web graph is primarily mapped to a 
random walker matrix, as each vertex/node is assigned with a value based on 
the probability of incoming/outgoing links representing the relationships with 
other vertex, while in CostRank the consideration should be given to the 
privileges, dynamic cost and exploit style. 
2- In PageRank, the damping factor (d) is assigned to a specific when there is a 
page(s) pointed to it while the value (1-d) which assigned to a specific web 
page when there is no page appointed to it at all. In CostRank, If the attacker in 
the Initial attack stage of multi-step attack in this case the attacker will start with 
a probability of (1-d), otherwise if the attack in the middle of the final stage of 
attack will continue with probability d. 
3-  The CostRank algorithm exercises an iterative mathematical process to 
calculate the maximal eigenvector of a practiced matrix with hosts’ dynamic 
cost values derived from designated file structures.   
A framework is carried out on a test network, using the Nessus scanner to detect 
known vulnerabilities, implement these results and to build and represent the 
dynamic cost centric attack graph using ranking algorithms (in a standardised 
fashion to Mehta et al. 2006 and Kijsanayothin, 2010). However, instead of using 
vulnerabilities for each host, a dynamic CostRank Markov model based on the 
states has developed. As a direct consequence of a framework implementation 
using the dynamic advance in estimating the Costs value of exploiting each state 
in the graph. The ranking results of DCCAG are more effective and represent the 
substantial impact of vulnerabilities. That has evidenced the CostRank model is 
more effective in term of detecting the actual risk and can be utilised to enforce an 
efficient method to implement the countermeasures and mitigations. The results, 
evidenced that the CostRank algorithm and approaches produce accurate 
solutions in terms of ordering the states during any attack compared to the other 
two methodologies, as well reducing the complexity in the attack graph and 
reducing the problem of visibility 
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 In the following chapter, a new parallel algorithm is applied to implement 
CostRank for distributed parallel computers using multiprocessors, to reduce the 
complexity )(
2n  of the serial CostRank algorithm. As the number of hosts in 
network are increased, the serial CostRank algorithm  is need to read the 
source CostRank values of different states and store it in a buffer, then read the 
parameters in the binary graph file header, and multiply the ranking vector of the 
random walker matrix.  
 To make CostRank calculations are more effective in term of a cost/benefit 
indication. An analysis of the performance and scalability of the parallel 
CostRank algorithm are introduced; the empirical approach to evaluate the 
CostRank algorithm’s performance indicates a major decrease in 
communication overhead and in runtime. 
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CHAPTER 5. A PARALLEL ALGORITHM TO 
CALCULATE THE COSTRANK OF A NETWORK 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The CostRank algorithm is used to rank the states of the DCCAG model based 
on cost-centric approach for network security. It computes the maximal 
eigenvector of a random walker Markov chain matrix (transition matrix) with the 
states’ cost value derived from designated file structures. The principal indicator 
for the CostRank algorithm to consider a state is important if other important 
states are linked to it. However, not all states are equal in importance; the links 
from different states hold different cost values. For n states v = 1, 2. . . n. The 
corresponding CostRank is set to   C=C1, C2, C3..Cn. The mathematical 
formulation for the recursively defined CostRank is presented in Chapter 4. The 
initial value vector is calculated by following this formula: 1/V; where V is the 
number of states present that describe the initial CostRank value for all states 
Vi, and the dynamic costs used to construct the random walk matrix. Then the 
formula is iterated until two consecutively iterated CostRank vectors are similar 
enough. The CostRank algorithm does not directly take input from link files, but 
rather involves the conversion of the out-links file into a binary graph file 
structure, M, as illustrated in Figure 5-1. The total number of floating point 
numbers read from graph file is |2*Vertices (Vx) | at the start of an execution. 
While the size of the data read from an attack graph file during each iteration is |
||V*s)(3|2*|É|*2 x  integers, where s represents the number of out links for 
each state.   Towards the end of the execution, entire | | numbers representing 
the consequential CostRank vectors have written into disks is: 
)V*s)(3 *2É2*(*2 x xV  
where    is the number of iterations. There is a linear association between the 
amount of links and sum of states in a graph file, and since the number of 
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iterations is nearly constant,  the total time spent on disk I/O during an execution 
is O(n) where n = | |. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1. The construction of a sample graph file  
 
 130 
 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the construction of an attack graph file. This file is 
structured with a file header and states input information about the hosts in the 
DCCAG. The file header has three components: entire number of states, entire 
number of links and the upper limit out degree in the attack graph. A state entry 
record saves the essential structural data for a state such as  state ID, the out-
degree, and then forward links (Link 1, Link 2, and Link v) along with the 
corresponding cost for each link (C1, C2, and Cv) respectively. It represents an 
array of n state IDs and m of links. All of the numerical data are represented in a 
4-byte integer buffer. The total volume of attack graph file is = 4 * (2v+2m+2o), 
where v represents the total number of states, m represents the entire number 
of links and o represents the maximum out degree. An example of representing 
states in a graph file is shown in Figure 5-1. As for memory usage, a buffer is 
used to hold the attack graph file, size of 4 * maximum Out-degree.  The setup 
for the CostRank implementation is done by creating two arrays of floating point 
values representing the rank directions calculations, as in Figure 5-2, called the 
CostRanksrc and the CostRankdest. The source and destination vector have V 
items, where V represents the full amount of states in the attack graph file. 
 
 
Figure 5-2. The CostRank calculations 
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Used for each iteration phase, the CostRanksrc represents the rank value of 
iteration t and the CostRankdest is referred to as the rank value of iteration t + 1. 
The sequential algorithm of the CostRank calculation is shown in Figure 5- 4. 
5.2 RESEARCH METHODS 
An analogous CostRank parallel algorithm is developed to implement CostRank 
for disseminating parallel computers with multi processors.  To reduce the 
complexity ))((
2n  of the serial CostRank algorithms as the calculations 
represent matrix multiplication, as the number of hosts in the networks 
increased, the serial CostRank algorithm complexity is  increased polynomially, 
as it required matrix multiply. The input n= ))((
3n    to read the source CostRank 
values of different states and store it in a buffer, then read parameters in the 
binary graph file header, which has three components: entire number of states, 
entire number of links and the upper limit out degree in the attack graph. A state 
entry record saves the essential structural data for a state such as  state ID, the 
out-degree, and then forward links (Link 1, Link 2, and Link v) along with 
corresponding cost for each link (C1, C2, and Cv) respectively. Parallel in-
memory Piccolo [Power et al., 2010] algorithm is selected to extensively reduce 
access share state stored in memory and iterations, which include table 
partitioning (local access), synchronization of distributed table, 
checkpoint/restore and load balance and task scheduling. In the same manner, 
larger scale networks are secured  that require quick and reliable computing to 
calculate the ranking of enormous graphs with thousands of vertices (states) 
and millions or arcs (links).  A parallel CostRank is used, the computational 
architecture on a cluster of PCs networked via 100 MB/s Ethernet LAN, using a 
cluster of 32 computers built with Pentium Core2Duo 2.54 GHz CPU, 2GB 
RAM, 250GB Hard Disk interconnected with 100 MB/s Ethernet LAN, running 
the Linux operating system. Thirty PCs was used for partitioning calculations 
and two masters, for synchronisations to assess the complexity and scalability 
of the algorithms.  
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In this thesis, the valuation of the parallel CostRank algorithm is based on the 
performance and scalability. The performance metrics are based on (i) The 
Total time expended in the CostRank iterations. (ii)  Speed up time by running 
Parallel CostRank over the serial CostRank algorithm. (iii)  Efficiencies time 
stability of CostRank algorithm, measured according to a different problem size.  
In order to evaluate the scalability, the Isoefficiency Metric is used to perceive 
the constancy of the efficiency when the problem size and the number of 
processors increased. 
In particular, a partitioning of input data, graph files and ranking vectors with an 
appropriate load balancing technique has reduced the runtime and hence 
scalability of large scale parallel  CostRank calculations.  This thesis presents 
an application case study of parallel CostRank Calculations using one-
dimensional sparse matrix partitioning on a modified research page at Stanford 
University. It describes the link structure of the stanford.edu-domain from a 
September 2002 collection and contains 281903 pages with about 2.3 million 
links, outcomes in a major reduction in communication overhead and in runtime. 
The performance of the parallel CostRank system, presented to know how have 
the parallel algorithm done well and right, by measuring the utilisation of the 
CPU (processor none idle time), the efficiency, the decrease of runtime and 
speedup metrics. An analytical discussion is provided for the performance of 
similar algorithms in terms of Execution times and Input/output (I/O), memory 
usage and synchronization and commendations rate.  
The speedup is the proportion of time in use to process CostRank using a single 
processor (serial CostRank) over the time in use to process CostRank using n 
processor on Parallel computing process (parallel CostRank). Let suppose that 
Ts represents the serial time portion of CostRank. The speedup of any parallel 
algorithm using any number of processors is limited to 1/Ts , this known as 
Amdahl’s law [Amdahl, 1967], for this reason, the speedup of any parallel 
algorithm will not continue to rise as the number of processors increased, the 
speedup be likely to be saturate at  a specific number of processors. 
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The efficiency of the parallel CostRank algorithm calculated using the ratio of 
speedup to the total number of processors, which measures the portion of time 
that the processors are busy in processing part of the CostRank calculations. 
The scalability of a system measures the change in the performance as the 
other features of the system is changed such as the problem size, the network 
bandwidth, the number of processors, and the processor specifications. 
The scalability of the algorithm measured according to the its ability to boost the 
speed up according to the number of processors used, in other words the 
algorithm's ability to effective granularity on the performance of the processors 
by maintaining the constant efficiency level while increasing the problem size 
and the number of processors.  
The main goal of the parallel CostRank algorithm empirical approach is to 
evaluate the scalability and the performance of the parallel CostRank algorithm, 
the serial CostRank algorithm used as main orientation for evaluation. 
 
5.3 PARALLEL COST RANK ALGORITHM 
A parallel algorithm is developed to implement CostRank for distributed memory 
parallel computers using multi-processors.  
Bulk-synchronous parallel model (BSP) projected in 1990 by [L. G. Valiant, 
1990.] to solve the weaknesses in the PRAM model is used in the parallel 
CostRank approach. The model used a fixed number of n processors and 
memory nodes connected by a computer network, this model used the super 
step idea of encompassing the synchronisation and communication process, 
also used public variables or transient message in processor communication. 
 Piccolo parallel in-memory algorithm is selected ‎[Power et al., 2010]  (Piccolo is 
a programming model which is represented as a library of existing programming 
languages such as C++, they are used to write in parallel in memory allowing 
computations from different PCs for parallel implementations). To extensively 
reduce access share state stored in memory and iterations, which include table 
partitioning (local access), synchronization of distributed table, 
checkpoint/restore and load balance/ and task scheduling. 
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Figure 5-3. Synchronization of distributed binary graph files 
  
Accurate and efficient computation of the CostRank score for a large network 
has to be addressed in order to secure significant assists among increasing 
numbers of devices and hosts in the network. Implementing the CostRank 
calculations in a parallel environment opens up several possibilities in 
partitioning the data and load balancing the data. During the implementation of 
partitions with load balance, the binary graph file divided into a relevant uniform 
part and circulated to different processors participating in rank calculating. This 
move leads to efficient use of all processors and this improved the overall 
quality of computing.  
Three different methods are deliberated for partitioning, taking from 
[Hendrickson, Bruce, and Tamara G. Kolda, 2000] [Trifunovic, Aleksandar, and 
William J. Knottenbelt, 2004], to state matrix among the processors thus:  
1-Divide the matrix using a row-wise distribution  
2-Divide the matrix using a column-wise distribution  
3-Divide the matrix as a 2D grid. 
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The method preferred for the computations is the row-wise partitioning as 
multiply the CostRanksrc into the rows of graph file to get the CostRankdest is 
needed in place of shown in Figure 5-2.  
The cluster of computing technology is used. The first step is to equally 
partitioned the binary graph file G into   files (where =number of processors), 
named later BGi, where 0 ≤ i < P, and allocated each partition to a PC 
processor. Allocated Mi bytes distributed in the main memory for each processor 
to do a portion of CostRank calculations, having   n entries to represent the 
portion of the corresponding CostRanksrc vector, and create synchronization File 
Si, storing two kinds of destination state IDs and their CostRankdest scores. This 
file is called a “synch,” to represent the destination rank vector adapted from the 
serial CostRank algorithm. The algorithm is first partitioned file BG into   
portions BG0, BG1, .. ,BG 1 , such that each BGi started from: 

Mi*
 to   

 Mi *)1(
. 
 
The distribution of attack graph file, as described above, will end to have a 
specific portion of graph file for each processor. Arrays of CostRankdest, i, out-
vector, and CostRanksrc, i are created for each PC. The CostRankdest, i array and 
the out-vector array contains only the consistent M  entries, while the 
CostRanksrc, i array comprises a different set of values needed in CostRank 
calculations for each iteration, such as total number of states, the number of 
links etc.  The parallel version of the CostRank computation is shown in Figure 
5-3 and Figure 5-4. Suppose M  receives an update message from some 
foreign document, and suppose XMP1 and XMP2 are two documents local to XMP, 
both of which are out linked by XMP, then one method of update would be to 
simply increment the CostRanks of XMp1 and XMP2  by w(v, u) ← h(v, u)/ sum 
×(update message received from XMB).  If the absolute change in CostRank 
were to exceed epsilon (error threshold); then XMP1 would send its own local 
update message to XMP2, This message would trigger a further update in the 
CostRank of XMP2. In sum, the idea would be to set up a local messaging 
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analogue between foreign linked documents. Please note, the variance among 
successive CostRank of a specific document is cast off to calculate the 
convergence, once the absolute change drops under epsilon (an error 
threshold), no additional change will bring up to date for that document. 
 
 
Figure 5-4. Parallel CostRank Algorithm 
 
Figure 5-5 shows the parallel CostRank computation during an iteration using 
30 processors and an extra 2 PCs to perform synchronizations of Synch files 
between processors. 
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Please note, that the residual calculation is repeated in Figure 5-4, for the 
purpose of the clarity. Practically the author used a residual function for the 
computation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Lab Topology Structure of parallel CostRank algorithm 
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5.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF PARALLEL COSTRANK ALGORITHM AND 
RESULTS 
 
5.4.1 Lab Topology Setup 
Experiments are performed on a cluster of 32 computers, each having Pentium 
Core2Duo 2.54 GHz processor, 2GB RAM, 250GB Hard Disk interconnected 
with 100 MB/s Ethernet LAN, running the Linux operating system. The research 
page at Stanford University been modified. It describes the link structure of the 
stanford.edu-domain from a September 2002 collection and contains 281903 
pages with about 2.3 million links. Stored in Mat lab sparse format, including the 
cost values and other fields in the graph file it takes up 74.6MB in CRS format. 
Variable Si corresponds to the synch file, Mi to the partitioned attack graph file, 
and Vi to the portion of source rank vector in memory existing at processor P. 
Throughout iterations, the following process occurred: first, computing a new 
rank based on the corresponding part of graph file Mi then push the calculated 
values into CostRankdest vector.  These processes will continue until the residual 
value exceeds epsilon. The calculated rank CostRankdest is being added to the 
local updated queue if the out link is local, or if the out link belongs to a foreign 
host, it is sent to the master host. 
In this thesis, the evaluation of the parallel CostRank algorithm is grounded on 
the performance and scalability. The performance metrics are based on the total 
time spent in the CostRank iterations, Speed up time by running Parallel 
CostRank over the serial CostRank algorithm and the efficiency of CostRank 
algorithm according to the problem size.  
In this segment, a visible logical dialogue has provided in terms the following 
metrics: I/O rate, Memory Norm, Synchronization rate, Execution times, Speed 
up, the charge per unit of parallel CostRank algorithms, Efficiency of parallel 
CostRank algorithm and the Load Balancing. 
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5.4.2 Input/ output (I/O) rate  
In the operation of parallel CostRank calculation, each CPU will perform the 
following I/O operations: 
1- Read an allocated part of an attack graph file |BGi|. 
2- Calculate the CostRankDest rank values |Qi|. 
3- The synch file is to save on the disk and re-take it from the master computer 
for synchronisations. 2x |Si| 
Therefore the total read-write I/O rate will be: 
 



i
oi QiSiBGiparallelR
0
/ ||2||
 
 
where Qi = local update queue. At this time, the summation of all P partitions of 
BGi is equal to the binary Attack graph file BG, and the outline of all synch files 
Si is S. 
 
 
Figure 5-6. I/O rate during iterations and data transport 
 
The amount of data transfer rate and level of iterations in terms of the 
communications rate represent the efficiency of I/O devices and the bandwidth 
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for each processor node, and on the start-up latency for the thorough transfer. 
Following to the analysis above, the I/O cost metric of data access is enlarged 
by the aspect of 2 x Si and local update queue Qi, which explains the linear 
increase of I/O with the number of processors up to 20 processors, as seen in 
Figure 5-6. The overhead of the processors is reduced as the problem size 
divided using a load balancing techniques, which makes the data access nearly 
steady after the 20 processors. 
 
5.4.3 Memory Norm 
All processors must assign fixed segments of memory to fit an array of 
CostRanksrc Mi. For that reason, the overall memory usage is: 
MMiparallelCMem  ||  
 
 
Since the source rank vector V is divided into β segments, the shape of all 
segments Vi will be equal to the size of the source rank vector V. Figure 5-7 
shows the memory usage per processor during computation. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-7. Memory usage per processors during computation 
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As seen in Figure 5-7, there is a high score of memory usage when only two 
processors are used. This is due to the extra storage needed for synchronized 
files. When the number of processors is enlarged along with accurate 
distribution of tasks according to the load balancing techniques in Section 5.4.9, 
then the total memory usage decreases, and tends to be stable after 20 
processors, which related that to the  scalability of 2.3 M link structure (please 
refer to Section 5.5) as shown in the Figure 5-7.      
    
5.4.4 Synchronization rate 
As the Synch file Si contains state ID and CostRank value, the size of Synch file 
Si= 2 * Vi. The synchronization rate among processors is: 
 



i
Synch Mi
SiparallelC
0
||)
2
||(*2|
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-8. Synchronization time vs. number of processors 
 
 142 
 
The local CostRank scores have to be synchronized among the ten processors 
to obtain the final rank to be used in the next iteration step. Figure 5-8 shows 
the synchronization time per number of processors. Each processor needs to 
receive an updated file from the neighbour host through the master 
(synchronize) machine, process the update, and then send the updated file to 
the next neighbour host through the master machine. The two master machines 
need to replicate the data between them. When the CostRank calculations need 
to get parameter values from another processor, then communication time 
overhead must be considered. On the other hand, when the master PC has to 
wait for synchronization from other machines, then the synchronization 
overhead slightly increases due to waiting time, as the total number of 
processors increases. Whereas the percentage of communication overhead as 
you see in Figure 5-9 grows with the number of processors and tends to be 
stable after 20 processors, due to the scalability of the 2.3 M link structure. Time 
devoted to communication and synchronization with other processors is 
calculated using the following formula: 
sequentialParallel TTTq  *  
 
 
ParallelT  represent a computation time for a CostRank per processor. 
  = processor number. 
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Figure 5-9. Communication time vs. processor number 
 
Figure 5-10 demonstrates the standard of residual errors increases when the 
synchronization interval increases and when the quantity of processors 
participating in the calculation is enlarged (in this work, two, four and eight 
processors are used to calculate the average residual error).  The average 
residual error calculated from synchronizing the local rank scores after every 5 
consecutive steps are less than 0.020. This value is used in this research 
purpose. Thus, the synchronization interval is set to five to be reported in 
experimental results. 
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Figure 5-10. Residual Error vs. synchronization interval 
 
 
5.4.5  Execution times  
The execution times should be in theory, equivalent to the serial execution time 
divided by processor numbers, given the assumptions of serial execution time 
and the network transfer between hosts and constant computational time per 
processor. Let iTparallel  be the computation time for a CostRank per processor i, 
tSynch  is the time to synchronize synch files. The execution time can then be 
estimated as: 
 



i
tParallelparallel SynchiTT
0
||2||
 
 
As the Serial CostRank execution time is divided into p segments, the outline of 
all portions ParallelT i will be equal to sequentialT  /p in addition to two synchronized files 
received from Pp-1 and Pp+1 (Overhead). 
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Figure 5-11. Total execution time vs. processor number 
 
 
The parallel CostRank algorithm and load-balancing scheme permitted us to 
load and distribute the matrices to the processors without overloading the 
memory on any particular machine.  Figure 5-11 presents the total execution 
time of the CostRank algorithm against the processors number for a simple 
distribution (equal number of rows on each processor).  
The runtime displays reduced while the processor number increases up to 20 
processors, then the trend becomes stable due to the overhead time (more 
details in Section 5.5), and this behaviour are smoothed with the load-balancing 
distribution.  As the algorithm is so sensitive to the communication pattern in the 
matrix-vector multiply operation, these peaks correspond to local limits in the 
communication patterns. 
 
5.4.6  Speedup  
Speedup is a measure of the increase in the speed and performance in a 
parallel algorithm compared with a sequential computing of CostRank algorithm. 
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pSP  is the proportion of the time of engagement of one processor (using serial 
algorithm) divided by the total time necessary to calculate on parallel 
environments using p processors, in order to calculate the CostRanks values. 
 
Parallel
sequential
p
T
T
SP 
 
 
sequentialT  is the time taken on one processor in sequential algorithms. ParallelT  is the 
total time necessary to compute CostRank on parallel environments using   
processors. 
 
 
Figure 5-12. Speedup vs. Processor number 
 
 
Figure 5-12 exposed the speedup of parallel algorithm with regard to processor 
number. In this graph, speedup is defined to be the ratio of time for the serial 
CostRank algorithm execution to the time for the parallel algorithm execution. It 
can be seen that the speedup time is sharply increasing during the experiments. 
The exceptional case, using only two processors, due to partitioning of the 
group file, load balancing, and synchronizations and due to the overall loads 
slumps on each processor.  There was a gradual increase up to 20 processors 
and tends to be stable after 20 processors, which indicate that the 20 
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processors represent the scalability of 2.3 M link structure according to 
isoefficiency function. (More details about isoefficiency function in Section 5.5 in 
this Chapter).  
 
5.4.7  Rate of parallel CostRank algorithm 
The total processing time used in analogous parallel algorithms to calculate the 
CostRank, refer to pR , where R represents the rate processing in parallel 
algorithm. 
*pR Parallel runtime for each processor ( pPr ) 



n
i
ipR
1
Pr*   
Figure 5-13 presents the computation time of the CostRank algorithm against 
the number of processors. The computation time displays a sharp decline with 
regard to the increase in processor number up to 20 processors. This is 
because of load distributions on processors along with using a parallel algorithm 
to calculate the cost, and then the computation time will become steady due to 
the scalability and using a fixed problem size. 
 
Figure 5-13. Computation time of the CostRank algorithm against the number of processors 
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5.4.8  Efficiency of parallel CostRank algorithm 
pE   is the effective and efficiency time of parallel analogous algorithms, that the 
processors are performing effective calculations.   
 
 

SP
T
T
E
Parallel
sequential
p 
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-14. Algorithm Efficiency vs. no. of Processors 
 
 
As the efficiency represents the speedup divided the processor number, as you 
can see in Figure 5-14, the efficiency increased when the number of processors 
increased for a fixed problem size, the exception in case of using two processors 
as the overhead of partitions of links files, load balancing, and synchronizations 
influence the efficiency. Ultimate efficiency is always one, and anything above one 
is super-linear and indicates out of bound status. Values less than 1 indicate slow 
performance and indicate more processors must be added to adjust the 
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proficiency.  The efficiency tends to be stable after 20 processors, which indicate 
that the 20 processors represent the scalability of 2.3 M link structure according to 
isoefficiency function. 
 
5.4.9  Load Balancing 
The load balancing is equally partitioned and distributed, the binary attack graph 
file M into β files balanced among processors (P) to accomplish a high deployment 
of processing usage, where 0 ≤ i < , and allocated each partition to a PC 
processor. Allocated Mi is distributed in the main memory for each processor to do 
a portion of CostRank calculations. Having   n entries to represent the portion of 
the corresponding CostRanksrc vector to represent the destination rank vector take 
on from the Serial CostRank Algorithm, first the attack graph file BG is partitioned 
into p portions BG0, BG1, .. ,BGp−1, such that each BGi started from:  

Mi*
 to   

 Mi *)1(
. 
 
If p represents the sum of processors used, while M represents the summation of 
states within the binary attack graph file, then the states are distributed based on 
the unique state-ID going from 

Mi*
  to   

 Mi *)1(
. Every processor is set to 
handle a particular value in the range of the function, all states having a state-ID 
that satisfies a particular processor’s value. To achieve this, the Greedy algorithm 
is implemented with round robin to distribute the tasks according to the number of 
keys in the table partition to multiple processors, as shown in Figure 5-15. In 
heterogeneous hardware, it is challenging to ascertain the exact execution time. 
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Figure 5-15. Greedy algorithm with round robin 
 
 
 
Due to the states’ distributions across hosts and processors and due to the use 
of the Greedy algorithm with the round robin technique shown in Figure 5-16, 
the load per processor reduces sharply with the number of hosts used during 
the experiments. 
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Figure 5-16. Processors loads vs. number of processors  
 
 
The load balancing represents an important characteristic of any parallel 
algorithm as load imbalancing that represent uneven processor utilisation and 
that can contribute to poor efficiency and scalability of the parallel 
arrangements. 
In this work, the binary graph file states’ are distributed across processors; and 
the Greedy algorithm was being utilised with the round robin technique; the cost 
assigned to transfer part of calculation to another processor is a lot less than the 
calculation time is required to treat the portion of the graph file. This process 
was performed using two synchronisation computers to make sure that each 
CPU receives the calculation part from others. 
Based on the above observations, this partitioning scheme yields a satisfactory 
load balancing. This is a result of the uniform distribution of states within the 
binary graph file. 
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5.5 THE SCALABILITY OF PARALLEL COSTRANK ALGORITHM 
The evaluation of parallel algorithms based on two metrics, the performance 
and the scalability.   
In section 5.4, an empirical approach to evaluate the parallel CostRank 
algorithm’s performance demonstrated a major reduction in communication 
overhead and in runtime. Several tests were performed using out-vector files 
synchronised from the real networked data. The given results are quite 
encouraging. A partition-centred CostRank algorithm has been produced that 
can efficiently work in a parallel setting. 
 In summation, a visible logical dialogue is provided in terms of I/O and 
synchronization rate, and memory utilisation, speedup gain by using parallel 
CostRank over the Serial CostRank algorithm, load balancing, processor loads, 
and efficiency of parallel CostRank algorithms. 
To evaluate the CostRank scalability metric, various trials were performed using 
out-vector files synchronised from the link structure of the stanford.edu-domain 
from a September 2002 collection and contains 281903 pages with about 2.3 
million links, to monitor the constancy of the efficiency when the problem size 
and the number of the processors increased. 
Isoefficiency Metric of Scalability [Grama et al., 1993] is being utilised to 
evaluate the scalability of CostRank algorithm. When the number of processors 
is increased using a fixed problem size, the efficiency of the parallel scheme 
increased to the certain number of processors and then will go down slightly, 
because of the load balancing techniques, as each processor is not fully utilising 
the resources. 
Using similar principles, when the problem size increased and at the same time, 
the efficiency increased as the number of processors increased, this indicates 
bad utilisation of the processing recourses.  
The prospect, which maintains the constancy of the efficiency while the problem 
size and number of processors increased, determines the scalability of the 
algorithm.  
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The problem size in this thesis used (PS) and total overhead time (To), which 
can be calculated using the following formula: 
sequentialParallelo TTT  *  
The parallel runtime is calculated using the following formula: 

 ),(0 sS
Parallel
PTP
T

  
The speedup can be expressed as: 
Parallel
s
Parallel
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The efficiency expressed as: 
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The efficiency maintains the constancy (fixed) values between 0 and 1, if 
SP
T0 , 
maintains a steady value, then the parallel algorithm can be called scalable.  
To extrapolate performance from small problems size and small systems to 
larger problem size on bigger system, the scalability experiments are performed 
using the following problem size, using 5, 10, 15, 25 processors: 
PS 
Links  
0.575 M 
 1.5 M 
1.725 M 
2.3 M 
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The experimental speedup of parallel CostRank execution times is shown in Table 
5-1 and in Figure 5-17, as you can see the speedup increased as the number of 
processors increased. According to Amdahl’s law the speed up tends to saturate, 
in this case study the saturation started at processor 20 for 2.3 M problem size,  
the maximum speed up for problem size=0.575 M using 5 processors and the 
minimum for the size=2.3 with 5 processors that was because the different 
overhead of parallel algorithms and the synchronizations. 
In other hand, Speed up time was sharply increasing during the experiments. The 
special case, when only two processors have utilised, due to the partitioning of the 
group file, load balancing, and synchronizations. There was a gradual increase in 
the speedup to 20 processors used and tends to be stable after 20 processors, 
which indicate that the 20 processors represent the scalability of 2.3 M link 
structure according to isoefficiency function. 
 
 
Figure 5-17. Speedup in Parallel CostRank execution times for different problem size 
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  
PS 
0.575 M 1.5 M 1.725 M 2.3 M  
1 1 1 1 1  
5 1.29 1 1.1 1.3  
10 1.32 1.59 1.3 1.7  
15 1.319 1.6 1.7 1.8  
20 1.31 1.61 1.83 1.92  
25 1.3 1.59 1.81 1.91  
Table 5-1.  Speedup in parallel CostRank execution times for different problem size. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
PS 
0.575 M 1.5 M 1.725 M 2.3 M  
1 100 100 100 100  
5 24.9 20.2 12.8 9.1  
10 30 25.0 23.1 20.0  
15 27.1 26.1 25.1 24.1  
20 25.33 25.31 25.3 25.11  
25 25.11 25.19 25.15 25.1  
Table 5-2. The efficiency of parallel CostRank execution times for different problem size. 
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Figure 5-18. Efficiency of Parallel CostRank execution times for different problem size 
 
The problem size in this practical model can be expressed as an isoefficiency 
function of the processor number in order to keep the efficiency steady.  
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As the goal to keep the efficiency steady, in this case 
E
E1
 should be constant=C. 
The relationship between the problem size and the overhead of the processors 
has used to calculate the scalability of parallel CostRank and demonstrated as 
follows: 
),(
'
SoS PCTP   
 
As you can see in Figure 5-18 and Table 5-2, The efficiency tends to be stable 
at (0.575 M, 5), (1.5 M 1, 10), (725 M, 15), (2.3 M, 20) with the value around 25 
which indicate that the 20 processors represent the scalability of 2.3 M link 
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structure according to isoefficiency function. That the scalability (isoefficiency 
function) of the parallel CostRank algorithm is  )log()( 2 SSS PPPS  . 
 
When the problem size is fixed and the figure of the processors increased, the 
efficiency has to be likely to increase and when the number of processors is set, 
while the problem size increased, the efficiency has become less efficient. 
Please notice that Ultimate efficiency is always 1 (scaled to 100 in this practice 
model).   
As expected according to isoefficiency approach, the problem size was 
increased with the number of the processors to keep a fixed level of efficiency, 
which indicates good utilisation of the processing resources in term of 
processors and network specifications setting. 
As exemplified above, the isoefficiency function, which has been used to 
monitor the efficiency to be nearly steady, according to the speedup and the 
number of processors, as you can view in Figure 5-18.  
The existing results of speedup and efficiency of the Stanford link structure 
show the scalability of using 20 processors as the overheads of each 
processors reduced.  
When more than 20 processors are used, the overhead is increased that  
means the processors become less involved in process of CostRank 
calculations as the efficiency tend to be stable and the speedup tend to 
saturate. 
The existing results showed the pattern of scalability of increasing the number of 
processors according to the problem size.  
The algorithm offers an excellent estimate of real parallel CostRank 
calculations, however, the wall clock time performance metric when the 
algorithm used different machines and network specifications, reduces 
convergence time, extensive memory demanding metrics are not considered as 
they are  not in the scope this study and they are suitable to be investigated in  
future work.   
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5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, a new parallel algorithm is applied to implement CostRank for 
distributed parallel computers using multiprocessors. To reduce the complexity  
of the serial CostRank algorithm (as it includes matrix multiplication, the 
complexity = )(
2n ) and to make CostRank calculations are more effective in 
term of the cost/benefits indication. When the number of hosts in the networks is 
increased, the serial CostRank algorithms need to read the source CostRank 
values of different states and store it in a buffer, then read the parameters in the 
binary graph file header. This has three components are entire number of 
states; the entire number of links; and the upper limit out degree in the attack 
graph. A state entry record saves the essential structural data for a state such 
as  state ID, the out-degree, and then forward links (Link 1, Link 2, and Link v) 
along with corresponding cost for each link (C1, C2, and Cv) respectively. The 
parallel in-memory Piccolo  algorithm is selected to extensively reduce access 
share state stored in memory and iterations, which include table partitioning 
(local access), synchronization of distributed table, checkpoint/restore and load 
balance/ and task scheduling. In the same way, the large scale networks are 
secured that require fast and reliable computing to calculate the ranking of 
enormous graphs with thousands of states and millions or links. In this, a focus 
on a parallel CostRank computational architecture on a cluster of PCs 
networked for partitioning calculations and two masters, for synchronisations to 
assess the complexity and scalability of the algorithms. It describes the link 
structure of the stanford.edu-domain from a September 2002 collection and 
contains 281903 pages with about 2.3 million links, outcomes in a major 
reduction in communication overhead and in runtime. To study its efficiency, 
several tests were performed using out-vector files synchronised from the real 
networked data.  
A parallel CostRank computational architecture has been used along a bunch of 
PCs networked via 100 MB/s Ethernet LAN, using a cluster of 32 computers 
built with Pentium Core2Duo 2.54 GHz CPU, 2GB RAM, 250GB Hard Disk 
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interconnected with 100 MB/s Ethernet LAN, running the Linux operating 
system. 30 PCs for partitioning calculations and two masters, for 
synchronisations to assess the performance and scalability of the CostRank 
algorithms.  
An analysis of the performance and scalability of the parallel CostRank 
algorithm is presented; the empirical approach to evaluate the CostRank 
algorithm’s performance indicates a major reduction in communication overhead 
and in runtime.  
The Total time expended in the CostRank iterations is reduced while the 
processor number increases up to 20 processors, then the trends become 
stable due to the overhead time, the problem size and algorithm scalability, in 
other hand Speed up time were sharply increasing during the experiments. The 
special case, when only two processors have utilised, due to the partitioning of 
the group file, load balancing, and synchronizations. There was a gradual 
increase in the speedup to 20 processors used and tends to be stable after 20 
processors, which indicate that the 20 processors represent the scalability of 2.3 
M link structure according to isoefficiency function. 
The efficiency of CostRank algorithm according to the fixed problem size (2.3 M 
link structure) increased when the number of processors increased, the 
exception in case of using two processors as the overhead of partitions of links 
files, load balancing, synchronisations influence the efficiency. 
The efficiency tends to be stable after 20 processors, which indicate that the 20 
processors represent the scalability of the 2.3 M link structure. 
 A visible logical dialogue has provided in terms of I/O and synchronization rate, 
and memory utilisation, speedup gain by using parallel CostRank over the Serial 
CostRank algorithm, load balancing, processor loads, and efficiency of parallel 
CostRank algorithms. 
The Isoefficiency function of Scalability [Grama et al., 1993] is used to measure 
the scalability of CostRank algorithm.  
An experiment is performed to investigate the scalability of the Parallel 
CostRank algorithm. As expected according to isoefficiency approach, the 
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problem size increased with the number of the processors to keep a fixed level 
of efficiency, which indicates good utilisation of the processing resources using 
the experimental network, bandwidth, and platforms setting. 
The business benefits of employing a parallel CostRank algorithm for enterprise 
network are: (i) speed up the process of detecting and mitigating the 
vulnerabilities in the enterprise network. (ii) As the dynamic approach considers 
the interactions between the vulnerabilities, that will increase the efficiency of 
security protections. (iii) The dynamic, parallel CostRank is scalable, and 
consider as a suitable solution for enormous network systems. 
 
In the next chapter, a novel effective countermeasures solution built up against 
network attacks using cost-centric model by identifying the set of top network 
risks and host and application vulnerabilities and countermeasures. In the DCAT 
model, attack detection and mitigation permitted not just at the leaf node, but at 
the transiting nodes as well. The effects of incorporating countermeasures and 
attacks in the DCAT are studied, using the DVSS framework and the Nessus 
scanner for vulnerability detections, to construct both dynamic Cost Centric 
Attack Trees (CCAT) and Dynamic Countermeasures Attack Trees (DCAT).  
A business case study is presented, using security investment analysis based 
on Daniel Bernoulli using Expected Utility Theory to forecast the expected 
benefits and the net expected benefit and Internal Net Return (IRR) of the 
dynamic security investment approach against the standard approaches of 
mitigations. 
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CHAPTER 6. DYNAMIC COST CENTRIC RISK 
MITIGATION MODEL 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter identifies and clarifies the cost centric risk mitigation model, a set 
of top network risks and vulnerabilities (please see appendix A)  are used to 
calculate the dynamic cost using a dynamic cost framework and DVSS 
explained in Chapter-3, and the countermeasures that are appropriate to 
address each vulnerability. In order to develop an effective dynamic 
countermeasures model against network attacks. 
 Developing a countermeasures and mitigation model is a complex and 
challenging goal for security professionals, system administrators, and 
information security researchers, as it is extremely significant to secure a 
network system. 
The wide variety of computer hardware; the complication of operating systems; 
the diversity of potential vulnerabilities; and the extraordinary skills of many 
attackers combine to create a problem, which is exceptionally hard to tackle 
computationally and from a human perspective to be able accurately identify, 
classify, and provide a better countermeasures model against the many types of 
malicious threats. That is emphasising the need to produce a dynamic, attack 
and a countermeasure model [Granadillo, Gustavo and Daniel Gonzalez, 2013].  
the attack modelling should  identify the significant attacker’s goals and must 
pursue a systematic plan of attack in terms of vulnerabilities identified by the 
system administrators and not by the attackers during and after vulnerabilities 
exploitation. 
 Using security a systematic attack model should ensure a full understanding of 
network systems and software applications used in the system as a total 
understanding of the systems, will help to identify the vulnerabilities that exist, 
and affect the important assets and help to rank them according to the severity, 
thus finding appropriate mitigations and countermeasures. 
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The systematic security approaches will also help to find different types of 
weaknesses in configurations and trust levels between different domains in 
order to provide effective protection against various malicious attacks.  The 
acknowledged vulnerabilities will be examined carefully and analysed using 
quantitative numerical dynamic risk propositions in terms of integrity, 
confidentiality, and availability (CIA) of the vulnerability.  In this model, 
identifying the vulnerabilities and threat priority uses a dynamic Cost-Centric 
Attack Tree (CCAT) approach; threats are prioritised using a CCAT algorithm to 
determine critical vulnerabilities that enable the attacker to reach their goal. The 
root of the CCAT represents the attacker goal and each leaf node represents 
multi-step attack vulnerabilities to move to the next level of attack. CCAT used 
AND & OR refinement, AND as defined in the general AT [Edge, Kenneth S, 
2013], the attacker should compromise all leaf node vulnerabilities to reach the 
goal or to progress to the next level of attack. While OR refinement means at 
least one vulnerability should be compromised to reach the goal or to progress 
to the next level of attack.  
Dynamic cost-centric approach is used, covered in chapter-3, to represent the 
vulnerabilities in the numerical cost values and probabilities to calculate the 
effective numerical values to reach the attacker goal. Representing CCAT with 
dynamic cost centric driven from DVSS is a new approach to build effective AT.  
Defence tree (DTs) [Bistarelli Stefano et al., 2006] have been developed to 
investigate the effect of defence mechanisms using measures such as attack 
cost, security investment cost, weight, return on attack (ROA), and return on 
investment (ROI) [Roy Arpan et al., 2010]. However, placing defence 
mechanisms only at the leaf nodes, the corresponding ROI/ROA analysis does 
not incorporate the probabilities of attack, while the costs and probabilities are 
addressed in CCAT, DCAT models.  
In the Dynamic Countermeasures Attack Trees (DCAT), the attack and 
countermeasures are combined in one tree using a cost-centric and probability 
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represented in CAT algorithms, calculating the effective security measures in 
terms of countermeasure implementations and having the option to apply 
different mitigation strategies.  To achieve optimal security protections, the 
DCAT implementations the valued assets of the state space model are taken 
according to the implementations of CostRank algorithms, discussed in chapter-
4.   
This chapter introduces a novel DCAT pattern, which brings into account attacks 
and countermeasures. In the DCAT model, attack detection and mitigation are 
permitted not just at the leaf node, but at the transiting nodes as well. The 
effects of incorporating countermeasures and attacks in the CAT are examined 
utilising the case studies presented in chapter 3, using DVSS framework and 
Nessus scanner for vulnerability detection and both CCAT and DCAT are 
constructed.  The analysis of cost value and probability is performed to reach a 
specific goal and compare to existing results to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
approach. 
6.2  DYNAMIC COST CENTRIC ATTACK TREES (CCAT)  
 
Attack trees are the method widely used in estimating and assisting the security 
operations of complex network systems. Bruce Schneier ‎ [Schneier, 1999] 
defines attack trees as follows: 
Attack trees afford a formal, systematic manner to represent the protection of a 
system based on different attacks, fundamentally, the representation of an 
attack against a system in a tree arrangement, within the end represents the 
origin node, and the leaf nodes represent the different techniques to gain the 
destination. 
The AT has been used in many of the real world security implementations, such 
as digital content security protocols and Mobile devices, WAP assisted protocols 
[Edge, Kenneth S., 2010]. 
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The root in an AT represents the terminal destination of an attacker, the source 
node is then refined into sub-goals and the sub-goals are further processed to 
reach the leaf node which represents the specific attacker's action.  
 
In the attack trees there are two kinds of refinement:  
1- Conjunction: refined sub-goals are satisfied if all children are true. 
2- Disjunction: refined sub-goals are satisfied if any of the children is true.    
 
Figure-6-1 shows a simple attack tree, where in order for the attacker to reach 
the goal node, he should satisfy (Exploit-1 or Exploit-2), and (Exploit -3 and 
Exploit -4). In the DCCAT model, the following levels are demonstrated: 
 
 
 Figure 6-1. Example of an Attack Tree 
 
1. The root of the tree at first level represents the valued assets to be protected. 
The vulnerability details are obtained by implementing the dynamic CostRank 
Algorithms.   
2. The intermediate level represents states as security properties that enable 
the attacker to reach the goal or to progress to the next level of the attack. 
3. The leaf of the tree, at the third level, represents a different attacker exploit.  
These three levels can be repeated in the CCAT as you can see in Figure 6-7 
and 6-8. 
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Fault and Attack trees have been practiced to resolve many computer-based 
problems including computer and network security [G. Helmer et al., 2002] 
Different metrics are employed and put to every node in the attack tree in order 
to compare the different numerical values with other nodes in the tree and to 
evaluate the cost to complete a specific attack. Different metrics and scales are 
used in different types of AT, beside the probability of success or failure, in 
different manners according to a systems requirement and applications.   
 
There are different types of AT based on the metrics used, for example, 
vulnerability trees, which use vulnerability metrics; defence trees and threat 
trees. 
 
Formal definitions of a CCAT are delivered and mathematical representations of 
AND & OR adapted and modified from [Edge, Kenneth S., 2010] and [Mauw, 
Sjouke, and Martijn Oostdijk, 2006] as follows: 
 
 
                                     AND- refinement                      OR- refinement 
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
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P=Probability, C=Cost.  
 
 
 
As an example, to implement the above formulae, referring to Figure 6-1, the 
following random parameters are applied: 
 7.01 ExploitP  
211 ExploitC  
6.02 ExploitP  
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412ExploitC  
75.03 ExploitP  
263ExploitC  
9.04 ExploitP  
124ExploitC  
 
In sub-goal-1, where the nodes 
connected using OR 
refinement:
)1((1
1
1 

 
n
k
kgoalSub PP  
 1goalSubP 1-((1-0.7)*(1-0.6)) 
 1goalSubP 0.88. 
))100//()*(()(
1
1
1
1 



 
n
k
k
n
k
goalsub kk
pCpCMaxC
 
 1goalsubC 41-((21*0.7)/(1.3*100)) 
 1goalsubC 40.917. 
In the sub-goal-2, which the 
nodes connected, using AND 
refinement: 


 
n
k
kgoalSub PP
1
2  
 2goalSubP 0.75*0.9=0.675. 
100/)(
1
1
2 


 
n
k
kgoalsub CCMinC  
 2goalsubC 12 - (26/100). 
 2goalsubC 11.47 
     
In the final attacker goal, which 
the nodes connected, using 
AND refinement:
 



n
k
kgoal PP
1
 
goalP 0.88*0.675=0.594. 
100/)(
1
1




n
k
kgoal CCMinC  
goalC 11.06 
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As shown in Figure 6-2, x+1 factors must be calculated to obtain the final attacker 
goal cost and probability, as x+1 represent the parent node. Csx and Psx represent 
the successful attack probability and cost for the node x. 
 
In order to calculate the x+1 cost and probability, the path from the root to the 
leaves in the tree will be navigated twice for each run. 
 
In this case, the sets   Psx, Csx where x=1, 2, 3 , … , n represent the success 
probability and cost for all the node n and they are self-determining from each 
other according to OR/AND refinement. 
 
The OR procedure (Psk, Csk) represents the procedure to calculate the cost and 
the probability if the nodes are OR refinement with root or parent, while 
ANDprocedure (Psk, Csk) represents the procedure to calculate the cost and the 
probability if the nodes are AND refinement with root according to the Edge et al 
formulae. 
 
A basic algorithm to make an AT including the calculated metrics up to the root 
node are shown in Figure 6-2. 
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Figure 6-2. Algorithm to build a Cost Centric Attack Tree 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Input: AT elements with leaf nodes set L= {L1, L2 ,…, Ln} 
             Success attack probability s Sn, Success attack cost c Cn 
Output: The Cost and probability of the root node (Attacker goal) 
Begin 
Assign initial values (Probability and Cost) for all leaf nodes  
   For Lx {L1, L2 ,…, Ln} Do 
     Ps: =0,   Cs: =0 
   End For 
Assign metrics for all leaf nodes  
For x: =1 to  n Do 
If the node.type=”OR” 
  Psx, Csx ORprocedure (Psk, Csk) 
       )1((100:
1
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      End If 
 
If the node.type=”AND” 
             Psx, CsxANDprocedure (Psk, Csk) 
        


ns
k
kk PsPs
1
:  
        100/)(:
1
1




ns
k
kkk CsCsMinCs     
      End If 
  End For 
End 
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6.3 DYNAMIC COUNTERMEASURES ATTACK TREES (DCAT) 
As mentioned earlier, there are many shapes and types of AT, mainly dependent 
on the metrics used to build and formulate the trees. DCAT is an annex of the AT 
symbolising attacks against a specific asset and the countermeasures required to 
mitigate different vulnerabilities to achieve high degrees of protection and security. 
In the DCAT model, attack detection and mitigation are permitted not just at the 
leaf node, but at the transiting nodes as well.  
 
The effects of incorporating countermeasures and attacks in the DCAT, using the 
DVSS framework and the Nessus scanner for vulnerability detections are 
examined to construct both attack trees and DCAT.  The idea of mixing 
countermeasures into attack trees, and more generally into directed acyclic 
graphs, using dynamic cost centric driven from DVSS and probability is a new 
approach. The main shift between CCAT and a DCAT is the CCAT represents the 
attacker actions using dynamic cost centric values and probability, while DCAT 
added a set of vulnerability mitigations to reduce the possible damage by an 
attacker to a critical asset in terms of protection. The root of the DCAT is linked to 
a critical, valuable asset that the system administrators need to secure and give 
special consideration. The leaf nodes in the DCAT represent either multi-step sub-
goals, which enable the attacker to compromise the root and might damage the 
critical asset or represent a set of mitigations as countermeasures of vulnerabilities 
to reduce the impact and change the total dynamic cost and probability to reach 
the goal. Non-leaf nodes could be represented in two different techniques as 
shown in Figure 6-3. For OR &AND nodes for an attack ORA and ANDA, is utilised 
and for countermeasures ORC and ANDC is applied. ANDA means the attacker 
needs to compromise all leaf node vulnerabilities (let consider two nodes with M, N 
costs) to reach the goal or to progress to the next level of attack the cost will be 
<Maximum (M, N). While ANDC refinement means at least one vulnerability should 
be compromised to reach the goal or to progress to the next level of attack ORA 
≤Minimum (M, N). ORA refinement means at least one vulnerability should be 
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compromised to reach the goal or to progress to the next level of attack ORA 
≤Minimum (M, N), while ORC means the attacker should compromise all leaf node 
vulnerabilities to reach the goal or to progress to the next level of attack. The 
DCAT can be described as CCAT enhanced by adding a set of mitigations to each 
leaf node with vulnerability. To represent optimal manners of vulnerability 
mitigations in DCAT to calculate the effective cost after implementing the 
mitigations, the system administrator will calculate the effective cost of possible 
mitigations in an attack scenario using CAT algorithms to reduce the total impact 
of a specific vulnerability.   
 
Mitigation(s) for a single vulnerability might be able to stop one multi-step attack or 
more. On the other hand multiple mitigations for multiple vulnerabilities may be 
able to prevent or stop one malicious attack, but in some cases, multiple 
mitigations fails to stop any attack, as preventing an attack is depends on the 
structures and distributions of the vulnerabilities and mitigations. The valued 
assets are obtained of the state space model according to the implementations of 
a dynamic CostRank algorithm; in standard security mechanisms, vulnerabilities 
are acknowledged using a vulnerability scanner such as the Nessus scanner. 
Vulnerabilities forming procedures and vulnerability analysis using DCAT are 
essential to systematically mitigate the vulnerabilities and find possible solutions 
for system protection. Calculating the effective security standards in terms of 
countermeasures implementations and having the option to apply different 
mitigations to reach optimal security protections is the essential process to 
effectively protect and secure system in a cost/benefit approach.  
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Figure 6-3. Attack trees and Dynamic Countermeasures Attack Trees 
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6.4  FORMAL REPRESENTATION 
In order to represent the Dynamic Countermeasures Attack Tree (DCAT), uses an 
unranked function F with Domain D and range of functions R, N represents the 
number of states in a specific space state.  
   Sfs)(  where  RDf
s
S :  for Ss  
 
Definition 5-1  
A CAT–symbol is a pair   ),( FP  such that 
P = {a, c} is a set of attacks (a) and countermeasures(c), (set  ca    and   ac 

), 
 
CACA
NS
C
SNS
C
SNS
A
SNS
A
S ANDORANDORF  },,)(,)(,){,){(    
 
is a set of functions of operations, with mapping type PPF 
*
, which expresses 
the type of each function symbol, as follows:  
       Denoted as a disjoint set union. 
For every S   N,   represents a tree with root node only;   represent a non-
decomposed node. 
 
 
Definition 5-2  
The set of all DCAT terms is denoted by: 


Since ),( cas  defined by 
C

   the set of all countermeasures and 
mitigations, 
A

   the set of all attacks. The set of attackers and countermeasures 
can be represented as follows:    
CA





   
 
The CAT terms of the Attacker and Definer (Countermeasures, Mitigation) type are 
built exclusively from the basic actions of the attacker 
AA
ANDOR,  and basic action of 
the definer as shown below. 
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Definition 5-3 
A Dynamic Countermeasure Attack Tree (DCAT) is a finite CAT tree T of a set of 
symbols 
},,,{ CCAA
CA
T
ANDORANDORF     
 
Alongside function, which define the type tree as Attack tree or countermeasures 
tree with OR, AND refinement. 
 
},{)(: CATtype 
 
 
which satisfies the following two conditions for every )(TType   
If there exist i }0/{  such that )(Ttypepi  and ppi   
 
then  







CC
AA
ANDOR
ANDOR
pT )(     
Otherwise 
 
T (p) = 
ppi
C
A if
B
B 
 
 
 
The function  allows us to differentiate between composed nodes(nodes with 
child’s) and a non-decomposed node(nodes without child’s). The value of   
determining the acts as an attacker or defender to use (AND, OR) or   . 
 
By comparing the value of  applied to the root with values applied to the children
ip , can decide which nodes are decomposed and non-decomposed. 
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Node p is decomposed if it has at least one child ip such that ppi  , a non-
decomposed node can have at most one child ip  and the child satisfies ppi  . 
 
Condition states that each node p in CAT tree is either a decomposed node in a 
conjunctive and disjunctive (AND, OR) manner.  
},,,{)( CCAA ANDORANDORpT  .  Or is a non-decomposed node 
}{)( CApT    
 
 
Definition 5-4 
 
If there exist i }0/{  such that Api  and ppi   and 
AANDpT )(  
then  
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n
k
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A
AND PP
1
     where  AANDP  is the probability for nodes to propagate up toward 
the root with AND decomposed.                                            
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ANDC  is the cost for nodes to propagate up 
toward the root with AND decomposed. 
 
 
Definition 5-5 
 
If there exist i }0/{  such that Api  and ppi   and 
AORpT )(  
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ORP   is the probability for nodes to propagate up 
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pCpCMaxC  where AORC  is the cost for nodes to 
propagate up toward the root with OR gate. 
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Definition 5-6 
 
If there exist i }0/{  such that Cpi  and ppi   and 
cORpT )(  
then  
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   where CORP  is the probability for nodes to propagate up toward the 
root with OR gate. 
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Definition 5-7 
 
If there exists }0/{i  such that Cpi   and ppi   and 
cANDpT )(  
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propagate up toward the root with AND gate. 
 
 
6.5  COUNTERMEASURES COST 
A dynamic severity cost measures for each state using the Dynamic Vulnerability 
Scoring System (DVSS) based on Intrinsic, time-based and dynamic-cost metrics 
by combining related sub-scores to produce a unique severity of impact cost by 
modelling the problem’s parameters in a mathematical framework. To adjust the 
countermeasure Cost value using a developed risk metrics, considering both the 
likelihood and dynamic impact for each vulnerability, the mitigation cost is 
introduced, to calculate the mitigation (countermeasure) cost (CMit). The analyst 
needs to assess the outcome of the mitigation of each attribute of likelihood and 
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impact, and then apply the same pattern to work out the values of the mitigation. 
The values have a negative real numbers (as the cost of an exploit in the DVSS 
and in CVSS is taking a positive real number, logically the mitigations should be in 
negative values), using the DVSS framework. In the classical countermeasure 
approaches, the cost value of mitigation will be just equal to the monetary value of 
the vulnerability, in other words: 
vvV CostMCostCMit   
 
The mitigations could be considered as a process to eliminate the impact of 
publishing vulnerabilities, always consider the mitigations Cost are mathematically 
equivalent to the vulnerabilities cost without giving enough consideration to the 
likelihood or to the new methods to exploit them, for that reason, the following 
assumption is applied 
 vv CostMCost   
 
Example  5-1 
To calculate the mitigation cost of the vulnerability “ICS-ALERT-12-166-01 Sielco 
Sistemi Winlog Buffer Overflow” that was published June 14, 2012.  
             Taken from  http://www.tenable.com  
 
A DVSS of the vulnerability metrics are: 
Intrinsic vector parameters =9.3: 
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: C  I:     C A: C 
Time-based vector parameters are(Temporal score= 9.3): 
E: H RL: U RC: C 
Costv vector parameters are: 
TD: H CDP: MH CR: H IR: H AR: H 
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To calculate the effective cost using Intrinsic, Time-based and Dynamic-cost 
factors in the same approach introduced in Chapter-3 in this thesis: 
))1(*)1(*)1(1(*41.10 AIInICII   
10.0I  
AuACAVEx ***20  
8.6xE  
)R*R*E* BS E CLroundAT (
1
 
3.9AT  
10*))(*)(*)10((( 1 TDCDPATATroundCostv   
96.0vCost  
 
After implementing the Sielco Sistemi update to repair these vulnerabilities, the 
following update parameters are reached: 
 
Intrinsic vector parameters are: 
AV: N AC: H Au: S C: N  I:     P A: N 
Time-base vector parameters are: 
E: H RL: OF RC: C 
Costv  vector parameters are: 
TD: M CDP: MH CR: H IR: L AR: L 
 
Then the effective cost after implementing the fix can be calculated as follows: 
 
))1(*)1(*)1(1(*41.10 AIInICII   
6.4I  
AuACAVEx ***20  
8.6xE  
))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((( 1 IFunctionEIroundBS x   
6.8BS
 
)R*R*E* BS E CLroundAT (
1
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5.0AT  
10*))(*)(*)10((( 1 TDCDPATATroundCostv   
65.0vCost  
 
It can be seen that the cost drops down sharply after applying the mitigation, but 
the risk is still there and for that reason ICS-CERT asked asset holders to take 
extra security actions. 
 
If the above Figures are implemented to the CAT, then the mitigation cost (CMit) 
will be: 
vvV CostMCostCMit   
0.650.96 VCMit  
0.31VCMit  
 
Example 5-2 
“Cross-site scripting attacks 
Synopsis: The remote web server is prone to cross-site scripting attacks. 
Description: The remote host is running a web server that fails to adequately 
sanitize request strings of malicious JavaScript. By leveraging this issue, an 
attacker may be able to cause arbitrary HTML and script code to be executed in a 
user's browser within the security context of the affected site. CVE : CVE-2002-
1060, CVE-2003-1543, CVE-2005-2453, CVE-2006-1681 BID : 5305, 7344, 7353, 
8037, 14473, 17408 Other  
Server Specs: Windows Server 2008 Standard (32-bit) 
Service Pack 1, references: OSVDB: 4989, OSVDB:18525, 
OSVDB:24469,OSVDB:42314.” 
        Taken from, http://www.tenable.com 
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Intrinsic vector parameters are: CVSS Base=4.3 (Risk Factor: Medium) 
  AV: N AC: M Au: N C: N  I:     N A: N 
Time-based vector parameters are(Temporal score= 4.1):  
E: F RL: U RC: C 
Costv vector parameters are: 
TD: M CDP: MH CR: L IR: M AR: L 
 
To calculate the effective cost using base, temporal and environmental factors: 
))1(*)1(*)1(1(*41.10 AIInICII   
2.90I  
AuACAVEx ***20  
8.6xE  
))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((( 1 IFunctionEIroundBS x   
6.8BS
 
)R*R*E* BS E CLroundAT (
1
 
4.3AT  
10*))(*)(*)10((( 1 TDCDPATATroundCostv   
59.0vCost  
 
After implementing the fix, the parameters changed as follows:  
Intrinsic Score = 3.9: 
AV: N AC: H Au: S C: N  I:     P A: N 
Time-based vector parameters are: 
E: F RL: OF RC: C 
Costv vector parameters are: 
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: N  I:     P A: N 
 
 
))1(*)1(*)1(1(*41.10 AIInICII   
2.90I  
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AuACAVEx ***20  
3.9xE  
))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((( 1 IFunctionEIroundBS x   
2.1BS
 
)R*R*E* BS E CLroundAT (
1
 
2.0AT  
10*))(*)(*)10((( 1 TDCDPATATroundCostv   
44.0vCost  
vvV CostMCostCMit   
0.440.59 VCMit  
0.14VCMit  
 
 
 
6.6 ALGORITHMS TO CONSTRUCT DYNAMIC ATTACK AND 
COUNTERMEASURES TREES 
The DCAT can be described as a dynamic CCAT enhanced by adding a set of 
vulnerability mitigations to each leaf node in CCAT. To stand for effective manners 
of vulnerability mitigations in DCAT, the system administrator will calculate the 
effective cost of possible mitigations in an attack scenario using DCAT algorithms 
to concentrate the entire impact of a specific vulnerability. To review how to 
construct attack and countermeasures trees, using the formal representation and 
definitions presented above, a basic algorithm to construct CCAT and CAT, 
including the calculated metrics up to the root node, is set out in Figures 6-2 and 
6-4. 
A DCAT algorithm calculates metrics from leaves up to the root to compute the 
effective dynamic cost and probability. 
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ORprocedure AOR  (Psk, Csk) represents the procedure to calculate the cost and the 
probability. If the node type is OR and the node represented in attack type, then 
the cost and probability are calculated according to the following rules:  
)1((1
1



n
k
k
A
OR PP  
)100//()*(()(
1
1
1





n
k
k
n
k
A
OR kk
pCpCMaxC  
while ANDprocedure AAND  (Psk, Csk) represents the procedure to calculate the cost 
and the probability. If the nodes are AND refinement with root according to the 
Edge et al formulae. 

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AND PP
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n
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If the node type is OR and the node represented in countermeasure type the  
ORprocedure COR  (-Psk, -Csk) then calculate the cost and probability according to 
the following formulae: 



n
k
k
C
OR PP
1
 
100/)(
1
1




n
k
k
C
OR CCMinC  
 
If the node type is AND and the node represented in countermeasure type, the  
ORprocedure CAND  (-Psk, -Csk)  then calculate the cost and probability according to 
the following formulae: 
 )1((1
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The DCAT approach enables the security decision making to calculate the 
expected loss before and after an investment decision, as exhibited in Section 5.5 
in this chapter using attacks and countermeasures scenario.  
Using different sets of countermeasures will result in different effective costs and 
probabilities that will help the network administrator to select the mitigation 
approach based on cost and benefits.  
Using DCAT algorithm, help to regulate the risk and uncertainty in the enterprise 
architecture, to be reflected in term of cost-centric and mitigation cost attributes 
and calculate the influence of the mitigation attributes on the attacker's ability to 
compromise a vital asset. 
A basic algorithm to construct CAT based on cost centric and considers attack and 
countermeasure costs, probabilities in one static tree structure, including the 
calculated metrics up to root node are shown in Figure 6-4,  
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Figure 6-4. Algorithm of building Dynamic Countermeasures Attack Tree 
 
Input: CAT elements with leaf nodes set L= {L1, L2 ,…, Ln} 
            Success attack probability s Sn, Success attack cost c Cn.  Node Type (A/C) 
Output: The Cost and probability of the root node (Attacker goal) 
Begin 
Assign initial values (Probability and Cost) for all leaf nodes  
   For Lx {L1, L2 ,…, Ln} Do 
   End For 
    Assign metrics for all leaf nodes  
    For x: =1 to  n Do 
If the node.type=”OR”  \*  ”A” *\ 
            Psx, Csx   ORprocedure ( ASkP , 
A
SkC )                        
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                        End IF       
       End For 
End 
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6.7 EXAMPLE OF DCAT ANALYSIS 
The Nessus scanner is employed to identify known vulnerabilities on PC1 and 
PC2 on a prototype network shown in Figure-3-5, presented in Chapter-3, for the 
evaluation of DCAT algorithms. 
 
The following standard scheme is used to build the DCAT: 
 
1.  Using CostRank Algorithm to determine the critical asset the system 
administrator needs to protect;  
2.  Track the Nessus scanner to determine the vulnerabilities associated with the 
asset using the cost centric framework and DVSS; 
3.  Check out all published mitigations for all vulnerabilities. 
4.  Assess how well the security solution mitigates those risks; 
5.  Assess DCAT algorithm in terms of effective security cost and probability.  
 
The foremost step is to select the critical assets that should be protected and 
choose PC1 from the paradigm network, represented in Figure 3-5. 
 
In the second step to determine the vulnerabilities associated with the asset using 
the cost centric framework and DVSS; referring to chapter 3 the following 
vulnerabilities were discovered by Nessus scanner and classified by operational 
level 0 and 1  and 3 as shown in Figure-6-5 and Table-6-1. 
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 Vn1 Vn2 Vn5 Vn10   OLC Value 
Probability 0.31 0.25 0.20 0.24     
None privileges 57 47 38 44   CPC1,0 56.31 
 Vn4 Vn6 Vn9 Vn11     
Probability 0.23 0.31 0.26 0.19     
User privileges 52 71 60 44   CPC1,1 70.47 
 Vn3 Vn7 Vn8      
Probability 0.33 0.33 0.33      
Root/Administrator 
privilege 
89 90 87    CPC1,2  89.12 
 
Table 6-1 The Vulnerabilities OLC of PC1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 6-5. The vulnerabilities distributions of PC1 
 
 
 
Figure-6-6 and Figure-6-7 show the vulnerabilities and mitigations in CCAT and 
DCAT are classified into three groups as user, root/administrator, and none. The 
user privileges mean that the intruder could exploit the vulnerabilities and gain a 
       
        
       
             
   
                                          
    
               
       
        
       
             
   
                                            
    
               
       
       
      
        
   
               
    
                              
 186 
 
user account privilege; while root privilege level refers to the vulnerabilities that 
could feed the intruder root or admin privilege after exploiting the vulnerabilities 
and none means the attackers can exploit the exposure from the networks or 
website with no privilege escalations. The following remark regarding the cost-
centric value and probability transfer from the child nodes to the parent node: 
1- The probability of parent node with AND bond will never increase as every 
attacker's action on the child nodes should succeed to find the parent node.  
The spread of the cost from the child node to parent’s node measures as the 
norm for all child cost nodes, again will never increase. 
2-  The probability of parent node with OR bond never has dropping values 
because the attackers can reach the parents using different nodes, then the 
probability of the parent will be larger or equal to the chance of the minor 
nodes.  
3- The cost-centric value of the parent node with OR bond will be near and less 
than the upper limit value of the child nodes and greater than the minimum 
value of the child nodes as one attacker's action on the child nodes should 
succeed to find the parent node.  In other words, the spread of the cost from 
the child node to parent’s node measures for all child cost nodes will never 
increase. 
4- The cost-centric value of the parent node with AND bond will be near and 
less than the minimum value of the child nodes as all attacker actions on the 
child nodes should succeed to find the parent node.  In other words, the 
spread of the cost from the child node to parent’s node measures for all child 
cost nodes will never increase. 
 
The majority of present CCAT and DCATs build on potential attack scenarios 
using attack profiles to detect possible vulnerable paths for the attackers to exploit 
vulnerabilities on the target assets. These approaches are in force in terms of 
finding vulnerabilities, but not in finding appropriate mitigations and measure the 
effective security before and later implementing the countermeasures. The DCAT 
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algorithm is developed based on dynamic cost centric, considered an attack and 
countermeasure costs, probabilities in one static tree structure. 
The effectiveness of DCAT algorithm is measured in this case as the CAT 
algorithm is constructed based on vulnerability analysis using the Nessus scanner 
on critical and valuable asset computed using CostRank Algorithm, Dynamic Cost 
value calculated for each vulnerability and for each mitigation as shown in the 
examples in the first place.  
 
As shown in Figure 6-7, possible mitigations for CCAT to protect PC1, represented 
in Figure 6-6, it can be ensured that the cost to make the root = 88.73 and the 
probability P= 0.95.  That suggests a high risk as the root connected sub goal 1, 2, 
3 using OR decomposed, as  explained in the first place in this chapter, the 
solution for which is to implement the mitigations to sub goal-1, goal-2 and sub 
goal-3, as shown in Figure 6-7.  The following mitigations will apply to the CCAT- 
Sub-Goal-2, shown in Figure 6-6: 
 
Mv3-1, C= 67.4, P= 0.22. 
Mv3-2, C= 79.4, P= 0.26. 
Mv7-1, C=69.5, P=0.23. 
Mv7-2, C= 79.8, P= 0.26. 
Mv8, C= 79.5, P= 0.25. 
 
There are two mitigations for Vulnerability-3 and Vulnerability-7, the Mv3-1 and 
Mv3-2, Mv7-1 and Mv7-2  with 
C
KAND - According to the rules and definitions 
explained in this Chapter, the AND for countermeasures decomposed using 
)( kCMax  and for that reason the CAT algorithm ignored the mitigation Mv3-1 and 
used Mv3-2 as Mv3-1 with higher effective cost weight and probability. 
 
The following mitigations will apply to the CCAT- Sub-Goal-1: 
 
Mv1, C=47, P= 0.27. 
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Mv2, C=43, P= 0.2. 
Mv5. C=32, P= 0.1. 
Mv10, C=38. P= 0.19. 
 
The following mitigations will apply to the CCAT- Sub-Goal-3: 
Mv9, C=50.8, P= 0.20. 
Mv6, C=61.66, P=0.26. 
Mv11, C=-41.66, P= 0.1. 
Mv4, C=40.8, P= 0.2. 
 
 189 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-6.  The DCCAT of PC1 uses OR decomposed for the root 
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The mitigations and security fixes in most cases are limited, as the software 
application providers need a long time to release the patches, since they require to 
carry out exhaustive testing to avoid more weaknesses. The most significance 
protection, when the network administrators experience problems in finding 
possible mitigations, is to use ORC refinement arrangements to bypass the 
unpatched vulnerability and to reduce the probability that an attacker can reach 
the goal or move to the upper level. Otherwise, the mitigation selection will be 
according to the effective cost weight and probability. The weighting scale 
between the effective attack cost based on a “What - If” scenario and 
countermeasures cost represent the principal function of the CAT algorithm.  The 
heightened DCAT is shown in Figure 6.7. As you will see, the cost value of 
exploiting PC1 drops down from 88.73 to 10.14, with an effective mitigations cost 
value of  (-78.59), if the countermeasures and mitigations implemented to all 
vulnerabilities, according to cost/benefit principle, the system administrator could 
only implement solutions to some vulnerabilities depending on the importance of 
the assets. The cost-centric value of Sub Goal-2 drops down from 89.12 to 11.35, 
with an effective mitigations cost value of (-77.76).  The cost value of Sub Goal-1 
drops down from 56.31 to 9.95, with an effective mitigations cost value of (-46.36). 
Finally, Sub Goal-3 drops down from 70.69 to 9.16, with an effective mitigations 
cost value of (-61.53). Figure 6-8 and Figure 6-9, show the cost values and 
probabilities and their dropped down and mitigations for all vulnerabilities and 
mitigations used in the example. Please note that the best security cost is when 
the value approaches zero and the worst cost when the value approaches 100.  
On the other hand, the probability of exploiting PC1 drops down from 0.95 to 0.18. 
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Figure 6-7.The optimized Dynamic Countermeasures Attack tree 
 
 192 
 
 
 
The implementations of DCAT in the above example change the security view 
dramatically and offer better security in terms of cost and probability.  
 
Figure 6-8, which represents a comparative figure of initial, mitigation, and 
effective cost value between CCAT and DCAT, shows clearly the improvement in 
security effective cost. 
 
Figure 6-8. Comparative figure of vulnerabilities Cost between CCAT and DCAT 
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Figure 6- 9 demonstrates the comparative diagram of the probabilities of exploiting 
PC1; you can see the dramatic improvement in terms of reducing the probability 
value of PC1, the probability  drops down from 0.95 to 0.18, with an effective 
mitigations probability value of  (-0.77).  The probability value of Sub Goal-1 drops 
down from 0.69 to 0.21, with an effective mitigations probability value of  (-0.48). 
The probability value of Sub Goal-2 drops down from 0.7 to 0.2, with an effective 
mitigations probability value of  (-0.5). Finally, Sub Goal-3 drops down from 0.5 to 
0.11, with an effective mitigations probability value of  (-0.39),  before and after 
implementing CAT. 
 
As you can see from the numerical analyses of DCAT algorithm, the effective 
countermeasures methodology developed against network attacks, applying 
different sets of countermeasures will result in different effective costs and 
probabilities, which help the network administrator to select the mitigation based 
on cost and benefits. The primary intention of developing DCATs is to combine 
countermeasures into directed acyclic graphs and to identify the critical threats in 
the systems to be mitigated. By selecting an effective, economical method to 
protect a critical asset by applying the mitigations only to a specific vulnerability, 
that bear on the critical assets and keeping off the total sum of mitigations to all 
exposures in the initiative. 
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Figure 6-9.Comparative figure of probabilities between CCAT and CAT 
 
6.8     BUSINESS CASE STUDY 
In this section, a systematic study of the cost analysis of the dynamic cost-
centric attack graph and mitigations is presented. In the area of security 
management, untreated threats can be hazardous and if the network 
administrators and security professionals are unaware of an attack, the impact 
could be very damaging to the businesses concerned. Referring to [Anderson, 
Ross, et al., 2012] model, the approximated costs of an attack are computed as 
the costs represent the expectancy of an approach, such as the prices of 
purchases of mitigations and implementing the countermeasures and controls 
by security pros. And, the consequence of an attack, such as the direct and 
collateral losses, and the response to an attach, such as recompense charges 
to the victims and other parties and Indirect costs, such as reputational impact 
and the loss as consequences of individual and business damage of internet 
transactions.  
 The business actions, customer satisfactions and overall national security 
depend on the security of network systems and cyberspace, including the 
software applications, data and the different technologies used to construct the 
network.  
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The Centre of Strategies and International Studies (CSIS) July 2013 estimated 
of criminal activity cost on the cyberspace in the range of $300 billion to $1 
trillion and estimated cost of breaching the secrecy (privacy) in the range of $1 
billion to $16 billion. As a result of the above Figures, billions of dollars have 
been allocated to secure the data of the public and private agencies, for 
instance, US government spends more than $100 million in the process of 
protecting, detecting and preventing cyber stacks. 
In malice of all these expenses, the security still not in a good shape, As an 
example [Anderson, Ross, et al., 2012.] states, there are in the UK a little over 
$1,2bn estimated cost of the fraudulence of the DWP (Department of Work and 
Pensions), and $3bn Income tax fraud. Whereas, they are in the process of 
preceding all the claims online in 2013, which could make the number is a lot 
more eminent. 
The attackers develop their skills and accomplished to discover new technique 
to exploit the vulnerabilities, even after implementing the mitigations or after 
obtaining a solution of a specific problem, using the multi - step approach. For 
example, the Google Chrome Pwnium browser attacks in 2012, as the attacker 
Pinkie Pie managed to perform a remote arbitrary code in the browser; using six 
individual low scoring vulnerabilities, in a successful multi-step approach to 
crack the Chrome sandbox. 
The static approach of numerical scoring of vulnerabilities, ignoring the dynamic 
relations between vulnerabilities and ignoring the mitigations of some exposures 
with very small scoring impact, highlight the reasons of the current security 
problems, which lead to inappropriate policy decisions. 
This thesis presented, a novel dynamic approach to calculate the severity of 
vulnerabilities, using a dynamic cost-centric approach. In order to formulate a 
cost-centric attack graph, using scalable parallel CostRank algorithms and 
finally using  dynamic cost centric risk mitigation model are presented to improve 
the network and cyberspace security and help the security professionals and 
system administrators to support security decisions and to create and maintain 
security policies and procedures. 
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In this section, the approach of analysis employed in this business case study will 
discuss, to assist the security investment decision makers in the process of 
choosing a proper security solution based on the cost/benefit analysis.  
Every bit you can understand from the numerical analyses of DCAT algorithm in 
Section 6-7, the effective dynamic countermeasures methodology developed 
against network attacks, using different sets of countermeasures will result in 
different effective costs and probabilities which help the network administrator to 
select the mitigation based on cost and benefit analysis. The primary intention of 
developing DCATs is to combine countermeasures into directed acyclic graphs 
and to identify the critical threats in the systems to be mitigated. By selecting an 
effective, economical method to protect a critical asset by applying the 
mitigations only to a specific vulnerability, that bear on the critical assets and 
keeping off the total sum of mitigations to all exposures in the initiative. This 
method will trim down the total price of implementing the countermeasures and 
ensure the effective protections of a critical asset. 
The case study approach used in this thesis based on Daniel Bernoulli using 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and von Neumann-Morgenstern EUT [Mongin, 
1997], these approaches calculate the consequence of the decisions under 
uncertainty and risk. As this thesis focuses on the risk valuation of a possible 
attack and determining a relevant solution of vulnerability mitigations to provide 
security professionals and system administrators with techniques and tools to 
support security decisions, the Bernoulli equations of probability theory and relate 
work is indispensable to assess the dynamic impact security, protection model. 
The annual loss, which interpret the likely loss per period (yearly in this case), 
can be calculated by the inbuilt of the possible loss probability with probability 
values of losses with a specific security level and without. 
Let assume the loss measured with implementing a specific level of security 
=LS1. 
In addition, the loss measured with implementing another level of security=LS2. 
Then can calculate the annual lost as follows: 
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         where x represents the possible loss. 
To set the standard Bernoulli equations with probability theory, assume the 
probability of loss using the loss assumption with a specific security level=Ps, the 
probability of loss without implementing any security = (1-Ps) and  represents 
the expected impact, in this case the LS  can be calculated for assumption  to 
have simple two loss outcome  (0, ) as follows: 
 
The expected benefit ( ) of implementing a specific level of information security 
techniques could be calculated as follows Annual: 


 
0
2121 ).( dxLLxLL SSAnnualSAnnualSS  
).( 21 SSS PP   
 
The net benefit expected ( ) can be calculated as follows: 
  where Cs= the cost of implementing a level of security. 
      Referencing to [Anderson, Ross, et al., 2012.] online banking attack cost:  
 
Phishing: estimate= $16m, Global estimate= $320m. 
Malware (consumer): UK estimate= $4m, Global estimate=$70m.  
Malware (businesses): UK estimate= $6m, Global estimate=$300m. 
The total estimated loss of indirect cost of £450 m ($700M). 
Bank tech. Countermeasures: UK estimate= $50m, Global estimate=$1 000m. 
In the dynamic cost-centric approach, to formulate a cost-centric attack graph, 
using scalable parallel CostRank algorithms and finally using dynamic cost 
centric risk mitigation model reduced the total cost of implementing the 
countermeasures and ensure the effective protections of a critical asset. 

 .0).1(. .SSSS PPPL 
S
s
Sss C 
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If the online banking attack in the UK is considered in this case study, 
considering the estimated price for implementing the countermeasures will 
reduce by only 7%, and the chance of successful attack will cut by only 3% using 
dynamic cost-centric approach. 
The [Anderson, Ross, et al., 2012.] online banking attack estimate cost, change 
according above probability as follows: 
Phishing: UK estimate= $25.5m, estimate= $319.9m. 
Malware (consumer): UK estimate= $3.88m, Global estimate=$67. 9m   
Malware (businesses): UK estimate= $5.82m, Global estimate=$291m  
The total estimated loss of indirect cost of £436.5 m ($679M) 
Bank tech. Countermeasures: UK estimate= $35m, Global estimate=$93 m 
Now if   the expected benefit is modified for 10 years project ( 10MaxTime ) with 
the yearly recruitment ( Rc ) cost of 1m in the dynamic security proposal and 5m 
yearly recruitment to mitigate all the vulnerabilities.  
SRSNMaxS CcLLTime  ).(  
The expected benefit of 50m countermeasures is: 
mSt 19650)3710960.(10  . 
The expected benefit of the dynamic Security investment approach is: 
mSd 3.23535)17.688960.(10  . 
With above calculations favour the dynamic approach, but let’s use the net 
present value. 
The return on security investment ( ) is defined as the ratio of the benefit of the 
      Security investment to the cost of security is: 
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The net present value ( ) considered the expected net benefit of security 
investment over the futures interval in the corresponding present value. 
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Let assume Dr=5% and TimeMax=10.  
mP sn 450  for the classical approach.  
mP dn 950  for the dynamic Security investment approach.  
The internal rate of return (IRR) represents the discount rate (Dr) when Pn=0,  
6.5rD  for the classical approach. 
3.9rD  for  the dynamic Security investment approach 
 
Figure 6-10. The visualisation of Net present value and IRR. 
 
As you can see in Figure 6-10 higher rate of return means the security 
investment of the dynamic approach is more valuable. 
In this segment, the business case study is presented, using security investment 
analysis, based on Daniel Bernoulli using Expected Utility Theory to forecast the 
expected benefits and the net expected benefit and Internal Net Return (IRR) of a 
dynamic security approach against the standard approaches of mitigations. 
 By using a humble figure of 7% reduction of the estimated cost, for implementing 
the dynamic countermeasures approach (as using dynamic cost centric risk 
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mitigation model reduced the total number of vulnerabilities mitigations, offer 
using a novel techniques to implement the mitigations and countermeasures for a 
critical vulnerabilities). The probability of successful attack is reduced by only 3% 
using dynamic cost-centric approach, which consider the interactions between 
vulnerabilities and finding a solution for treating a low score vulnerability and 
other parameters are covered in Chapter-3.  The existing result of using two 
approaches is showing that the dynamic cost-centric approach provides better 
and cost effective solution compared with the classical methods of security 
protections. 
  
6.9 SUMMARY OF FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter, a novel effective countermeasure-based solution is developed 
against network attacks using the cost-centric model checking by identifying the 
set of top network risks and hosts and application vulnerabilities, and 
countermeasures. In the DCAT model, attack detection and mitigation are 
permitted not just at the leaf node, but also at the transiting nodes as well as 
demonstrated in sub-goal-1, sub-goal-2 and sub-goal-3. In this example, the 
results of incorporating countermeasures and attacks into the DCAT, using a 
DVSS framework and Nessus scanner for vulnerability detections to construct both 
dynamic attack trees and DCAT are presented.  The idea of mixing 
countermeasures into attack trees, and more generally into directed acyclic graphs 
using cost centric driven from DVSS and probability, is a new approach. The main 
difference between a dynamic CCAT and a DCAT is: that a CCAT is represents 
the attacker actions using dynamic cost centric values and probability. However, 
DCAT added a set of vulnerability mitigations to select an effective set of 
mitigations to reduce the possible damage by an attacker to a critical asset in 
terms of security protections, to improve the overall security of the system in the 
cost/benefit approach. The root of the DCAT is linked to a critical, valuable asset 
that the system administrators need to secure and give special consideration. The 
DCAT can be described as CCAT enhanced by adding a set of vulnerability 
mitigations to each child node, to support security decisions and to create and 
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maintain security policies and procedures. DCAT represent optimal manners of 
vulnerability mitigations in CAT, the system administrator will calculate the 
effective cost of possible mitigations in an attack scenario using DCAT algorithms 
to reduce the total impact of a specific vulnerability.   
Mitigation for a single vulnerability might be able to stop one or more attacks, on 
the other hand, multiple mitigations for multiple vulnerabilities may be able to 
prevent or stop one malicious attack. The valued assets of the state space model 
are obtained according to the implementations of a dynamic CostRank algorithm, 
in the standard security mechanisms, vulnerabilities are acknowledged using a 
vulnerability scanner like Nessus. Vulnerabilities forming procedure and 
vulnerability analysis using DCAT are essential to systematically mitigate the 
vulnerabilities and find economical and effective possible solutions for system 
protections. Calculating the effective security measures in terms of 
countermeasure implementations and having alternative choices to apply different 
mitigation approaches in orders to reach an optimal security protection level. The 
consequences of incorporating countermeasures in the DCAT are studied using 
the case studies presented in chapter 3, with the DVSS calculator and Nessus 
scanner for vulnerability detections and both DCCAT and DCAT are constructed.  
The analysis of cost value and probability to reach a specific goal has performed 
and compared to existing results to evaluate the effectiveness of the methodology. 
In this Chapter, a business case study is presented; the information systems 
represent an asset that should be secured to ensure that the business standard in 
the right directions, as any breach of the security could cause operational losses, 
damage in the confidentiality and integrity and availability and corporate 
reputation.  
In this case study, a consideration of reduction of estimated cost by 7% only using  
the dynamic cost-centric countermeasures, 3% of successful attacks. 
These figures are much lower than the reality, as the DCAT novel approaches are 
designed to implement the countermeasures only for a critical asset that the 
security professionals and system administrators need to secure, in additions 
offers the selection of more effective mitigations, which reduces the total cost. 
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Regarding successful attacks, the DCAT approach considers the interactions of 
vulnerabilities, network architectures, frequency of attacks, and many other 
parameters covered in Chapter-3. 
The existing results shows, benchmarking with the classical approach of 
implementing the countermeasures that the DCAT approach provides momentum 
effective solutions to protect and secure information systems, 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Securing a large and complex network is a challenging task for security 
professionals and system administrators, as they need to trace and protect all the 
network paths that an attacker could use to exploit a specific vulnerability. Attack 
graphs (AG) are the most relevant method of illustrating the paths that an attacker 
can use to compromise vulnerabilities across the network. However, the existing 
AG models suffer from visual complications that deter humans from fully 
comprehending the information presented. An additional barrier is the huge 
amount of data required to accurately construct the AG. 
This thesis presents novel approaches and methodologies to  secure Network 
systems from intended attackers by providing security professionals and system 
administrators with techniques and tools to support security decisions and to 
create and maintain security policies and procedures. The approaches used in this 
thesis are based upon adapted AG models and associated set of algorithmic 
analysis tools. 
The first hypothesis of this thesis was to evaluate the method of developing a 
unique severity cost of all vulnerabilities existing in a network host using  dynamic 
risk impact metric methods. The purpose being to ensure that the new approach 
improved the risk scoring method and applied to produce cost-centric access to 
thin out the visual complexity of attack graph as presented and benchmarked in 
this dissertation. 
 A novel approach to developing tools for dynamic vulnerabilities quantitative 
scoring was presented, including network topological analysis to measure the 
impact of the network devices and configurations, and considering the correction 
factor to change the score of the intrinsic metric on the final scoring value of 
vulnerabilities. As the network topology and configuration change, the formula 
adapts the scoring values from the developed dynamic database file instead of 
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constant empirical static values used by CVSS, taking into considerations the 
interaction between vulnerabilities to improve the risk detections and mitigations. 
The dynamic impact scoring of  vulnerabilities is used to advance the cost-centric 
method to assign a unique severity cost for each host by dividing the scores of the 
vulnerabilities to three main levels of privileges: i) none; ii) user and iii) root. The 
approach then classifies these levels into operational levels to identify and 
calculate the severity cost of multi-step vulnerabilities. These approaches and 
methods that provide an important step to achieve the aim of this thesis, to secure 
network systems and to assist the security investment decision makers in the 
process of selecting a proper security solution based on the cost/benefit analysis, 
as the cost-centric method will be used in building and ranking a novel cost-centric 
attack graph. 
The cost of the total weight of all vulnerabilities for each host has been used to 
develop a unique dynamic severity, using DVSS scores of intrinsic, time-based 
and ecological metrics by combining related sub-scores and modelling the 
problem’s parameters into a mathematical framework. In the test pad, Nessus 
Scanner 4.x is used to discover known vulnerabilities. Open source programs 
have been developed to process and combine different dynamic files to produce 
dynamic scores, the CVSS calculator demonstrated in the Appendix- is used to 
benchmark the DVSS scores with CVSS to monitor the impact of using a dynamic 
approach of calculation vulnerabilities scoring.  
As the risk should be evaluated in terms of maximum impact on an adverse event, 
in the risk matrix used formulae are modified to collaborate the risk equations.  
The method of vulnerability classification is divided into three main levels, 
according to privileges (user, root/administrator, none) and is tested by comparing 
the most critical vulnerability scoring. To make sure that the calculated values 
reflect a real representation of the vulnerabilities existing in the hosts and the 
operational levels of  vulnerabilities states for each privilege are rigor, significance, 
and it will lead to correct results, at the time when the dynamic cost-centric values 
used to build and rank the attack graph. Using the cost-centric framework to 
classify the vulnerabilities to none, user and root privileges, and then finding the 
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scores to OLC, the practical experiments proved that this classification really 
reflects the use of the risk matrices. The calculated values are used to build the 
cost-centric attack graph. 
As established above, the author evidenced that a unique severity cost of all 
vulnerabilities existing in a network host with a new method to construct a cost-
centric model checking approach, using  novel dynamic risk impact metric 
methods improved the quantitative risk impact metric.  
 
A new methodology has been developed to represent an attack graph with 
dynamic cost metrics and also a new methodology to calculate and represent the 
cost for each host. The problem’s parameters have been modelled into a cost-
centric framework to be used in the experiments. 
A scalable, dynamic CostRank algorithm for ranking the AG is developed using a 
new approach to represent the states by implementing a dynamic cost-centric 
driven from statistical probability of  dynamic impact scoring for the vulnerabilities.  
The ranks of the states represent the significance of the states in the DCCAT. 
Thus, these rankings represent a metric that can be used by security professionals 
and system administrators to make different security decisions to improve the 
network security based on cost/benefits as demonstrated in Chapter-6. Ranking 
an AG signifies a useful approach to solve the problem of AG visual complexity by 
providing a sight to the critical area of vulnerabilities to perform the analysis and to 
discover the effective method to implement the mitigations.  
The CostRank algorithm is developed based on Google PageRank algorithm to 
demonstrate significance high rank states based on dynamic cost probability that 
the attackers can use in multi-step attack to exploit a vulnerability in the target 
critical asset.  
In the CostRank algorithm the information about pre-condition probability, not 
necessary to be known before hand  for all states as the values can be derived 
from partial information to perform the ranking, however knowing the probability 
can produce more accurate results. 
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The CostRank algorithm exercises an iterative mathematical process to calculate 
the maximal eigenvector of a practiced matrix with hosts’ dynamic cost values 
derived from designated file structures.  A framework is implemented on a test 
network, using the Nessus scanner to discover known vulnerabilities, implement 
these results and to build and represent the dynamic cost centric attack graph 
using ranking algorithms (in a similar fashion to Mehta et al. 2006 and 
Kijsanayothin, 2010). However, instead of using vulnerabilities for each host, a 
CostRank Markov Model has developed, thereby reducing the complexity in the 
attack graph and reducing the problem of visibility and significantly approved that 
the dynamic CostRank methodology can provide the optimum solution of ranking 
attack graphs towards minimising the dimension and complexity of attack graphs. 
A systematic model for parallel CostRank algorithm based on performance has 
been developed. The model is built on a number of intellectual performance 
factors such as load balancing, speed up, delay and efficiency.  
As demonstrated above, a dynamic CostRank methodology provided an effective 
solution with ranking attack graphs using a cost-centric approach, minimising the 
dimension and complexity of attack graphs, please refer to the hypothesis-2. 
 
A novel parallel algorithm is presented in this thesis to implement CostRank for 
distributed parallel computers using multiprocessors. To reduce the complexity of 
the serial CostRank algorithm and to make CostRank calculations more effective 
in terms of the cost/benefits approach. As the number of hosts in the network is 
increased, the serial CostRank algorithm needs to read the source CostRank 
values of different states and store it in a buffer, then read the parameters in the 
binary graph file header. This has three components, the entire number of states, 
and the entire number of links, and the upper limit out degree, in the attack graph. 
 A state entry record saves the essential structural data for a state such as  state 
ID, the out-degree, and then forward links (Link 1, Link 2, and Link v) along with 
corresponding cost for each link (C1, C2, and Cv) respectively. The parallel in-
memory Piccolo  algorithm is selected to extensively reduce access share state 
stored in memory and iterations, which include table partitioning (local access), 
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synchronization of distributed table, checkpoint/restore and load balance/ and task 
scheduling. In the same way, the large scales networks are secured that require 
fast and reliable computing to calculate the ranking of enormous graphs with 
thousands of states and millions or links. In this, a focus on a parallel CostRank 
computational architecture on a cluster of PCs networked for partitioning 
calculations and two masters, for synchronisations to assess the complexity and 
scalability of the algorithms.  
In particular, a partitioning of input data, graph files, and ranking vectors with an 
appropriate load balancing technique has reduced  the runtime and hence 
scalability of large scale parallel  CostRank calculations.  In this thesis, an 
application case study of parallel CostRank calculations is presented using one- 
dimensional sparse matrix partitioning on a modified research page at Stanford 
University. It describes the link structure of the stanford.edu-domain from a 
September 2002 collection and contains 281903 pages with about 2.3 million links, 
outcomes in a major reduction in communication overhead and in runtime. To 
study its efficiency, several tests were performed using out-vector files 
synchronised from the real networked data. The given results are quite 
encouraging.  
The efficiency and speedup increased when the number of processors increased 
for a fixed problem size, the exceptional at case of using two processors as the 
overhead of partitions of graph link files, load balancing, synchronisations 
influence the efficiency, speed up. 
During the investigations of the behaviour of CostRank algorithm, which provide a 
linear speedup as expected when the number of processors increased with fixed 
problem size, the observation that a slow system have better speedup for both 
single thread with delay and without delay.   
An analysis of the performance and scalability of the parallel CostRank algorithm 
is presented in this thesis. The empirical approach to evaluating the CostRank 
algorithm’s performance demonstrates a major reduction in communication 
overhead and in runtime. Several tests were performed using out-vector files 
synchronised from real networked data.  
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A visible logical dialogue had also provided in terms of I/O and synchronization 
rate, and memory utilisation, speedup gain by using parallel CostRank over the 
Serial CostRank algorithm, load balancing, processor loads, and efficiency of 
parallel CostRank algorithms.  
The isoefficiency Metric of Scalability was used to measure the scalability of 
CostRank algorithm. If the number of processors increases using fixed problem 
size, then the efficiency of the parallel scheme should increase accordingly, using 
similar fashions, if the problem size is fixed and at the same time the efficiency 
becomes stable, when the number of processors increased then, this will indicate 
bad utilisation of the processing recourses.  
An experiment was performed to investigate the scalability of the Parallel 
CostRank algorithm. As expected according to isoefficiency approach, the problem 
size increased with the number of the processors to keep a fixed level of 
efficiency, which indicates good utilisation of the processing resources in term of 
machines and network specifications setting. 
A partition-centred CostRank algorithm has been developed that can efficiently run 
on a parallel background and the scalability (isoefficiency function) of the parallel 
CostRank algorithm is  )log()( 2 SSS PPPS  .  
From the above discussion, the parallel CostRank algorithm makes the rank 
calculations for an increasing number of hosts in the networks in a quick, effective 
and scalable manner; please refer to the hypothesis-3. 
A novel effective countermeasure solution against network system attacks was 
established using a cost-centric attack graph by developing DCAT, in the DCAT 
model, attack detection and mitigation are legitimate not just at the leaf node, but 
at the transiting nodes. The results of incorporating countermeasures and attacks 
in the DCAT, using the DVSS framework and the Nessus scanner for vulnerability 
detections to construct both dynamic attack trees and DCAT, show clearly the 
effectiveness and the significance of CAT algorithm. These are, both in terms of 
reducing the total impact of a specific vulnerability and giving the security 
professional/system administrators the capability to select more mitigation that are 
effective.  The idea of mixing countermeasures into attack trees, and more 
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generally into directed acyclic graphs using cost centric driven from DVSS and 
probability, is a new novel approach. The root of the DCAT is linked to a critical, 
valuable asset that the system administrators need to secure and give special 
consideration. The DCAT could be described as CCAT enhanced by adding a set 
of vulnerability mitigations to each child node, To represent optimal manners of 
vulnerability mitigations in CAT, the system administrator will calculate the 
effective cost of possible mitigations in an attack scenario using DCAT algorithms 
to reduce the total impact of a specific vulnerability.   
Mitigation for a single vulnerability might be able to stop one attack or more, on the 
other hand multiple mitigations for multiple vulnerabilities may be able to prevent 
or stop one malicious attack. In other hand, both single and multiple mitigations 
may not prevent any attack, especially at the time of using static, classical policy of 
mitigations, in DCAT approach only effective mitigations in dynamic impact 
methods, which ensure the implementing operative mitigations in cost/benefit 
tactic. 
The valued assets of the state space model are obtained according to the 
implementations of a dynamic CostRank algorithm, in the standard security 
mechanisms, vulnerabilities are acknowledged using a vulnerability scanner like 
Nessus scanner. Vulnerabilities forming procedure and vulnerability analysis using 
DCAT are essential to systematically mitigate the vulnerabilities and find 
economical and effective possible solutions for system protections. Calculating the 
effective security measures in terms of countermeasure implementations and 
having the alternative choices to apply different mitigations to reach optimal 
security protections.  
 The analysis of cost value and probability to reach a specific goal, was performed 
and compared to existing results in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
methodology. 
A Business case study is presented, using security investment analysis based on 
Daniel Bernoulli using Expected Utility Theory. In order to calculate the expected 
benefit and the net expected benefit and Internal Net Return (IRR) of the dynamic 
security investment approach against the standard approaches of mitigations. 
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 In this case study, a consideration of reduction of estimated cost by 7% only using 
the dynamic cost-centric countermeasures, 3% of successful attacks. 
These figures are much lower than the reality, as the author, novel approach is 
designed to implement the countermeasures only for a critical asset that the 
security professionals and system administrators need to secure. In addition, this 
offers the selection of more effective mitigations, which reduces the total cost. 
Regarding successful attacks, the approach presented in this thesis considers the 
interactions of vulnerabilities, network architectures, frequency of attacks and 
many other parameters of a dynamic cost impact approach. 
The DCAT approach has produced dynamic countermeasure attack tree model 
that provides the cost effective solution to implement operative countermeasures 
and mitigations. 
As established above, the author evidenced that Countermeasures Attack Tree 
algorithms can represent the optimum solution to implement effective 
countermeasures and mitigations..  
 
 
7.2 FURTHER WORK 
 
In this section, the set out a further study related to the methodologies and 
techniques employed in this thesis are presented. 
 
7.2.1 Using Shannon information entropy to calculate uncertainties 
The risk assessment of any security system has a high level of uncertainty 
because usually probability and statistics are used to evaluate the security of 
different cyber security systems.  Using Shannon entropy to represent the 
uncertainty of information used to calculate systems risk and entropy weight 
method, since the weight of the object index is normally used and points to the 
significant components of the index. The risk of security systems should be 
evaluated in terms of different security layers and protection. The security 
evaluation algorithm must be written to normalise the protective matrix and 
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calculate the entropy and the entropy weight, then the weight and paths are used 
to evaluate and calculate the total risk in the system and give the system 
administrator clear guidance on the vulnerable security entities.  
 
The basic security evaluation algorithm is written to normalise the protective matrix 
and calculate the entropy and the entropy weight, then the weight could be used to 
evaluate and calculate the total risk in the system and give the system 
administrator clear guidance on the vulnerable security entities. 
 
Mat lab could be used to execute the following algorithms to calculate the entropy 
and the entropy weight: 
1- Construct evaluation matrix: specify the different cost values assigned to 
Security entities in the form of numerical matrix rxy. 
2- Calculate the normalised process. 
    
      
3- Calculate the Entropy: if the index information is smaller, the index provides 
the information, content bigger, so the index of small entropy has important 
value. 
             Where  
4-  Calculate the index entropy weight. 
 , and  
The majority of the works in this thesis, such as risk evaluation methodologies and 
Cost-Centric attack graphs and CAT, are based on probability and statistics and 
therefore the results will have enormous amounts of uncertainty, which might 
affect the accuracy of risk assessments. Using Shannon information entropy and 
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entropy weight is suggested to represent the average uncertainties and combined 
them with the results to improve the quality. That related to objective-1 improved 
the quantitative risk impact metric,  objective-2  improve the cost-centric approach 
based on an attack graph model, the objective-3 dynamic CostRank methodology, 
objective-4 parallel CostRank algorithm and objective 5 Countermeasure Attack 
Tree algorithms. 
 
7.2.2  Combine the DCAT and the  Dynamic Cost Centric AG, model with the 
library of action 
As further work, referring to [Kannan, Karthik, and Rahul Telang, 2005], it is 
possible to combine the Countermeasures Attack Tree and the cost centric AG 
model with the library of action to automate the mitigation similar to Net SPA. An 
input needs to build to the model builder, obtaining information about the 
vulnerabilities and mitigations, and to build an atomic framework of attack graph 
and DCAT for better and more accurate results, as this action related to the thesis 
aim and all objectives. 
 
 
7.2.3 Feasibility for very large graphs 
In this work, the author started by highlighting the restrictions of previous work in 
network hardening using attack graphs. In confident, both theoretically and 
practically approach, shows that the model is feasible only for relatively small and 
medium graphs. 
For future work, implementing both parallel dynamic CostRank and DCAT 
Algorithms for a larger graph is suggested to obtain more findings to correlate the 
algorithms and make them ready for industrial applications. 
The wall clock time performance metric when the Parallel CostRank algorithm 
used different platforms and network specifications, reduces convergence time, 
extensive memory demanding metrics are not counted as they are not in the 
scope this thesis and they are suited to be investigated in the future work.    
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GLOSSARY 
A 
Attack trees:  are an abstract diagram exhibition showing in what manner a target, 
or critical asset, might be attacked (the attackers exploit the vulnerabilities). Attack 
trees have been cast off in a variety of IT applications.  
Attack: A violation of system security policies that originates from an existing 
vulnerability, i.e., an intellectual action (attempt) of an attacker to exploit existing 
vulnerabilities to escape security services and intrude upon the security policy of a 
system. The attack type, as active or passive can occur, by an inside or by outside 
attackers, or through a multi - step attack. 
Attacker: Attacker is individual who endeavours to exploit  one vulnerability or more 
to accomplish an objective(s). 
 
B 
Backdoor: A backdoor is an instrument fitted after an attack to enable an attacker 
escalates the privileges and gain  access to the other systems all over the place, to 
violate existing security policies. 
Bots:  The Bots are ideal Trojan Horses. With the ability to communicate with the 
boat creator, which enables the attackers to control the communication channels. 
Some Bots, have update structures. At the beginning  Bots comes as a spam spread. 
When that is sorted, they converted as  Distributed Denial of Service architects. 
Recently converted as keystroke loggers chasing for financial or software license 
information. 70 to 80 percent of all spam originates from bots.. 
Buffer Overflow: A buffer overflow (buffer overrun), is an abnormality of using a 
program or application, though writing data to a buffer, invades the buffer limit and 
overwrites adjacent memory.  
Buffer overflows can be started by inputs that are intended to execute scripts. This 
can produce unpredictable of application behaviour, together with memory access 
errors, improper outcomes, a crash, or a compromise of system security. The buffer 
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overflow can produce by using software vulnerabilities, multi –step attacks and 
constructed executable codes. 
 
C 
CCATs:  Acronym for “Cost-Centric Attack Trees.” are conceptual diagrams showing 
how an asset, or target, might be attacked using the cost metric of vulnerabilities to 
represent the tree. 
CCATs:  Acronym for “Cost-Centric Attack Trees.” are conceptual diagrams showing 
how an asset, or target, might be attacked using the cost metric of vulnerabilities to 
represent the tree. 
CERT: Acronym for “Computer Emergency Response Team.”, the CERT is 
developed by Carnegie Mellon University to use of applicable technology to avert 
attackers from exploiting vulnerabilities in network systems, to reduce attack impacts  
and to guarantee the availability of significant services. 
Compromise: a compromise is a term used in security to designate an occurrence of  
exposed confidential data to unofficial individuals.  The release of the private 
information is expected to have a bad economic impact on the organisation's contour 
and legal, reputation effect. The compromise can be either intentional or 
unintentional. 
Countermeasure: a countermeasure is an inaction, such mitigation policy, 
procedure, or technique that decreases the harm (impact) of a vulnerability, 
preventing vulnerability exploits (an attack) or by detecting and reporting the 
vulnerability, consequently a remedial action can be taken. 
CostRank algorithm: Is a ranking algorithm that calculates the costs  of a 
dependency AG state using a cost-centric method. The algorithm analyses both the 
number of  incoming links and the cost of a specific state based on cost-centric 
framework of the referring vulnerability to generate an effective cost measurement.  
CVSS:  Acronym for “Common Vulnerability Scoring System.” An industry open 
standard, CVSS is comprised of three metric sets: Base, Temporal and 
Environmental metrics; respectively containing established numerical severity 
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quantitative measures aimed to provide the end user with a complete combination 
mark to represent the static risk and severity of a vulnerability. 
 
D 
Damage: The damage represents the consequences of an attack (intended or 
unintended), which might affect the confidentiality, integrity and the availability of the 
processes of the target system.  
Data:  Detailed annotations, usually in numeric or textual form. 
DCAT:  Acronym for “Dynamic Countermeasures Attack Tree.” are conceptual 
diagrams showing how an asset, or target, might be attacked using the dynamic cost 
metric of  vulnerabilities  and the dynamic cost metric of mitigations to calculate the 
effective cost of implementing the mitigations. 
Defence Trees: a type of ATs has been developed to investigate the effect of 
defence mechanisms using measures such as attack cost, security investment cost’s 
weight, return on attack (ROA), and return on investment (ROI). 
139. 
Denial of Service: The process of preventing authorised users from accessing the 
system resource or causing a delay in accessing the system operations and services. 
DVSS:  Acronym for “Dynamic Vulnerability Scoring System.” An improvement of 
CVSS, is comprised of three metric sets: Intrinsic, Time-based and Ecological 
metrics; respectively containing established numerical dynamic severity quantitative 
measures aimed to provide the end user with a complete combination mark to 
represent the dynamic risk and severity of a vulnerability. 
Dynamic systems: Qualitative observational research is not apprehensive with 
having direct, right, or wrong responses. Alteration in a study is a normal process as 
the researcher's aim is not product only one solution. 
E 
Efficiency: This term is generally used in the parallel algorithms literature to mean 
the speedup divided by the number of units of execution such as the number of 
processors.  
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F 
Firewall: Is a software/hardware tools, designed to secure a network resources from 
unauthorised users, by denying/permitting a specific traffic between networks, 
utilising different security levels using sets of rules and policies.   
 
H 
Hijack Attack: is the types of tapping, as the attackers take control on established 
communication channels, violate the confidentiality and integrity and availability. 
Host: Is a computing Hardware with processors as the operating system and 
software applications are based. 
 
I 
Impact: Impact represents the results (damage) caused by an attack in term of cost 
such as CIA disruption, financial consequences. 
Injection Flaws: this type of attack can occur when the attackers sends (inject) 
untrustworthy text/data to, for example, LDAP, SQL queries or OS injection, the 
injection source data will have a code to exploit the syntax vulnerability of the 
directed interpreter and might result in account takeover, retrieving data/information, 
data loss/corruptions or denial of access. 
IP Address: denoted as “internet protocol address.” Is a numerical code that 
identifies a specific computing device on the Internet. 
 
L 
LAN: Acronym for “local area network.” Is a cluster of computing devices connected 
through infrastructure backbone to share resources and common communications. 
Link: is a pointer from one vertex (node) to another. 
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M 
Malware: A common term for "malicious software". Represent any software (such as  
programs, Files, emails) that cause a harm to the computing devices, examples of 
malware are viruses, Trojon horses, worms and spyware.  
Markov Chain: A Markov Chain is a stochastic model recounting a sequence of 
possible actions in which the probability of each action is subject to only the state 
achieved in the previous action. 
Mitigation: Is a methodical decrease in the cost of a vulnerability/risk in term of 
likelihood and impact. Sometime it  called “risk reduction”. 
 
N 
NIST:  Acronym for “National Institute of Standards and Technology.” Non-regulatory 
federal agency within U.S. Commerce Department's Technology Administration. 
NVD: Acronym for “National Vulnerability Database.” Is one of the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST)’s important security assets for determining the 
severity of computer security risks. NVD is the sum of many other security databases 
and utilizes the CVSS scoring system. 
 
P 
Patch: is an update to existing applications to enhance functionality or to fix a 
vulnerability or problems. 
Policy: represent  rules of principal satisfactory use of computing resources, security 
put into practise, and managerial development of operative procedures 
Probability: Is the fortuitous that an occurrence is going on randomly, the degree to 
which something is probable to occur or be the instance. 
Processor: is the logical electrical system that reacts to and processes the different 
instructions that tell the computer what to do.  
 
R 
Rigour: Grade to which research methods are carefully and accurately carried out in 
order to distinguish significant impacts happening in a experimentation. 
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Rootkit: A set of software tools and techniques that facilitate an attacker to escalate 
the privilege to root/administrator level, in order to control a computer system.  
 
S 
Speedup: Is the ratio of decline in the run time required to process a specific 
problem size (a task) using many processors (Parallel) to the run time required to 
process same task using a single processor (Serial).  
SQL Injection: SQL injection is a security exploit, where the attacker develops a 
crafted Structured Query Language (SQL) script in the input box of a specific Web 
site to gain access, modify  the resources, influencing the integrity and confidentiality 
of the system.  
 
T 
Trojan Horse: Is a useful, (generally free) computer software application/program 
having a significant malicious function to avoid a security restriction and performs a 
harmful task such as escalate the privileges to access system resources. 
 
V 
Visual complexity: visual complexity of an Attack graph, described the complexity, 
accessibility and usability problems of an AG, which deters humans from fully 
comprehend the information presented by the AG tools. 
Vulnerability: Is a weakness/flaw in the design of software applications, 
configurations, operations and management, which can be exploited by attackers to 
compromise the CIA of system resources and evade the security policies. 
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APPENDIX A.TOP 10 APPLICATION SECURITY 
RISKS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
In this work, the top ten security risks and countermeasures are presented, 
adapted from the new version announcement of the OWASP [Williams, Jeff, and 
Dave Wichers, 2010] Top 10 risks results to calculate the ranks and impotence 
risks of application security.   By using the methodologies and the approaches in 
this work, this will help to develop plans to think outside the 10 risks and their 
countermeasures to avoid the impacts of different risks and vulnerabilities existing 
in their applications and businesses and the optimal method to solve the security 
problems. 
 
1. Injection: Injection flaws, this type of attack can occur when the attackers send 
(inject) untrustworthy text/data to, for example, LDAP, SQL queries or OS 
injection, the injection source data will have a code to exploit the syntax 
vulnerability of the directed interpreter and might result in account takeover, 
retrieving data/information, data loss/corruptions or denial of access. 
 
Exploitability Hackers send (inject) untrustworthy 
text/data originated attacks that abuse the 
syntax of the focussed interpreter. Nearly 
all bases of data could be an injection 
route. 
Occurrence Happens when the attacker/assailant 
transmits simple untrustworthy data to 
Lightight Directory Access Protocol 
(LDAP), SQL queries, OS, or 
programming command parameters.  The 
discovery of Injection flaws are simple, in 
the case of code investigations, but extra 
complicated by means of testing.  
Impact The impact of Injection flow, in terms of 
data, alteration/damage/loss, denial of 
access or account/host takeover. 
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COUNTERMEASURES: 
 
A.  The ideal injection flows countermeasures choice is to evade using the 
interpreter directly, in its place using a safe Application programming interface 
(API); such interface will help to provide a location (parameterised interface) for 
code investigation.  
B.  In case the API is not on hand, the users should escape using special 
characters by designing particular interpreter escape syntax. 
C. Using whitelist input inspection/validation would aid injection flows protections. 
The only problem with this method is that many applications require using special 
characters in their input.  Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), for 
example, uses a rich whitelist library for their input inspection/validation practice.   
 
Paradigm of injection flow attack: In the following SQL queries call, the un-trusted 
data used in the structure of vulnerable SQL identify. 
 
 
 
The assailant changes the ‘id’ in the getParameter to '1'='1 in their Internet 
browser to post. The action will alter the significance of the query to display/return 
all the records account from the database, the assailant uses these vulnerabilities 
to call up exceptional actions in the database, tolerating an entire host takeover of 
the database. 
 
2. Cross Site Scripting (XSS): The flaws happen when unreliable data send to a 
web browser with no appropriate validation/inspection from a submission (an 
application). XSS permits the hackers to perform arbitrary scripts in intentions web 
browser, in terms of taking control of user sessions, spoiling web sites, or 
forwarding the browsing to malicious web sites. 
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Exploitability Hackers send untrustworthy text scripts 
(codes) that exploit the browser 
interpreter’s vulnerability. More or less 
any basis of data could be attack 
parameter, counting in-house resources. 
Occurrence XSS is mainly general web application 
security flaw. The XSS flaws happen 
when un-reliable data are sent to a web 
page with no appropriate 
validation/inspection of the content from 
a submission (an application).  
The main three types of XSS flaws are:  
1) DOM, 2) Stored, 3) Reflected 
founded XSS. 
Impact Hackers can execute arbitrary codes 
(script) in the target host browser, in 
term of take control on user sessions, 
spoil web sites, or forward the browsing 
of malicious websites, insertion of 
intimidating content, , etc. 
 
 
COUNTERMEASURES 
 
A.  The ideal choice is to accurately get away from the entire untrusted data 
founded on the HTML background, such as Java scripts, Cascading Styles 
Sheets (CSS), HTML attributes, Body, which the data needs to be located 
inside.  The developers have to incorporate the filtering/escaping script inside 
the applications if not using User interface (UI).  
B.  Using whitelist input inspection/validation with suitable decryptions would 
support protections against XSS flaws. The main problem with this method is 
many applications require using special characters in their input. The 
inspections/validation process includes 1) decrypt the encrypted input.  2) 
Checking the input length, format, and characters. 3) Implement any other 
rules essential to accept the input.   
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3. Broken Authentication and Session Management: Software application 
utilities/functions to control and manage the sessions and the authentications are 
frequently not configured correctly, permitting the compromise of accounts, 
passwords, session’s indications, keys, by the hackers, or exploiting the 
vulnerabilities in the applications to deduce the users’ information/authentications. 
 
Exploitability Software application functions to control 
and manage the sessions and the 
authentications are frequently not 
configured right, let to compromise 
accounts, password, session’s 
indications, keys, by the hackers. 
 
Occurrence Application developers often design 
traditional sessions and authentication 
methods, the perfect design doesn’t exist 
and hard to achieve, as consequences 
the applications often comes with 
vulnerabilities in the authentication 
process, remember my style, timeout, 
secret questions and answers..etc.  Find 
mitigations to such vulnerabilities could 
be now and then is hard, as each 
application is sole. 
Impact These vulnerabilities could let the 
hackers to compromise several or all 
accounts. On one occasion of successful 
attack, the hackers could perform any 
task the account holders can do; the 
accounts with root/admin privilege 
tolerate more harm. 
 
COUNTERMEASURES 
 
A.  The developers should design the application’s security controls according to 
OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASKS), in terms of the 
session management and authentication. 
B.  A template of application security controls should be used by the 
programmers/developers with a straightforward API. For example, OWASP 
Enterprise Security API (ESAKI) is a free, open source template, which 
enables the developers to design low risk User APIs and Authenticator.  
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C.  As XSS vulnerabilities could be used to take control of user sessions, spoil 
web sites, or forward the browsing of malicious websites, concerted efforts, in 
terms of finding countermeasures and mitigations, should be used to evade 
XSS.  
 
4. Insecure Direct Object References: this type of attack happens when the 
programmers/developers make a specific location/object (such as database 
item/key, directory, or file) inside an application available to access without using 
relevant protections. These items could be controlled, manipulated, and used to 
gain access to illicit data.   
 
 
Exploitability The insiders/attackers, officially 
considered as legal users of a system, 
can alter the constraint values related to 
an object to another object, which they 
are not officially allowed to access.   
Occurrence The application developers often use the 
real object’s key or name of applications 
during the web page design.  These 
applications do not always confirm that a 
specific user using the object is officially 
authorised, that will result in an insecure 
direct access flaw for the target object. 
Examiners/testers can simply use 
constraint values to sense, discover 
such types of flaw, and preform a 
scripts/codes exploration, which 
illustrates if authorisation is used and 
verified correctly.  
Impact The insecure direct object references 
flaws could make all the data oriented 
by the parameters compromised by 
attackers. Except if, the namespace is 
sparse. 
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COUNTERMEASURES 
A.  Custom indirect object references. This represents a methodology to avoid 
direct access of unauthorised properties. For example, if the users have a 
drop-down menu list with five items, the default method to use the numerical 
values from one to five to specify the user selection. The indirect method could 
use the real database key mapped to the pre-user reference. The 
programmers/developers can use random and sequential access mapping to 
avoid direct referencing to the objects.   
B.  Access is validating. All users with a direct object reference from untrustworthy 
resources must be validated using an access control to guarantee that the 
user who demanded the object is authorised. 
 
5. Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF):  in this flaw, the attacker forces the 
target’s (victim) vulnerable web browser to direct a fake HTTP call, this results in 
sending authentication data, cookies of the target’s sessions, to a specific web 
application.  The CSRF flaw services the targeted web browser to create a call to 
vulnerable browser deliberates are valid call from the target. 
 
Exploitability The CSRF flaws generate a fake HTTP 
call and direct the target’s browser to 
submit the data through XSS, image 
labels or many other methods. In the 
case, if the user is legitimate, the 
attack will be successful. 
Occurrence As web browsers send identifications 
routinely such as authentication data 
and session cookies, hackers can 
make malicious web pages that 
generate fake calls that are indistinct 
from genuine ones. 
Impact If this flaw has been utilised by the 
attackers, they can alter any data that 
the legitimate user can change or 
achieve any task on a target machine 
the legitimate user can do. 
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COUNTERMEASURES 
 
Avoiding CSRF needs the exclusion of any unexpected token per capita 
transaction. This requires creating a unique token; the tokens should, as far as 
possible, be unique for each user session, but could likewise be unique for every 
call (request). 
 
A.  The ideal selection is to compromise and send the unique token in a hidden 
field in the body of the HTTP call. If the unique token is present in the URL or 
URL parameters, such action will increase the risk of token exposure and 
compromise. 
 
6.  Security Misconfiguration:  All operating systems’ platforms and software 
applications such as web servers and browsers, applications clients and servers 
should have security configurations and settings to secure different tasks and 
transactions. These settings and configurations need to be well defined, applied, 
and preserved, as many software applications are dispatched without default 
security settings.  
 
Exploitability The attacker gains access through 
factory default accounts, vulnerabilities 
without proper security patches, and 
many other flaws to advance illegal 
access to the data and information of 
an organization or a system.  
Occurrence Security misconfiguration could occur 
at all operating systems’ platforms and 
software applications such as web 
servers and browsers, applications 
clients and servers. Network and 
security administrators and   
developers/programmers must work 
closely to make sure that all the 
software applications and operating 
systems are configured correctly in 
terms of security. Auto-security 
scanners should be used to detect 
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different vulnerabilities and omitted 
security patches, use of default factory 
accounts, misconfigurations, etc. 
Impact Security misconfiguration often gives 
attackers illegal access to the data and 
information and utilities of the system. 
Sometimes, Security misconfiguration 
causes a comprehensive system take 
over. 
 
 
COUNTERMEASURES 
 
A.  The security configuration process should be created in a reliable and stress-
free form and should be fast to implement in similar settings. The configuration 
should be automated through deployment applications to reduce the effort 
needed to secure different systems. 
B.  The process should maintain operating systems, software applications, and 
security patches updated in timely methods for all systems.  
C.  The network design, architecture should afford proper security between 
different components in the network. Auto-security scanners should be used to 
detect different vulnerabilities and missing security patches 
 
6. Failure to Restrict URL Access: a lot of web applications verify the access 
privileges/rights before proceeding to the protected links; all web applications 
should do analogous access rights checking before proceeding to a different link. 
Sometimes the attackers will be talented enough to create a fake URL to access 
protected links. 
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Exploitability The insider system users can amend 
the URL to gain access to the 
protected web, if web applications do 
not verify the access privileges. In the 
same way, unspecified users 
(anonymous) can access protected or 
private web pages. 
Occurrence Some web applications do not verify 
access rights before proceeding to a 
protected link. On occasion, in some 
web applications, the URL security is 
handled through settings and 
configurations. The occurrence of this 
type of flaw might happen due to the 
misconfigurations. The 
programmers/developers should 
impose a suitable code to detect such 
flaws.  
Impact Failure to restrict URL access lets 
attackers gain access to illegitimate 
tasks. Root/Administrative tasks are 
the main objectives for the attackers in 
this category. 
 
COUNTERMEASURES 
Avoiding unofficial URL access requires appropriate verification and appropriate 
permission for each web page.  
A.  Enforcing appropriate verification and permissions policies of each web page 
is the key solution to this type of flaw.    
B.  In order to reduce the complications of the policies’ execution, the policies 
must be easy and well defined to be configured. 
C.  The impose method(s) must reject all access in the first instance, then grant 
privileges and permissions to different users to gain access to each web page 
D.  In the case where the web pages need to forward the link to a protected web 
page, the developers must be sure to use appropriate conditions to verify the 
privileges and the permissions.  
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8. Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards: Often the web applications forward and 
pass on users to other links using untrustworthy data to find out the target 
websites. The lack of appropriate verifications and confirmations will let the 
attackers forward the links to malware or phishing web pages and might lead to 
access protected web pages.  
 
Exploitability An attacker could forward or redirect 
users to malware of unsafe links due 
to the lack of appropriate 
verifications and confirmations. 
Occurrence Often the web applications forward 
and pass on users to other links 
using untrustworthy data to find out 
the target websites. Occasionally 
the goal web page is adapted inside 
an unauthorised constraint, 
permitting attackers to select the 
target web page. 
The lack of appropriate verifications 
and confirmations will let the 
attackers forward the links to 
malware or phishing web pages, 
and might lead to access protected 
web pages. 
Impact Invalidated redirects and forwards 
flaws might lead to password 
disclosure, installing malware, and 
hacking utilities or go around access 
verification process.    
 
COUNTERMEASURES 
A.   Evade using forwards and pass on. 
B.   In the case of using forward and redirect, the use of target constraints 
(parameters) in the process of finding out the target websites should be 
avoided.  
C.  If the use of target parameters cannot be avoided, the parameters’ values 
should be verified and the user’s privileges and permissions must be checked.  
D.  Using ESAPI to countermand the sendRedirect() process in the web 
application to ensure that all the forwarding and the redirecting to different 
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links and websites are secure and safe.  It is suggested and helpful to use 
plotting (mapping) values if targets’ constraints have been used, in which case 
the web server will translate the plotting values to find out the target websites.  
  
 
9. Insecure Cryptographic Storage: The protection of critical data such as credit 
and debit card information, Social Security Number (SSNs) and authentication 
identifications is not properly constructed in numerous web applications using  a 
suitable encryption method. Attackers might utilise this vulnerability to conduct 
cybercrimes such as identity theft and credit and debit card fraud. 
 
Exploitability Usually attackers do not break down 
the encryption methods to decrypt the 
data streams, instead they use 
different methodologies such as catch 
a clear text of encrypted data, 
determine the encryption key, or 
access the decrypted data through 
some channels. 
Occurrence The main cause of this flaw is due to 
not using any encryption algorithms to 
protect important or critical data. Other 
occurrences are when specific 
encryption methods are used, due to 
utilising weak encryption algorithms, do 
not use rotating keys, using unsafe 
keys or using fragile hashes to secure 
passwords. When the attackers access 
the networks as external users, they 
face difficulties to discover such 
vulnerabilities because of the access 
limitations.  
Impact Insecure cryptographic storage flaws 
occurrences might result in a 
compromise of all the data in the 
system, including authentications, 
credentials, and configuration. 
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COUNTERMEASURES 
A.  Security planning for all networks must pay specific attention to using 
appropriate encryption algorithms to secure all sensitive data, special 
consideration should be taken to internal and external users as attackers. 
B.  In the backup’s procedures, the off-site backups must be encrypted, the 
backups of encryption keys must be managed individually. 
C.  Strong encryption algorithms with robust encryption keys should be used in 
the process of data protections.    
D.  Robust hashes algorithms should be used to secure passwords. 
 
10.Insufficient Transport Layer Protection: protection of critical network 
communications has been often unsuccessful because the software applications 
do not use cryptographic algorithms to encrypt sensitive network, and in the case 
of using them, sometimes using  fragile algorithms, unacceptable or expired 
certificates or using them in improper ways. 
 
Where transport layer security is implemented, that will impact the network 
segment design.  In this case, the Secure Socket Security (SSL) /Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) needed for all pages in the segment, the SSL/TLS implementation 
will affect the network performance.  For that reason, sometimes the use of 
SSL/TLS for critical pages only might lead to compromise data, sessions IDs. 
 
Exploitability Observing network traffic from a 
specific user could be problematic, 
especially when the monitoring of the 
network traffic happened during the 
users accessing or communicating with 
vulnerable segments. 
Occurrence Most of the applications do not secure 
the network traffic; they use SSL/TLS 
through the authentication process, 
and frequently do not properly protect 
network traffic. Usually, they use 
SSL/TLS through authentication, but 
not elsewhere, showing totally 
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transported data including session IDs. 
Applications using unacceptable or 
expired certificates or using them in 
improper ways. 
Impact Insufficient transport layer protection 
flaws could compromise users’ data, 
account robbery. In the case that 
root/administrator account using the 
system, the entire system might be 
compromised. The bad SSL setting 
could lead to phishing attacks. 
 
 
COUNTERMEASURES 
A.  Ensure the SSL/TLS or any other reliable technologies are used for back and 
front end and all additional links. 
B.  Ensure SSL configured for all designated web pages and not SSL designated 
to specific pages that forward to the SSL web page. 
C.  Ensure that the selected SSL/TLS supplier only backing robust algorithms. 
D.  Ensure that all critical cookies have secure flag setting. 
E.  Guarantee that certificate is usable, acceptable, or not expired.  
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APPENDIX B. O  ON V LNER BILITY S ORING 
SYSTE    VSS  STR  T RE 
The commercial open framework CVSS is intended to indicate the impact‘s 
numerical severity quantitative measures of different vulnerabilities in terms of the 
Base, Temporal, and Environmental metrics to help in finding a specific mitigation 
of the vulnerability and to set the priority of response.  
 
The formulae used to calculate the impact‘s numerical severity quantitative 
measures of CVSS were considered to be accurate, inclusive and straightforward 
to employ. For these reasons, CVSS was widely used to perform a reality testing 
of vulnerabilities in the end user background. 
 
 
Figure B-1. The CVSS Model shows the relations between Base, Temporal, and Environmental Metric 
Groups modified from [Mell et al., 2007] 
 
As mentioned earlier, CVSS is comprised of three metric sets: Base, Temporal, 
and Environmental metrics; respectively containing established numerical severity 
quantitative measures aimed to provide the end user with a complete combination 
mark to represent the risk and severity of a vulnerability. 
A. Base Metric collection [Mell et al., 2007] have general details and qualities of 
a given vulnerability that do not change if the vulnerability exists in different 
environments  or over time, base metrics gives the general severity of a given 
vulnerability. 
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It is represented by two subdivisions: 
 Exploitability: represented using Authentication, Access Complexity, Access 
Vector;  
 Impact: represented using Integrity, Availability, and Confidentiality.  
 
Access Vector (AV): weighs the access methodologies used to exploit a 
vulnerability an attacker can reach to exploit vulnerability in terms of vulnerabilities 
access (such as locally, network) and if configuration settings are essential to 
exploit them in term of access. 
 
Access vector encompasses the following factors: 
a. Local (L): The attackers can access and exploit  vulnerabilities in a LAN  
locally, there is no need for any network connections,  
b. Adjacent Network (A): The hackers can access the collision or broadcast 
domain of the application software where the vulnerability is based. 
c. Network (N): To exploit a vulnerability, the hackers do not need to access a 
LAN or a neighbouring network, as the vulnerabilities based on the application 
software are preordained for network stack and could be accessed through 
Internet access only. 
 
Access Complexity (AC):  AC measures how complicated an attack is, designed 
to measure the level of difficulties of an attack to exploit the vulnerability in the 
aimed target. 
a. High (H): represents the high risk in terms of access complexity, i.e. the attacker 
has considerable talent and experience to compromise further systems in a multi-
step attack process, or using advanced social engineering techniques, which 
might lead that attacker to gain root privileges.  An example of such attack, the 
Injection flaws; this type of attack can occur when the attackers sends (injects) 
untrustworthy text/data to, for example, LDAP, SQL queries or OS injection, the 
injection source data will have a code to exploit the syntax vulnerability of the 
directed interpreter and might result in account takeover. 
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b. Medium (M): The access complexity is to some extent skilled; for instance, only 
various users are capable of completing specific attacks on some explicit 
systems, the concerned configuration changes are special and require an 
acceptable talent, or specific information collection is demanding. 
c.Low (L): represents a low risk in terms of accessible environments, for example 
the affected applications or systems need admission to a variety of users, the 
attackers require a small amount of talent or the information collection needed is 
less.   
 
Authentication (Au): In order for attackers to exploit a vulnerability, they might or 
might not have to authenticate, Au classifies the number of times an attacker need 
to authenticate in order to conduct a specific attack.   
a. Multiple (M): The attacker needs authentication twice or more (even if the same 
authentication has been used) to exploit. 
b. Single (S): The attacker needs a single authentication to exploit a vulnerability in 
the target system. 
c.None (N): The attacker does not need any authentication to exploit a 
vulnerability in the target system. An example of such attack, Cross Site Scripting 
attack, whereby the flaws happen when unreliable data is sent to a web browser 
with no appropriate validation/inspection from a submission (an application). XSS 
permits the hackers to perform arbitrary scripts in intentions web browser, in 
terms of taking control of user sessions, spoiling web sites, or forwarding the 
browsing to malicious web sites. 
 
Confidentiality Impact (CI): An attacker might compromise the confidentiality of 
the data (intentional data disclosures) in a system or in a communication channel 
between sender and recipient. CI evaluates the consequence and harm on 
confidentiality if the attacker succeeds in exploiting a vulnerability. An example of 
such attack, the insecure direct object references flaws could make all the data 
oriented by the parameters compromised by attackers.  
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a. Complete (C): Entire data being compromised, data disclosures happened 
during the exploitation of a vulnerability. 
 
b. Partial (P): Significant data disclosures happened during the exploitation of a 
vulnerability  
 
c. None (N): If there is no harm or consequence on the confidentiality during the 
exploitation of a vulnerability. 
 
Integrity Impact (InI): An attacker might compromise the consistency and the 
accuracy of the data in a system; the INI evaluates the consequence and harm on 
integrity if the attacker succeeds to compromise the integrity of a system by 
exploiting a specific vulnerability. An example of such attack, the Cross Site 
Request Forgery, the attackers can alter any data that the legitimate user can 
change or achieve any task on a target machine the legitimate user can do. 
 
a. Complete (C): Entire data consistency and the accuracy impact of a system; 
affecting the integrity during the exploitation of a vulnerability of systems. 
b. Partial (P): Significant data consistency and the accuracy impact affecting the 
integrity during the exploitation of a vulnerability of a system. 
c. None (N): If there is no harm or consequence affecting the integrity during the 
exploitation of a vulnerability. 
 
Availability Impact (AI): An attacker might compromise the availability of a 
system in terms that an authorised user can access resources in a consistent and 
appropriate way, AI evaluates the impact of exploiting a specific vulnerability on 
the availability of a system. An example of such attack, exploiting the vulnerability 
CVE-2009-1758 in Linux kernel by local user with no privilege, which makes the 
kernel, crash and bring down the whole system. 
 
a. Complete (C): Completely affect the system availability, such as system 
shutdown.  
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b. Partial (P): Instabilities in resources and performance reduction, which might 
affect the system availability partially.  
c. None (N): If there is no harm or consequence affecting the availability during the 
exploitation of a vulnerability. 
The representation of Base Metrics in the following format: 
 
AV: L AC: H Au: M C: N  I:     N A: N 
 A  M  S  P  P  P 
 N  L  N  C  C  C 
 
OR: 
 
 
As shown in Table 2.1, 2.2 each rating for the CVSS Attributes assigned with the 
rating value metric    
 
The equation to calculate Base Metric (BS) is: 
))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((1 IFunctionEIroundBS x   
where round1=round to one decimal, I=Impact, Ex=Exploitability. 
 
))1(*)1(*)1(1(*41.10 AIInICII   
AuACAVEx ***20  
where 00)(  IIfIFunction  
    0176.1)(  IIfIFunction  
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Table B-1. CVSS   base metrics- exploitability [Mell et al.,2007] 
 
 
Table B-2. CVSS base metrics- Impact [Mell et al., 2007] 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Temporal Metric collection: 
The threat presented by the vulnerability might modify and change over the time of 
vulnerability.  
The temporal metric composes three factors:  
Exploitability 
Remediation Level 
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Report Confidence 
 
Because the temporal metrics are optional, so the metrics values of the three 
factors might have no effect on the final score. 
 
Exploitability (E): Evaluates the existence of exploiting codes and techniques. 
1. Unproven (U): The exploits codes/techniques are not available. 
2. Proof-of-Concept (POC): Indicates the availability of exploit code/techniques or 
an impracticable exploit.  
3. Functional (F): Indicates the availability of functional exploit code. 
4. High (H): There are functional portable independent codes/techniques and 
details are widely available. 
5. Not Defined (ND): The ND score would not affect the temporal Metric score.  
ND only gives an indication to the formula to ignore this metric. 
 
Remediation Level (RL): Points towards the availability of remediations 
(mitigations) and performs the numerical rating values to each case. 
 
Official Fix (OF): Indicates if the retailer fix (patches) is available, for instance an 
authorised upgrade or fixes (patches). 
 
The possible values for this metric are: 
1. Temporary Fix (TF): indicates the scales of official temporary fix availability. 
2. Workaround (W): indicates whether an unofficial solution is available. 
3. Unavailable (U): indicates official fixes, Solutions are not available. 
4. Not Defined (ND): No value assigned. 
 
 
Report Confidence (RC): Indicates the level of trust present of a vulnerability and 
the degree of reliability of the acknowledged technical information. 
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The factors’ values of this metric are shown below: 
1. Unconfirmed (UC): this factor indicates a single unconfirmed report or multiple 
inconsistence sources. 
2. Uncorroborated (UR): several unofficial reports, which might be from research 
groups or independent security corporations.  
3. Confirmed (C): The trouble/vulnerability officially reported to the retailer’s own 
software application or practical exploits script exists in the public domain. 
4. Not Defined (ND): there is not enough information on the vulnerability, no rating 
value is allocated in this case. 
 
The representation of Temporal Metric is in the following format: 
 
 
 E: U RL:   OF RC:   UC 
 POC  TF  UR 
 F  W  C 
 H  U  ND 
 ND  ND   
OR: 
 
 
The Temporal Metric Score (TS) is calculated as follows: 
)R*R*E* B TS CLSround (
1
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Table B-3. CVSS temporal metrics [Mell et al., 2007] 
 
C.Environmental Metric collection: indicates the alteration of vulnerability metric 
that related to the user settings and configurations of a particular asset’s 
environment. The three factors that CVSS releases are:   
Collateral Damage Potential 
Target Distribution 
Security Requirements 
 
Collateral Damage Potential (CDP): indicates the possible damage or theft of 
resources such as theft of equipment and financial damage to profits /production. 
 
The probability values for this metric are: 
1. None (N): No possible damage or theft of resources or loss of profits. 
2. Low (L): Minor loss of resources or slight financial damage to profits. 
3. Low-Medium (LM): Medium loss of resources or average financial/productivity 
damage. 
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4. Medium-High (MH): Major loss of resources or significant financial/productivity 
damage. 
5. High (H): Catastrophic loss of resources or catastrophic financial/productivity 
damage. 
6. Not Defined (ND): No metric value will be assigned. 
 
Target Distribution (TD): TD indicates the figure/percentage of the target 
systems that could be impacted by the vulnerability, according to environment 
setting. 
 
The possible values for this metric are listed below: 
1. None (N): (0%) The target systems are not present, or the systems available 
are only in specialised or laboratory site.  
2. Low (L): (2-25%) targets that could be impacted by the vulnerability. 
3. Medium (M): (26-75%) targets that could be impacted by the vulnerability. 
4. High (H): High scale of system targets (76-100%) exists. 
5. Not Defined (ND): No metric value will be assigned. 
 
Security Requirements (CR, IR, and AR): Grades special score based on the 
assets/targets significance to the establishment. The security requirements three 
factors in terms of assets impact are Confidentiality Requirement (CR), Integrity 
Requirement (IR), and Availability Requirement (AR).  These metrics influence the 
base metric corresponding values of availability, integrity, and confidentiality. 
 
The impact on specific target or system could be: 
1. Low (L): Possible limited impact/ effect only. 
2. Medium (M): A serious attack consequence on significant assets /targets.  
3. High (H): A disastrous attack consequence on significant assets /targets.  
4. Not Defined (ND): No metric value will be assigned. 
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The representation of Environmental Metric is in the following format:  
CDP: N TD: N CR: L IR: L AR: L 
 L  L  M  M  M 
 LM  M  H  H  H 
 MH  H  ND  ND  ND 
 H  ND       
 ND         
 
 
 
The Adjusted Impact Score (AI) is calculated as follows: 
)*1(*)*1(*)*1(*41.10,10(Minimum ARAIIRInICRCIAI 
 
The Base (BSE) score is recalculated using Adjusted Impact (AI) instead of 
Impact as shows below: 
))(*)5.1*4.0*6.0((1 IFunctionEAIroundBS xE   
The Adjusted Temporal Score (AT) is calculated using BSE as follows: 
)R*R*E* BS E CLroundAT (
1  
The Environmental Metric Score (ES) is calculated as follows: 
)**)10((((1 TDCDPATATroundES   
 
The formula above shows the methodology to calculate the ES by multiplying the 
(10 - adjusted temporal) * (represent exploitability, remediation level and report 
confidence) with CollateralDamagePotential and target distribution (explained 
earlier in this chapter) and adding the result to the value of adjusted temporal.  
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Table B-4. CVSS environmental metrics [Mell et al., 2007] 
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APPENDIX C.THE LIST OF V LNER BILITIES OBT INED 
FRO  NESS S S  NNING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The list of Vulnerabilities is obtained after using Nessus scanning reports is shown 
below: 
Results Details: 
 
Scan Information PC1: 
PC1: 192.168.153.160 
 
 
Vn1:11324 - CVE-2004-0230, TCP/IP packet's sequence number guess, the 
attacker directs the spoofed RST to the remote host and terminates established 
connections, causing DoS and partially disrupting the availability. 
 
DVSS Score Medium 
 
Intrinsic =5.0: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: N  I:     N A: P 
Time-based =3.9: 
E: P RL: OF RC:  C 
Ecological = 57: 
TD:  M  CDP: MH CR: L IR: L AR: M 
 
57Vn1 Cost  
 
Vn2:46628: CVE-2010-0025, SMTP and Exchange Server services (windows 
server 2003) might lead to DOS and partially impact the confidentiality.  
 
CVSS Base Score Medium 
 
 
Intrinsic =5.0: 
 256 
 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: P  I:     N A: N 
Temporal=4.1: 
E: F RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 47: 
TD:  M CDP: LM CR: L IR: L AR: M 
74Vn2 Cost  
 
 
Vn3:11467: CVE-1999-1011, This vulnerability in Microsoft IIS Data Access 
Components (MDAC) RDS, which might permit attackers from remote sites to 
access Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) and run Illogical scripts.   
 
Execution CVSS Base Score Critical 
 
Intrinsic =10.0: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: C  I:     C A: C 
Time-based 7.8: 
E: P RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 89 
TD:  H  CDP: H CR: H IR: H AR: H 
89Vn3 Cost  
 
Vn4:12172 - CVE-2002-1142, Buffer overflow vulnerability affects a remote host, 
Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) RDS Data Stub Remote Overflow 
 
CVSS Base Score High 
 
Intrinsic =7.5: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: P  I:     P A: P 
Time-based 7.8: 
E: P RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 52 
TD:  H  CDP: MH CR: H IR: H AR: H 
 
 
 
25
Vn4
Cost
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Vn5:12324 - CVE-2010-0386, HTTP TRACE / TRACK vulnerability enables 
attackers to take cookies and authentication ID using a cross-site tracing attack 
(XST). 
 
CVSS Base Score Low 
 
Intrinsic =4.3: 
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: P  I:     N A: N 
Time-based 3.6: 
E: F RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 38: 
TD:  L  CDP: L CR: M IR: L AR: L 
 
38
Vn5
Cost  
 
Vn6:11981 - CVE-2003-0717, In Windows NT up to server 3003, the messaging 
services do not correctly check the message size, the attackers might utilise this 
vulnerability by running illogical scripts using buffer overflow and  cause the 
Messenger Service to fail. 
 
CVSS Base Score High 
 
Intrinsic =7.5: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: P  I:     P A: P 
Time-based 5.9: 
E: P RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 71: 
TD:  M CDP: MH CR: M IR: M AR: M 
 
71Vn6 Cost  
 
Vn7:21283 - CVE-2006-3439, MS06-040: Vulnerability in Microsoft Server Service 
that permits the attackers to run remote script and totally control the target system. 
 
CVSS Base Score critical 
 
Intrinsic =10.0: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: C  I:     C A: C 
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Time-based 7.8: 
E: F RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 90.0: 
TD:  ND  CDP: MH CR: H IR: H AR: H 
90.0Vn7 Cost  
 
Vn8:18519: CVE-2005-1983, Vulnerability in Plug and Play Service, permits 
remote attackers to influence the plug and play services by inserting illogical script 
using a worm such as Mytob; this could enable the attackers as local users to 
escalate the privileges.  
CVSS Base Score Critical 
 
Intrinsic =10.0: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: C  I:     C A: C 
Time-based 7.8: 
E: P RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 87.0: 
TD: U  CDP: MH CR: H IR: H AR: H 
87.0Vn8 Cost  
 
 
Vn9:21245: CVE-2006-1314, Vulnerability in Server Service that permits the 
attackers to run remote script and prompts memory corruption and avoids length 
limitations and partially influence the confidentiality, Integrity and availability. 
 
CVSS Base Score Medium 
 
Intrinsic =7.5: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: P  I:     P A: P 
Time-based 5.9: 
E: P RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 60: 
TD:  M  CDP: LM CR: M IR: L AR: L 
60Vn9 Cost  
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Vn10:54321 - CVE-2000-1200, Vulnerability in Microsoft Windows SMB, 
influences the confidentiality by permitting remote attackers to get the domain SID 
and have a list of all users in a domain. 
 
CVSS Base Score Medium 
 
Intrinsic =5.0: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: P  I:     N A: N 
Time-based 3.9: 
E: P RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 41: 
TD:  L  CDP: L CR: M IR: L AR: L 
 
41Vn10 Cost  
 
Vn11:54322 - Vulnerability in SMB, practising Host SID to Enumerate Local Users 
without Credentials, pPartially influences the confidentiality 
 
CVSS Base Score Medium 
 
Intrinsic =5.0: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: P  I:     N A: N 
Time-based 3.9: 
E: P RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 44: 
TD: L  CDP: LM CR: M IR: L AR: L 
 
44Vn11 Cost  
 
Scan Information PC2: 
IP2: 192.168.153. 31 
 
Vn1:13124 - CVE-2004-0230, TCP/IP packet's sequence number guess, the 
attacker directs the spoofed RST to the remote host and terminates established 
connections, causing DoS and partially disturbing the availability. 
 
 Risk Factor Medium 
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Intrinsic =5.0: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: N  I:     N A: P 
Time-based 3.6: 
E: U RL: TF RC:  UC 
Cost v= 50.0: 
TD:  L  CDP: MH CR: L IR: L AR: H 
 
50.01 VnC  
 
Vn2:55172 - CVE-2011-3188, Linux Kernel TCP Sequence Number Generation 
Security Weakness 
 
Risk Factor Medium 
 
Intrinsic =6.8: 
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: P  I:     P A: P 
Time-based 4.9: 
E: U RL: TF RC:  C 
Cost v= 64.0: 
TD:  M   CDP: MH CR: M IR: M AR: M 
 
64.02 VnC  
 
 
Vn3:51452 – CVE-2010-3867, ProFTPD: Multiple Vulnerabilities 
 
Risk Factor Critical 
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Intrinsic =10.0: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: C  I:     C A: C 
Time-based 8.7 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 92.0: 
TD:  H  CDP: MH CR: H IR: H AR: H 
  
92.03 VnC  
 
 
Vn4:52475 - CVE-2010-0110, ProFTPD: SQL Buffer Overflow 
 
Risk Factor Critical 
 
Intrinsic =10.0: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: C  I:     C A: C 
Time-based 8.7: 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 91.0: 
TD:  M  CDP: MH CR: H IR: H AR: H 
  
91.04 VnC  
 
 
Vn5:12658 – CVE-2003-0831, Pro FTPD File Transfer Newline Character 
Overflow 
 
Risk Factor Critical 
 
Intrinsic = 9.1: 
AV: N AC: L Au: S C: C  I:     C A: C 
Time-based 7.9: 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 90.0: 
TD:  N  CDP:  H CR: H IR: H AR: H 
 90.05 VnC  
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Vn6:14568 – CVE-2005-4816, Pro FTPD Buffer overflow, permits attackers to 
impact the availability of the system (crash the systems) using DoS, permits the 
attackers to run remote password script. 
 
Risk Factor Medium 
 
Intrinsic =7.5: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: P  I:     P A: P 
Time-based 5.5: 
E: U RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 69.0: 
TD:  M  CDP: MH CR: M IR: M AR: M 
 
69.06 VnC  
 
Vn7:46126 - CVE-2009-3555, Apache 2.2 less than 2.2.15 Multiple Vulnerabilities 
 
Risk Factor Medium 
 
Intrinsic = 5.7: 
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: N  I:     P A: P 
Time-based 5.0: 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 54.0: 
TD:  K  CDP: ML CR: L IR: M AR: M 
 
 
 
 
Vn8:43164 - CVE-2009-2699, Apache HTTP Server earlier 2.2.14 and additional 
services do not correctly function with errors, which permits attackers to cause a 
denial of service remotely through HTTP requests. 
 
 Risk Factor: Medium 
 
Intrinsic = 5.0: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: N  I:     N A: P 
 
54.07 VnC
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Time-based 4.4: 
E: H RL: OF RC:   C 
Cost v= 48.0: 
TD:  L  CDP: ML CR: L IR: L AR: M 
 
 
 
 
Vn9: 55895 - CVE-2011-3192, Apache HTTP Server Byte Range DoS, permits 
attackers to cause a denial of service remotely and gain privileges. 
 
Risk Factor Critical 
 
Intrinsic =7.8: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: N  I:     N A: C 
Time-based 5.8: 
E: U RL: OF RC: C 
Cost v= 82.0: 
TD:  M  CDP: MH CR: H IR: M AR: M 
 
 
 
 
Vn10:18582 - CVE-2007-1741, Apache mod_suexec Multiple Privilege Escalation 
Vulnerabilities. 
 
Risk Factor High 
 
Intrinsic =6.2: 
AV: L AC: H Au: N C: C  I:     C A: C 
Time-based 5.4: 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 77.0: 
TD:  H  CDP:  H CR: H IR: M AR: H 
 
 
 
 
48.08 VnC
82.09 VnC
77.010 VnC
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Vn11:18573 - CVE-2012-1708, Apache mod_negotiation Multi-Line Filename 
Upload Vulnerabilities, permits attackers to impact the integrity of the system  
 
Risk Factor Medium 
 
Intrinsic =4.3: 
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: N  I:     P A: N 
Time-based 3.7: 
E: H RL: OF RC:   C 
Cost v= 51.0: 
TD:  M  CDP: ML CR: L IR: M AR: L 
 
 
 
 
Vn12: 57424 - CVE-2011-3348, Apache 2.2 less than  2.2.21 mod_proxy_ajp, 
permits attackers to cause a denial of service remotely through HTTP requests. 
 
Risk Factor: Low 
 
Intrinsic =4.3: 
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: N  I:     N A: P 
Time-based 3.7: 
E: H RL: OF RC:   C 
Cost v= 18.0: 
TD:  N  CDP: LM CR: L IR: L AR: M 
 
 
 
 
Vn13:12746 - CVE-2003-0310, Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in article 
view.php for eZ publish 2.2 permits attackers to remotely insert illogical web script. 
 
Risk Factor: Medium  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51.011 VnC
18.012 VnC
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Intrinsic = 5.7: 
AV: N AC: M Au: N C: P  I:     P A: N 
Time-based 5.0: 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 54.0: 
TD:  L CDP: LM CR: M IR: M AR: L 
 
 
 
 
Vn14:18753 - CVE-2009- 4484, MySQL less than 5.0.90 / 5.1.43 / 5.5.0-m2 
Multiple Buffer Overflows 
 
Risk Factor Medium 
 
Intrinsic =7.5: 
AV: N AC: L Au: N C: P  I:     P A: P 
Time-based 6.5: 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 65.0: 
TD:  M  CDP:  ND CR: M IR: M AR: M 
 
 
 
Vn15:47620 - CVE-2010-1850 MySQL Community Server less than 5.1.47 / 5.0.91 
Multiple Vulnerabilities permit remote authenticated attackers to run illogical script 
through a COM_FIELD_LIST command. 
 
Risk Factor: Medium 
 
Intrinsic =6: 
AV: N AC: M Au: S C: P  I:     P A: P 
Time-based 5.2: 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 66.0: 
TD:  M  CDP:  MH CR: M IR: M AR: M 
54.013 VnC
65.014 VnC
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Vn16:46895 - CVE-2010-3676, MySQL Community Server less than 5.1.49 
Multiple Vulnerabilities 
 
Risk Factor Low 
 
Intrinsic =4.0: 
AV: N AC: L Au: S C: N  I:     N A: P 
Time-based 3.3: 
E: F RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 38.0: 
TD:  L  CDP:  LM CR: L IR: L AR: M 
 
 
 
 
Vn17:48285 - CVE-2010-2008, MySQL Community Server less than 5.1.48 Denial 
of Service 
 
Risk Factor Low 
 
Intrinsic =3.5: 
AV: N AC: M Au: S C: N  I:     N A: P 
Time-based 3.0: 
E: H RL: OF RC:  C 
Cost v= 23.0: 
TD:  L  CDP:  L CR: L IR: L AR: M 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66.015 VnC
38.016 VnC
23.017 VnC
 267 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D.   R LLEL  OSTR NK EX ERI ENTS 
In this Appendix, a description of our approach and experiments of parallel 
CostRank presented in Chapter-5. 
Sparse matrix decomposition implemented on a link structure of Stanford.edu 
domain crawl, which contains 281903 pages and 2.3 million links. 
Our approach to shorten the size of web crawl is using the MapReduce [Lattanzi, 
Silvio, et al., 2011] method for adequately compressed graphs. 
The MapReduce filtering method using a minimum cut of the graph and reduced 
the estimated number of vertexes and edges to modify the link data composed as 
shown in Figure D-1. 
The MapReduce algorithm processes the input information, which should store in 
the form of Key, value. The calculation continues with sequences, which involve 
three phases of map, shuffle, and cut back. 
 
 
Figure D-1. The subgraph drawn only the edges of weight W, (W/2)+1, (W/2
i+1
) and (W/2
i
)+1 taken from 
[Lattanzi, Silvio, et al., 2011]    
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The modified link data decomposed to Stanford-1 with 0.5M links and 61283 
pages, Stanford-2 with 1.5M links and 183849 pages, Stanford-3 with 1.725M links 
and 214491 pages, Stanford-4 with 2.3M links and 281903 pages, as exhibited in 
Figure D-2.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D-2. The decomposition model for Stanford crawl 
 
 
 
The bulk of the clauses and practical assignment of attack graph ranking used the 
value d= 0.85, but other values could be practiced according to specific 
environments. 
The damping factor is representing the chance of an attacker continuing to fathom 
the current course of the attempt. Therefore, in the context of network: 
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Where n is the number of links point to state x and  N is the total number of states  
in a network representation graph. 
A CostRank assigned to the N sates of the graph, depends on the stochastic 
random walker matrix multiply in the ranking vector, for each step of attack, the 
attacker move with probability P to the next step of the multi - step attack, if a 
dangling state (without out links) reached the attacker needs to move randomly to 
another state  with probability 1. The CostRank of a specific state, represent the 
amount of time and efforts that the attackers spend to exploit the vulnerability to 
achieve that country. 
The CostRank represent a stochastic course of actions of attack graph states, this 
process depends on the graph, the cost vectors and the damping factor.  
The damping factor can take any value in the range of [> 0, <1] and it is important 
to monitor the ranking induced by the mutation of the damping element. 
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1- The experiment to calculate CostRank using a Stanford-1 data link with 
damping factor=0. 85.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d=. 85        
Order CostRank Page      
1 0.028879 http://aa.stanford.edu    
2 0.018288 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/AAfolks.html  
3 0.01761 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/AssistantsAero.html 
4 0.017065 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/EngineerAero.html 
5 0.017027 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/Faculty.html  
6 0.016165 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/FellowsAero.html 
7 0.015583 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/GraduateGuide.html 
8 0.014989 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/Labs.html  
9 0.014572 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/Links.html  
10 0.013452 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/MSAero.html  
11 0.013385 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/News.html  
12 0.012778 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/PhdAero.html  
13 0.012742 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/aacourseinfo.html 
14 0.012526 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/aafaculty.html  
15 0.012398 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/aalabs.html  
16 0.012337 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/admitinfo.html  
17 0.012334 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/courseinfo.html  
18 0.012318 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/draftcourses.html 
19 0.012229 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/labs.html  
20 0.012092 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/prospective.html 
21 0.011911 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/resources.html  
22 0.011873 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/visitday.html   
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2- The experiment to calculate CostRank using Stanford-1 data link with damping 
factor=0.95.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d=.95       
Order CostRank Page     
1 0.018151 http://aa.stanford.edu   
2 0.010391 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/AAfolks.html 
3 0.009599 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/AssistantsAero.html 
4 0.009195 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/EngineerAero.html 
5 0.008988 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/Faculty.html 
6 0.007925 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/FellowsAero.html 
7 0.007743 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/GraduateGuide.html 
8 0.007021 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/Labs.html 
9 0.006595 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/Links.html 
10 0.006053 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/MSAero.html 
11 0.006024 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/News.html 
12 0.005844 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/PhdAero.html 
13 0.005838 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/aacourseinfo.html 
14 0.005458 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/aafaculty.html 
15 0.005221 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/aalabs.html 
16 0.00496 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/admitinfo.html 
17 0.004952 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/courseinfo.html 
18 0.004554 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/draftcourses.html 
19 0.004521 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/labs.html 
20 0.004415 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/prospective.html 
21 0.004194 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/resources.html 
22 0.004082 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/visitday.html 
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3- The experiment to calculate CostRank using Stanford-1 data link with damping 
factor=0.99.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d=.99       
Order CostRank Page     
1 0.013041 http://aa.stanford.edu   
2 0.011202 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/AAfolks.html 
3 0.009913 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/AssistantsAero.html 
4 0.009824 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/EngineerAero.html 
5 0.009607 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/Faculty.html 
6 0.009419 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/FellowsAero.html 
7 0.008052 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/GraduateGuide.html 
8 0.007772 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/Labs.html 
9 0.007169 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/Links.html 
10 0.007082 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/MSAero.html 
11 0.006958 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/News.html 
12 0.006783 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/PhdAero.html 
13 0.006622 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/aacourseinfo.html 
14 0.006151 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/aafaculty.html 
15 0.006058 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/aalabs.html 
16 0.006047 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/admitinfo.html 
17 0.00592 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/courseinfo.html 
18 0.005915 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/draftcourses.html 
19 0.005837 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/labs.html 
20 0.005582 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/prospective.html 
21 0.005394 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/resources.html 
22 0.005354 http://aa.stanford.edu/aeroastro/visitday.html 
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In the experiments, using Stanford-1 link data to compute the CostRank using 
0.85, 0.95, 0.99 damping factors, indicates clearly the ranking values changed 
significantly (not stable) according to the variations of damping factor, please refer 
to Figure D-3. 
The result indicates as well that the damping factor (0.85) is ultimate at least for 
using a cost-centric AG ranking, as the convergence of CostRank algorithm 
iterations increased rapidly, when d=0.85 is used.  
The apprehension of how the ranking value changes according to modified 
damping factors needs to be undertaken to get stable ranking for different 
applications.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D-3. CostRank calculation metric as d varies. 
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APPENDIX E.  TT  K GR  H  O  LEXITY [I    ,  0 0] 
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APPENDIX F.T BLE OF ITER TES FOR  OSTR NK 
 O   T TION    
Iteration CostRank 
1 [ 0.0375 0.0442 0.0438 0.0352 0.0463 0.0608 0.0768 0.0584 0.0719 0.1001 0.1337 0.1413 ] 
2 [ 0.0294 0.0215 0.0252 0.0200 0.0488 0.0635 0.0607 0.0583 0.0546 0.1001 0.1740 0.2456 ] 
3 [ 0.0478 0.0169 0.0123 0.0115 0.0488 0.0635 0.0661 0.0461 0.0545 0.1001 0.1740 0.3197 ] 
4 [ 0.0188 0.0275 0.0096 0.0056 0.0488 0.0635 0.0661 0.0502 0.0431 0.1001 0.1740 0.3197 ] 
5 [ 0.0434 0.0513 0.0501 0.0386 0.0523 0.0701 0.0890 0.0673 0.0825 0.1150 0.1559 0.1642 ] 
6 [ 0.0435 0.0514 0.0503 0.0390 0.0526 0.0703 0.0892 0.0675 0.0828 0.1154 0.1561 0.1645 ] 
7 [ 0.0436 0.0515 0.0505 0.0394 0.0529 0.0705 0.0894 0.0677 0.0831 0.1158 0.1563 0.1648 ] 
8 [ 0.0437 0.0516 0.0507 0.0398 0.0532 0.0707 0.0896 0.0679 0.0834 0.1162 0.1565 0.1651 ] 
9 [ 0.0438 0.0517 0.0509 0.0402 0.0535 0.0709 0.0898 0.0681 0.0837 0.1166 0.1567 0.1654 ] 
10 [ 0.0439 0.0518 0.0511 0.0406 0.0538 0.0711 0.0900 0.0683 0.0840 0.1170 0.1569 0.1657 ] 
11  [ 0.0390 0.0519 0.0513 0.0410 0.0541 0.0713 0.0902 0.0685 0.0843 0.1174 0.1571 0.1660 ] 
12 [ 0.039 0.0519 0.0513 0.041 0.0541 0.0713 0.0902 0.0685 0.0843 0.1174 0.1571 0.166 ] 
13 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
14 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
15 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
16 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
17 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
18 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
19 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
20 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
21 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
22 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
23 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
24 [ 0.0441 0.0520 0.0515 0.0414 0.0544 0.0715 0.0904 0.0687 0.0846 0.1178 0.1573 0.1663 ] 
 
 
 
